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 How and why does legal mobilization for social rights emerge? What explains 
variation in legal mobilization for social rights in terms of who makes claims and on 
which issues? Leveraging comparisons within and across cases, I investigate legal 
mobilization for social rights in two social constitutionalist countries, Colombia and 
South Africa. In Colombia, legal claims to the right to health have become ubiquitous, 
yet relatively few housing rights claims have emerged. In South Africa, on the other 
hand, legal claims to the right to health have been rather limited, focusing on 
HIV/AIDS related issues, while claims to the right to housing predominate. Existing 
theories of legal mobilization rest on implicit claims about subjective beliefs and tend 
to examine only one part of legal mobilization, segmenting off the process by which 
grievances develop from the process by which claims advance through the courts from 
the process by which judges render their decisions. In contrast, this dissertation 
develops a constructivist account of legal mobilization, explicating the central role of 
beliefs and unearthing the importance of repeated interaction between claimants, 
activists, lawyers, and judges for both the filing of rights claims and the official 
response to those claims. 
 Legal mobilization for social rights represents a new phenomenon, wherein both 
ordinary citizens and judicial actors have come to view problems related to access to 
healthcare, housing, social security, and education through the lens of the law, in 
 effect pushing the question of social incorporation into the formal legal sphere. The 
goal of ensuring that each and every Colombian and South African is able to live a life 
of dignity remains unmet, but the legal recognition of social rights in both countries 
has empowered citizens to advance rights claims to the goods and services necessary 
for a good life. This dissertation investigates the changes in beliefs and institutions 
that allowed for this kind of claims-making to emerge, and it considers the manifold 
consequences of this kind of claims-making for state-society relations, access to social 
welfare, and the judicialization of politics.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On a Sunday afternoon in early April, a woman named Doña Beatriz1 told me 
about her life in Aguablanca, the densely populated neighborhood on the outskirts of 
Cali, Colombia, where she lived, operated an informal sewing business out of her 
living room, and weathered as best she could the interrelated threats of violence, 
drugs, and economic insecurity that swirled around her. Social service provision in 
Aguablanca is sorely lacking, and access to doctors and hospitals is particularly 
difficult. The state’s presence appears to be limited to two sets of police officers, who 
– according to residents of the neighborhood – punch, kick, and shoot first, asking 
questions later, if at all. Doña Beatriz described how after she developed a problem 
with her trachea that made it difficult to breath, she attempted but failed to attain what 
she deemed adequate medical attention. In the midst of this difficult situation, what 
did she do? Surprisingly, she turned to the courts, filing a claim to the constitutional 
right to health through a legal procedure called the tutela, because, as she put it, 
“Everything happens through the tutela.”2 This kind of legal claim is understood as the 
only way to gain access to healthcare services. 
Every year since the tutela was created in 1991, thousands upon thousands of 
citizens have used this mechanism to make claims to their constitutional rights. In fact, 
in 2008, nearly 143,000 Colombians filed legal claims regarding the right to 
                                                 
1 The names of respondents in this chapter have been changed in an effort to protect their anonymity.  
2 Aguablanca interview 6. 
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healthcare using the tutela procedure – like Doña Beatriz. Not only did this occur in a 
country in which citizens routinely disparage the legal system, expressing little to no 
confidence in judges, but even more surprisingly, actors generally not associated with 
constitutional rights talk, such as doctors, pharmaceutical companies, and insurance 
companies, openly encouraged citizens to file these claims. A Constitutional Court 
decision in that year spurred massive changes to the Colombian healthcare system, 
changes that were debated and drafted not within the halls of the legislature but in the 
courthouse. Formal claims-making to the right to health continue at rates unheard of 
elsewhere in the world.  
In South Africa, by contrast, legal claims-making to the right to housing is 
quite common. Patrick and Sifiso, two members of the Durban, South Africa-based 
shack-dwellers’ movement, Abahlali baseMjondolo, described to me the ups and 
downs of their many efforts to improve the conditions of those living in informal 
settlements across the country.3 These efforts have continued despite the fact that 
Abahlali members have been subject to acts of intimidation, assault, and even 
politically-motivated killings.4 While Abahlali engages in disruptive protests among 
numerous other tactics, its signature victory came through a successful legal challenge 
to the KwaZulu-Natal Elimination and Prevention of the Re-emergence of Slums Act 
(“Slums Act”) in the late 2000s. Sifiso reflected on this legal victory, noting, “Luckily, 
                                                 
3 Interview 2017.11.29.10.02_01. 
4 In fact, the killing of Abahlali members has been linked to members of the African National Congress 
(various interviews with members of Abahlali; GroundUp 2018). Further, the movement’s founder, 
S’bu Zikode, has told media outlets that “Everyone who joins our struggle accepts this risk. And we tell 
comrades from the onset that when they sign up to join Abahlali, they could die. We have buried 
comrades. We continue to bury comrades” (Kulkarni 2018). 
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our courts were there with us.” The Constitutional Court decided in favor of Abahlali, 
holding that the Act was unconstitutional and that it would result in widespread 
evictions without the provision of alternative accommodation. In this case, housing 
and eviction policy was restructured as a result of formal legal review. This was one of 
well over one hundred housing rights cases heard in the post-apartheid period, a 
quantity that dwarfs all other social rights claims.  
The most famous housing rights case in South Africa was decided years 
earlier, in 2000. Irene Grootboom, with about 900 others, had filed a legal claim 
regarding the right to adequate housing when faced with a potential eviction from their 
squatter settlement on land earmarked for low-income housing outside of the city of 
Cape Town. The Constitutional Court ruled in favor of Grootboom, staying the 
eviction and requiring that the state develop an emergency housing policy; however, 
eight years after the ruling, Grootboom died, still homeless and living in abject 
poverty.5 The judgment in the subsequent Treatment Action Campaign case 
nevertheless cited Grootboom as precedent and mandated the government provision of 
an antiretroviral drug that inhibits mother to child transmission of HIV, an act thought 
to have saved many thousands of lives (Langford 2014). A series of housing rights 
cases emerged, including the Slums Act case, and this set of cases dramatically 
affected both state housing policy and the protections afforded to individuals in the 
face of potential evictions. Yet, while those living in informal settlements in and 
                                                 
5 Importantly, the Court’s decision included no promise to Grootboom that she or any of the other 
claimants had a right to receive a house as such, instead it declared that the government had the 
obligation to create reasonable policy directed toward the realization of access to housing, particularly 
for people like Grootboom, who number among the most vulnerable South Africans. 
  4 
around the city of Durban – including members of Abahlali baseMjondolo, like 
Patrick and Sifiso – have vocally adopted the language of rights and handily navigated 
the legal system, not all those living informally have been able to leverage the legal 
system in their favor. 
These are just a few examples of variation in legal mobilization6 to assert 
rights to elements of social citizenship.7 These instances of legal mobilization move 
beyond traditional understandings of citizenship rights defined in narrow legal and 
political terms. As such, they reflect claims to citizenship rights that include social 
benefits and new forms of social inclusion or incorporation. Deborah Yashar (2005: 6, 
emphasis in original) notes that citizenship regimes determine “who has political 
membership, which rights they possess, and how interest intermediation with the state 
is structured.” She continues, “As citizenship regimes have changed over time, so too 
have the publicly sanctioned players, rules of the game, and likely (but not 
preordained) outcomes.” Most of the time, citizenship regimes have been oriented 
around specific civil and political rights, with only limited recognition of social 
citizenship rights. The recognition of social citizenship rights and claims-making 
regarding those rights signal a shift in the ways in which societal and state actors 
interact. 
                                                 
6 Legal mobilization refers to “the use of law in an explicit, self-conscious way through the invocation 
of a formal institutional mechanism” (Lehoucq and Taylor 2018: 4). In other words, it involves claims-
making in the courts and quasi-judicial bodies, such as an ombudsperson’s office. I explore the contours 
of legal mobilization in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
7 Marshall (1950: 11) defines social citizenship as encompassing everything “from the right to a 
modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to 
live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.” I describe social 
citizenship further in Chapter 3. 
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Traditionally, social incorporation or the provision of social welfare in 
developing societies has occurred through one of three dominant models of state-
society relations: patron-clientelism, corporatism, or the market alternative. In a 
setting defined by patron-clientelism, social goods are not universal rights, but 
discretionary benefits that are selectively allocated by political authorities or brokers 
to individuals in exchange for political loyalty (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; 
Auyero 2001; Chandra 2004; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes et al. 2013). 
Corporatism, on the other hand, enables access to social goods through segmented 
linkages between states or ruling parties and organized sectors of the formal economy, 
particularly workers with membership in labor unions (Schmitter 1974; Collier and 
Collier 1979; Yashar 1999). Finally, the neoliberal or market alternative holds that the 
marketplace and the private sector facilitate more just, rational, and efficient provision 
of social goods than the state. In this system, social goods become available to citizens 
on the basis of their ability to pay the market rate, with the state providing a minimal 
safety net for those who are incapable (e.g., due to age or disability) of meeting their 
needs in the marketplace (Hall and Soskice 2001; Adésínà 2009). 
Recently, however, many countries have adopted constitutions that include 
substantial social rights protections for all citizens. This social constitutionalist 
commitment to promoting access to social goods on the basis of an understanding of 
inherent human dignity marks a stark difference from these traditional models. Social 
constitutionalism is grounded in principles of universal rights, in contrast to traditional 
models which offered social inclusion in a selective, discretionary, or politically 
mediated fashion that excluded large numbers of citizens – in particular, those who 
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lacked the partisan ties, organizational advocates, or market leverage required to 
access social benefits. Moreover, social constitutionalism assigns the courts a 
prominent role in processing and adjudicating claims to social goods, claims that 
traditionally have been channeled through political parties, legislative bodies, and state 
or municipal social service agencies, or simply depoliticized through their relegation 
to the private sphere of commodified market exchange. 
What does it mean for the state to commit to formal legal promises to 
universal, de-commodified social incorporation? The consequences are potentially 
widespread. Questions of state-society relations and social incorporation have long 
implicated concerns about democratic engagement, state capacity and institutional 
performance, and welfare provision. Social constitutionalism opens up the possibility 
for new social actors to make new types of claims to social goods through the process 
of legal mobilization, while simultaneously raising new concerns about the nature of 
rights and the appropriate role of the courts in democratic states. 
Comparative social policy scholarship has tended to focus on the differences in 
and determinants of formal welfare policies or types of welfare states (e.g., Esping-
Andersen 1990; Powell and Barrientos 2004; Lynch 2006; Pribble 2011; Huber and 
Stephens 2012). Another strand of scholarship has explicitly examined why 
developing countries have failed to construct robust social welfare protections 
comparable to those in Western Europe (e.g., Gough et al. 2004; Haggard and 
Kaufman 2008; Rudra 2008; Mares and Carnes 2009; Huber and Stephens 2012; 
Garay 2016). Further work on developing countries has explored the role of 
conditional cash transfers as part of social welfare policy (Valencia Lomelí 2008; 
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Fiszbein et al. 2009; Ferguson 2015). Scholars have also begun to identify informal 
dimensions of welfare policy (Holland 2017), the role of non-state actors in the 
provision of social goods and social programs (e.g., Wood and Gough 2006; Martinez 
Franzoni 2008; Cammett and MacLean 2011), and the importance of shared histories 
and social identities for social policy development (Singh 2015; Wilfahrt 2018). 
According to these accounts, with greater or lesser success, citizens pursue 
such channels as voting, lobbying, and otherwise pressuring elected officials to voice 
their preferences or make social welfare demands, or they look inward, to self-help or 
friends and family. In particular, existing studies of the development of social policy 
regimes emphasize the electoral determinants of social policy change or policy 
enforcement (e.g., Iversen 2005; Mares and Carnes 2009; Garay 2016; Holland 2017), 
the importance of the preferences of employers (e.g., Swenson 2002; Mares 2003), or 
the strength of the political Left (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 
2012). Yet, with the emergence of social constitutionalism, issues related to the 
provision of social goods were thrust into the legal sphere. On paper, the guarantees of 
social constitutionalism are universal in nature, though, like other universalistic 
guarantees, access to these social goods and services in practice often remains less 
than desired. In this context, social policy expands and contracts in part on the basis of 
the ability of individuals or groups to make legal claims and receive a positive 
response from courts. Here we see a new form of selectivity, one that differs from the 
selectivity inherent to clientelism, corporatism, or market-based access to social 
goods. In addition, the social constitutionalist model raises the question of who or 
what institutions will enforce the social rights claims that judiciaries may assert, but 
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cannot on their own deliver. A discussion of legal claims-making related to social 
goods, however, has remained beyond the scope of these studies on social policy – a 
gap this project seeks to fill. 
While social rights appear in international law as a single, coherent idea, 
providing the minimum conditions necessary for a dignified life and conferring both 
positive and negative obligations on the state, the goods that comprise social rights 
relate to the market in very different ways and are claimable in very different ways as 
well. These goods can be constructed as public, private, or a mix of the two, and the 
extent to which the state engages in the public provision of each good may vary across 
time and place.8 For instance, in the present day, most states provide for some degree 
of basic education and require school attendance, often through the end of secondary 
school. On the other hand, states vary substantially in terms of investment in large-
scale public infrastructure and investment designed to provide access to other social 
goods. Healthcare can also be understood primarily as a private good, a market 
commodity accessible by individuals through private insurance plans, clinics, and 
hospitals, or as a mix of the two. The same can be said for housing. Generally 
speaking, the market alternative, clientelist, and corporatist models do not treat 
healthcare or housing as public goods in that some measure of formal excludability 
persists, which is not true of social constitutionalism. Social constitutionalism and 
ensuing legal mobilization for social rights, thus, fundamentally shift the boundaries of 
social policy and the nature of social incorporation. 
                                                 
8 As Holland and Ross Schneider (2018) discuss, the extent to which the state delves into a welfare-
related issue may depend in large part of whether the good falls within an “easy” forms or “hard” form 
of social policy provision.  
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I examine the construction and re-construction of notions of obligation, 
specifically with respect to the conditions under which the state has an obligation to 
protect the social needs of its citizens in Colombia and South Africa. Focusing on one 
particular site of contention over these notions of obligation – the legal sphere – I 
investigate the dynamics of legal mobilization for social claims in the context of social 
constitutionalism. In the process, I address issues related to the functioning of 
democratic institutions and the actors that operate within them, state-society relations, 
social welfare provision, and institutional change over time. The project turns on two 
central research questions: (1) How and why does legal mobilization for social rights 
emerge? (2) What explains variation in legal mobilization for social rights in terms of 
who makes claims and on which issues? Throughout this dissertation, I develop what I 
call the “constructivist account of legal mobilization.” In doing so, I demonstrate how 
a careful consideration of the beliefs held by both citizens and judicial actors about the 
law, rights, and the state – and how those beliefs were constructed through myriad 
interactions between individual citizens, social groups, and judicial authorities – is 
crucial to answering these questions.  
 
Overview of the Argument: The Constructivist Account of Legal Mobilization 
 
Early law and society research, especially at the theoretical level and in studies 
focused on the United States, noted the status quo bias of law (e.g., Scheingold 1974; 
Bourdieu 1987; Kelman 1987; Rosenberg 1991), particularly the propensity of law to 
favor the more powerful in society (Galanter 1974; Nonet and Selznick 2001). 
Subsequent comparative scholarship has found significant but limited potential of 
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litigation-driven social change (McCann 1994; Epp, 1998; de Sousa Santos and 
Rodríguez Garavito 2005; Gargarella, Domingo, and Roux 2006; Gauri and Brinks 
2008; Yamin and Gloppen 2011; Young 2012). For these authors, the question shifted 
from whether law ever results in substantive change at the societal level to which 
conditions produce opportunities for individuals or movements to engage the legal 
system, legal processes, or legal language to advance their goals. Still, these authors 
acknowledge that progress through the judicial system is no easy task. Scholars of 
social movements and judicial politics have pointed to the importance of grievances 
(Smelser 1963; Snow and Soule 2010; Simmons 2014; but see McCarthy and Zald 
1977), support structures (Epp 1998), political opportunity structures (McAdam 1982; 
Tarrow 1994; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), and legal opportunity structures 
(Hilson 2002; Wilson and Rodríguez Cordero 2006; Vanhala 2012, 2018a), comprised 
of features of the legal system (Michel and Sikkink, 2013) and judicial behaviors 
(Epstein and Knight 1998; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 1999; Helmke 2005; 
Hilbink 2012). These structural and institutional variables provide incentives and 
disincentives for action, but they do not in fact cause agents to behave in particular 
ways. A turn to the beliefs that agents hold helps to address this gap. 
The main theoretical claim of this dissertation is that while there are many 
theories of why legal mobilization occurs or why it is successful, all rest on implicit 
claims about subjective beliefs and all miss the interactive effect of different kinds of 
situated actors in context. In short, beliefs both underpin and mediate existing theories 
about the use of the law. Over the course of this study, I advance my constructivist 
account of legal mobilization, specifying how beliefs held by claimants and by judges 
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interact and influence existing theories of legal claims-making. Combinations of 
institutional and structural factors may create or close off opportunities for action, but 
without consideration of the beliefs held by constitutional designers, judges, and 
individual claimants, these factors offer an incomplete understanding of legal 
mobilization and cannot account for the variation in legal mobilization over time and 
across policy issues. Importantly, beliefs provide the impetus for action, encouraging 
individuals and groups to understand and respond to external stimuli in particular 
ways. These responses then augment or challenge existing institutional arrangements, 
leading to institutional continuity on the one hand, or institutional change on the other. 
This project investigates how the interaction between changes in ideas and changes in 
institutions triggers legal mobilization,9 focusing on the antecedent conditions that 
give rise to the constitutional recognition of guarantees to social rights, as well as the 
response of legal actors and everyday citizens.  
 
On Social Rights, Social Policy, and Democracy 
 
Social rights refer to “claims to change the rules that govern the production and 
distribution of basic economic and social goods” (Gauri and Brinks 2008: 13) or to “a 
desired set of social outcomes – roughly, that the rights holders at no time should lack 
access to levels deemed adequate of subsistence, housing, health care, education, and 
safety or to the means of obtaining the same (say, through available, remunerated 
work) for themselves and their dependents” (Michelman 2008: 5).10 In other words, 
                                                 
9 Blyth (2002) investigates a similar dynamic with respect to economic ideas and institutions.  
10 Throughout this dissertation I refer to social rights rather than the broader category of socioeconomic 
rights, which also includes rights regarding conditions of employment (see, e.g., Articles 6-8 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights). Both of these definitions actually 
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they refer to the conditions of access to things like food and water, health, housing, 
and education, the goods that form the foundation of an individual’s livelihood and 
ability to participate in social and political life. Arguments about the meaning of social 
rights, the obligations they imply, and their feasibility abound (see, e.g., Beetham 
1995; Sunstein 2005; Neier 2006; Michelman 2008; Tushnet 2008; Langford 2009a; 
Liebenberg 2010). These debates are negotiated and renegotiated, settled and resettled 
through political contestation, as states recognize (or do not recognize) rights in 
particular ways in particular historical moments and citizens make claims to those 
rights and push their boundaries (or do not). 
In recognizing social rights, the state in question acknowledges both the 
content of the rights and some notion of obligation. Whether or not a state recognizes 
an obligation – and whether that obligation is negative or positive in nature – to 
protect, fulfill, respect, promote, or otherwise advance social rights is secondary to the 
initial recognition of the scope or content of these rights. Yet, the mode of recognition 
is central to the ways in which individuals and social groups can make formal rights 
claims. States have increasingly constitutionalized recognitions of social rights, often 
taking the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) as 
the definitional starting point. The national level, however, features substantial 
variation in the institutional arrangements and practices of different states regarding 
social rights protections (Langford 2009b). There are four primary models of 
recognition of these rights:  constitutional codification, acknowledgment as directive 
                                                 
refer to socioeconomic rights, even though the definitions seem better suited to the more limited 
category of social rights. 
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principles of state policy, inclusion in statutory law, and non-recognition. Within these 
models of recognition, states may declare social rights justiciable,11 justiciable insofar 
as they are connected to or emanate from other rights (usually the right to life or right 
to dignity), justiciable for particular disadvantaged groups, or not justiciable at all.12 
This project focuses on the first model – that of constitutional codification.  
There are several reasons to examine the claims to constitutionally codified 
social rights. First, for those without access to health, housing, food, water, sanitation, 
and other social welfare goods, life is remarkably insecure. Absent a fundamental 
level of access to welfare, individuals cannot participate fully in political, social, or 
economic life. Second, a significant part of the transition away from an 
unrepresentative and violent state involves the shift from ensuring only life for some 
to ensuring livelihood for all, or in other words, developing wide protections for social 
rights. Moreover, states have increasingly recognized social rights in their 
constitutions and defined themselves as “social states under the rule of law” rather 
than simply “states under the rule of law.” These shifts in constitutional norms suggest 
a commitment to social inclusion and the extension of social citizenship (Marshall 
1950). At least on paper, these commitments to address inequality and specifically the 
unequal access to social goods dramatically change the nature of state-citizen 
relations. Here, poverty and inequality become not simply the byproducts of economic 
or social relations, but evidence of the failure of the government to live up to its 
obligations.  
                                                 
11 Justiciability refers to whether or not the claim can be heard in a court of law. 
12 Interestingly, in the case of the United States, social rights recognitions tend to appear in state 
constitutions rather than at the national level. For more, see Zackin (2013). 
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Demands to social goods through the legal claims, then, demonstrate the ways 
in which social policy is understood to be inadequate. The ability of the poor to 
influence social policy historically has been limited due to challenges to effective 
political mobilization, including but not limited to labor informality, diverse and even 
contradictory interests, and exclusionary or clientelistic political contexts (e.g., 
Weyland 1996; Cross 1998; Roberts 1998, 2002; Kurtz 2004; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2007; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Abdulai and Hickey 2016).13 Considering the 
limitations facing the poor and marginalized, social constitutionalism and legal 
mobilization potentially offer citizens who are otherwise cut off from formal channels 
of political access the chance to express need or discontent, an opportunity largely 
unavailable for individuals in the context of other modes of social incorporation. In 
this view, the courts serve the interests of the poor, perhaps more so than any other 
democratic institution, contrary to traditional views on the judiciary. Traditionally, 
though, courts are cast as conservative bastions of the old order, useful for advancing 
elite interests such as property rights protections, but hardly suited to defending 
individual or group rights to social needs like healthcare and housing (Galanter 1974; 
Scheingold 1974; Rosenberg 1991; Nonet and Selznick 2001). Further, some scholars 
point to the dangers of “counter-majoritarianism” (Bickel 1962), or the possibility that 
special interest groups representing the preferences of the few win out in the courts at 
the expense of the interests of the general population. The extent to which social 
constitutionalism contributes to the deepening of democracy or, in fact, thwarts 
                                                 
13 Though see Garay (2016) and Holland (2017) for accounts of how the poor or marginalized have, 
under certain circumstances, more influence on social policy than would be expected. 
  15 
democratic processes is an open empirical question, one that ought to be examined 
closely across contexts. 
 
Research Methods: Logic of Comparison and Inquiry 
 
At its most abstract, this dissertation involves a set of layered comparisons – it 
is a cross-national, cross-sector study of legal mobilization for social rights in 
Colombia and South Africa over the duration of the most recent constitutional periods 
in each country. Legal mobilization for social rights could occur in all countries;14 
however, I restrict my study to social constitutionalist countries. Social 
constitutionalism is a process characterized by constitutional reform to expand 
recognition of rights, particularly social rights, and to grant review powers to the 
judiciary.15 When constitutions codify social rights, they set out a specific way of 
understanding the state’s responsibilities vis-à-vis its citizens and create the possibility 
of mobilization around these rights.  
Daniel Brinks, Varun Gauri, and Kyle Shen (2015: 294) summarize the 
historical and political context in which social constitutionalism emerged, noting that: 
A series of events – the dismantling of many European welfare states, the end 
of the Cold War and the incorporation of the ‘Second World’s’ concern for 
welfare rights, the failure of earlier heterodox attempts to ensure a general 
                                                 
14 For example, the United States Constitution does not explicitly recognize social rights, but cases like 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1970), which at its core focuses on the right to 
education, have advanced to the level of the Supreme Court. 
15 See Angel-Cabo and Lovera (2015) for a discussion of social constitutionalism in the Latin American 
context in particular. Others refer to new constitutionalism instead (Hirschl 2004; Gill and Cutler 2015) 
and even neo-constitutionalism (Urueña 2013: 38). I adopt the term social constitutionalism because it 
more clearly describes the change enacted by these constitutional reforms – states are redefined as 
social states under the rule of law rather than simply new states. South Africa’s experience is often 
defined as an experiment in transformative constitutionalism (e.g., Davis and Klare 2010), but the 
elements of this constitutional reform result in a social constitution. In short, social constitutionalism is 
the most substantive way to think about this process. See also Bonilla (2013) for a more general 
discussion of constitutionalism in the Global South. 
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level of social welfare, and general disillusionment with neoliberal market 
prescriptions for bringing prosperity to all – seemed to call for a new approach 
to social democratic politics. 
 
In this context, more and more states created new constitutional courts or 
constitutional chambers within existing courts and codified social rights, including the 
rights to health and housing. In fact, most of the constitutional reforms of the late 
1980s through the early 2000s implicate some sense of social constitutionalism, 
suggesting a shift in constitutional models. One way to get a rough idea of whether or 
not a country has adopted this social constitutionalist model is to check for 
constitutional recognition of the rights to health and housing and the creation of a 
Constitutional Court. Admittedly, this is a rather static and superficial way to examine 
social constitutionalism, but it does allow us at a general level to identify the set of 
countries defined by social constitutionalism. Currently, 133 countries recognize the 
right to health, 74 recognize the right to housing, and 94 have Constitutional Courts 
(Constitute Project 2018). These countries span Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, 
Europe, and even much of Asia. 
I selected Colombia and South Africa following the logic of contextualized 
comparisons and analytically parallel cases (Locke and Thelen 1995; Simmons 
2016).16 Scholarship in comparative politics traditionally has drawn on some variant 
of Mill’s methods to facilitate case selection for “controlled comparisons.” Richard 
Locke and Kathleen Thelen (1995), who are careful to note the utility of matched 
comparisons – whether most similar or most different – also identify three key 
                                                 
16 Of the “four traditions of validation” identified by Seawright and Collier (2014: 126), the 
contextualized comparison approach falls within the “case-based tradition,” along with other 
comparative case study methods and historical institutional work. 
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limitations in the approach: (1) “these analyses often portray a set of external pressures 
(e.g., increased international competition, technological innovation, or industrial 
restructuring) as equally pervasive or intense to all national economies,” (2) 
“traditional analyses often obscure stark differences in starting points and hence the 
significance of the changes,” and (3) “traditional comparisons often assume that the 
same practice has the same meaning or valence across the various countries” (339-40).  
Beyond these general limitations of Mill’s methods, I chose to adopt the 
contextualized comparative approach, because both a most similar systems design or a 
most different systems design could apply to social constitutionalism in Colombia and 
South Africa, depending on how one truncates the process. The adoption of social 
constitutionalism is indicative of a similar outcome resulting from very different 
political contexts, which would call for a most different systems design. The 
subsequent patterns in claims-making better fit a most similar systems design, where 
similar constitutions prompt health rights claims in Colombia and housing rights 
claims in South Africa. I seek to explore the entirety of the process of social 
constitutionalism; thus, I move away from a classic controlled comparison. 
A contextual approach allows for the examination of the differences that 
emerge within relatively similar processes. Here, the idea is to identify similar 
processes at work and explore the unfolding of those processes in their social, 
political, and historical contexts, rather than assuming those contexts away or 
flattening them into discrete variables. Erica Simmons (2016: 31) explains:  
We choose cases where we see similar dynamics or processes at work, 
allowing ourselves the flexibility to identify complex causal processes as they 
unfold. From this in-depth knowledge, we can develop portable insights. These 
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insights are not contingent on problematic assumptions about what the 
theoretically relevant variation that needs to be controlled is or whether the 
same empirical phenomena work in the same ways across contexts. 
 
This approach could be understood as a variant of the “paired comparison” (Tarrow 
2010)17 that effectively “relaxes” the assumption of control integral to Mill’s methods. 
The focus is on processes as they unfold in expected or unexpected ways, rather than 
on pre-specified variables whose influence is assumed to be accounted for due to the 
combination of cases. By attending to how processes unfold researchers are able to 
pay more attention to context, which may in fact be crucial to understanding the cases 
under investigation. Further, as Erica Simmons and Nicolas Smith (2017: 126) 
advocate, the contextualized comparison approach allows for “comparison with an 
ethnographic sensibility,” which involves “being sensitive to how informants make 
sense of their worlds and incorporating meaning into our analyses.” In this case, social 
constitutionalism – both in terms of the process of creating new constitutional texts 
and the process of the social and institutional embedding this form of 
constitutionalism – serves as the process under investigation. I seek to understand the 
process of social constitutionalism in context, identifying both emergent similarities 
and differences between the constitutional projects as they are understood, 
implemented, and contested in Colombia and South Africa.18 
                                                 
17 Contextualized comparisons could, in theory, involve more than two cases, though the ability of the 
researcher to consider in-depth the conditions and processes under investigation diminishes as the 
number of cases increases. 
18 Following alternative logics of case selection, scholars have also examined South Africa and various 
middle-income Latin American countries – often, but not always, Brazil – in other studies (e.g., 
Seidman 1994; Marx 1998; Lieberman 2003, 2009; Zuern 2011; Bonilla 2013; Garay 2016). 
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 This approach is consistent with what Sean Yom (2015) has called “inductive 
iteration,” which explicitly acknowledges that the practice of conducting research 
often differs from the kinds of deductive templates implied by controlled qualitative 
comparisons (as well as statistical analyses).19 The practice of inductive iteration 
involves beginning with “hunches and constantly revising […] propositions in 
response to unexpected discoveries,” and it ends only after “the researcher determines 
that a theoretically grounded and internally robust explanation has coalesced for 
outcomes of interest” (Yom 2015: 616, 618). In other words, rather than assuming that 
all relevant factors will be known ex ante, derived from existing literature, both the 
method of contextualized comparisons and the process of inductive iteration hold that 
data collection, theory generation, and theory testing are related in a recursive fashion.  
 To summarize, the project involves a contextualized comparison of the 
embracing, embedding, and enacting of social constitutionalism in Colombia and 
South Africa. I selected the cases of Colombia and South Africa not on the basis of an 
ability to control away existing explanations for legal mobilization, but with the goal 
of examining how seemingly similar processes emerge and develop in different ways 
in different contexts. Within this national-level comparison, I compare legal claims-
making related to different social rights in each country, thus leveraging comparisons 
within and across cases to help me understand the dynamic process of legal 
mobilization. The project relies on the practice of inductive iteration, which allows for 
                                                 
19 As Yom (2015: 616) notes, “Inductive iteration is not so much a new technique [as] the formalization 
of existing practices collected from different methodological traditions.” 
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the continuous updating and incorporation of propositions about legal mobilization 
that surface through the process of conducting research.  
 
Cases: Colombia and South Africa, and the Rights to Health and Housing 
Colombia and South Africa appear very similar with respect to structural 
indicators measuring economic and human development, inequality, and levels of 
violence over the last three decades (see Figures 1.1-1.4 below). Yet, even in the midst 
of these structural similarities, the two countries have been defined by substantially 
different state configurations, different party systems, and different historical legacies. 
The South African National Party implemented apartheid in 1948, developing a state 
that at the same time was highly legalistic, violent, discriminatory (toward non-white 
South Africans) and featured an interventionist, welfare-oriented economy policy (for 
white South Africans) (e.g., Abel 1995; Meierhenrich 2008; Nattrass and Seekings 
2011). Just ten years later, a different form of exclusionary governance was formed in 
Colombia, with the National Front Agreement, which mandated power sharing 
between the Liberal and Conservative Parties and further marginalized those outside 
of these traditional networks of power. Around the same time, guerrilla groups took up 
arms in a revolutionary challenge to the state (e.g., Palacios 2006; Tate 2007). Just as 
apartheid and the anti-apartheid struggle indelibly marked South African political 
development, so too did the protracted war between the revolutionary Left and the 
state, albeit in different ways. Following the end of apartheid, the African National 
Congress has dominated South African politics, certainly at the national level and to a 
large extent at the provincial level, rendering the country a de facto one-party 
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democracy. On the other hand, the historical dominance of the Liberal and 
Conservative parties in Colombia has faltered, with the Colombian party system 
veering toward deinstitutionalization (Mainwaring 2006; Morgan 2013; Albarracín et 
al. 2018).  
Figure 1.1. GDP/Capita   Figure 1.2. Human Development Index 
  
Figure 1.3. GINI Score   Figure 1.4. Homicides per 100k People 
          
Citizens in both Colombia and South Africa pushed for fundamental changes 
to the state, and especially its foundational legal order in the early 1990s, and in 
response, policymakers adopted new constitutions in both countries. As in South 
Africa, Colombia historically had been defined by its long-standing – if differently 
operationalized – commitment to formalism in law. Yet, the combination of decades 
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of war between Leftist guerrillas and the state that showed little sign of abating, a 
consistently unresponsive legislature, and the emergence of a student movement, 
comprised largely of law students, resulted in demand for a new legal experiment, one 
that ultimately would recognize a new set of rights and empower the judiciary (Dugas 
2001; Lemaitre 2009). Interestingly, as Jens Meierhenrich (2008) demonstrates, in 
South Africa, features of the apartheid state actually promoted shared stabilizing 
expectations among elites, many of whom trained as lawyers, about the role of law in 
the transition to inclusive democracy. In this context, a basic level of confidence in the 
idea of law and constitutional rights permeated throughout society, regardless of race. 
Further, the Constitutional Court – at least initially – was understood and understood 
itself to be engaging in a joint constitutional project with the other branches of 
government (Fowkes 2016). Considering these factors, the empowerment of the 
courts, the recognition of social rights, and citizen trust in the legal process are less 
surprising that they might initially appear.  
These contrasting combinations of structural and institutional factors provide 
the background for legal mobilization for social rights throughout the 1990s, 2000s, 
and 2010s in both Colombia and South Africa. Within the similar adoption of social 
constitutionalist models by these two countries, important differences emerge in terms 
of institutional design and development. I will explore both the differences and 
commonalities in the unfolding of social constitutionalism in more detail in the 
empirical chapters of this dissertation. Deserving special mention, however, are the 
differences in institutional mechanisms to expand immediate rights protections and 
access to the courts.  
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In Colombia, the acción de tutela, at least in theory, allows all citizens to make 
claims on the courts, as long as those claims refer to “fundamental” rights. Ordinary 
courts must prioritize tutelas over other legal claims, and all tutelas are sent to the 
Constitutional Court for the possibility of review. As such, the tutela procedure offers 
individuals the chance to make claims without paying legal fees or enduring the time-
intensive process of traditional litigation. Initially, social rights in the Colombian 
Constitution were not recognized as fundamental or fully justiciable in themselves, 
which means that, formally, individuals could not use the tutela to make claims about 
social rights; instead, only civil and political rights were considered justiciable. Over 
time, however, judges reinterpreted social rights as justiciable, at least in some cases. 
Between 1992 and 2016, the Constitutional Court heard an average of 243 abstract 
review claims and reviewed an average of 709 tutela claims per year. According to 
data provided by the Defensoría del Pueblo, health tutelas alone made up on average 
30% of all tutelas filed in the country between 1999 and 2012, and a sample of tutelas 
reviewed by the Constitutional Court reveals about 25% of these reviewed tutelas 
related to the right to health between 1992 and 2016. In contrast, only 3.4% of these 
reviewed tutelas claimed the right to housing.20  
South Africa’s new constitution, on the other hand, immediately recognized all 
enumerated rights as justiciable, including social rights. Rather than creating a new 
legal mechanism to expand access to rights, the South African Constitution lowered 
standing requirements, as described in Article 38. These lowered standing 
                                                 
20 The Defensoría del Pueblo does not track the number of housing rights tutelas nationwide, arguably 
reflecting the fact that few tutelas overall pertain to housing. 
  24 
requirements allow individuals not directly affected by a rights violation to file claims 
on behalf of those who are. Further, though most constitutional claims must begin at 
the High Court level, under certain conditions, claimants can directly petition the 
Constitutional Court, asking the Court to serve as the first and last instance because of 
the urgency of the issue in question, though this direct access mechanism has been 
used quite infrequently. The courts have adopted what is known as the 
“reasonableness” standard for social rights, examining whether government policies 
and actions are justifiable in light of the state’s constitutional duty to “take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realization of these rights.” Between 1995 and 2016, the Constitutional 
Court heard an average of 30 cases per year, issuing about three decisions per year on 
cases involving the right to housing, education, social security, health, or water.21 
Housing cases make up 61% of all social rights cases (across the High Court, Supreme 
Court of Appeal, and Constitutional Court) and 52% of social rights cases at the 
Constitutional Court, eclipsing all other types of social rights cases.  
The cross-national comparison between Colombia and South Africa, in 
combination with the cross-sector comparison between the rights to health and 
housing demonstrate that there is no necessary feature of any one social right that 
makes it uniquely amenable to legal mobilization. While legal claims to the right to 
health predominate in Colombia, housing rights claims are much more common in 
                                                 
21 Importantly, as Justice Richard Goldstone (2008: x) notes, “rights are realized not only when the 
officials responsible for providing them take appropriate action in consequence of litigation but, more 
frequently, when they do so in order to preempt litigation.” 
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South Africa. These layered contextualized comparisons reveal the contingent and 
context-specific nature of legal mobilization for social rights. 
 
Sources of Data  
In this project, I examine the beliefs that both societal and judicial actors hold 
about the law, rights, and the state, and the relationship between those beliefs, the 
social construction of legal grievances, legal opportunities, and judicial behavior. I am 
interested not only in variation in beliefs about law, but also in where these beliefs 
came from, or how ideological framing, social mobilization, and political conflict and 
compromise resulted in shifts in understandings about law, rights, and citizenship over 
time. In short, why did both societal and judicial actors who have not traditionally 
thought that courts have a role to play in adjudicating social rights claims come to 
think that they did? How did these understandings vary across actors, rights, and 
contexts? 
In order to investigate these questions, I draw on three principal sources of 
data:  legal documents, interviews, and surveys. I first established general trends in 
mobilization in each country and then examined patterns of mobilization and beliefs in 
particular communities in closer detail, incorporating inductively-gleaned insights as 
the data collection progressed. An analysis of archival documents regarding the 
official constitutional debates, as well as of legal documents of cases that reached the 
Constitutional Courts, from the time the Courts began accepting cases (1992 for 
Colombia and 1995 for South Africa), helped me to determine trends in the beliefs that 
undergird mobilization. By examining patterns in claims-making across policy 
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spheres, the spatial distribution of claimants, and the variation in legal outcomes and 
judicial reasoning, I was able to properly situate information revealed in interviews.  
After uncovering general patterns, I could then determine the contemporary 
history of variation in legal mobilization, especially regarding the timing of different 
claims. In Colombia, this involved retrieving documents from the Asamblea Nacional 
Constituyente, which are available online and at the Biblioteca Luis Ángel Arango. I 
collected legal documents in two ways. All decisions are available online, which 
allowed me to scrape a random sample of tutela from the Constitutional Court’s 
website and to organize that sample into a dataset.22 I obtained information about 
abstract review cases from the Congreso Visible project at the Universidad de los 
Andes. In South Africa, I examined documents in the archives of the Constitutional 
Court. Information on legal cases comes from the Constitutional Court’s website and 
the Southern African Legal Information Institute (SAFLII). From these sources, as 
well as NGO reports, I created an original database of social rights cases in South 
Africa covering the High Court, Supreme Court of Appeal, and Constitutional Court. 
I conducted interviews with both “legal elites” – lawyers, judges, law 
professors, and activists at non-governmental organizations that include litigation 
within their strategies – and, to a lesser extent, potential claimants or everyday 
citizens. This amounted to 82 interviews with 90 legal elites, as well as 74 interviews 
with 93 non-elites in Colombia, and 80 interviews with 88 legal elites in South 
                                                 
22 Thank you to Josh Meyer-Gutbrod for help with web scraping. 
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Africa.23 These interviews allowed for the probing of the orientation of the judicial 
establishment, as it appears on the inside (to judges and lawyers) and the outside (to 
academics and activists), as well as to those who have tried to traverse those 
boundaries (including claimants and activists). Furthermore, these interviews 
facilitated the identification of beliefs about the appropriate role of legal institutions in 
democratic society and the status of social rights (specifically to what extent they are 
justiciable or claimable).  
Finally, I fielded surveys in both countries to further assess the understandings 
potential claimants have about the law and state. The Colombian survey involved 310 
respondents, all of whom could be considered “claimants,” and the South African 
survey covers 551 respondents with a mix of both “claimants” and “non-claimants.” 
The designs of these surveys will be described in greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6. 
The identification of these beliefs is fundamental to exploring the role of judges or 
legal culture in opening space for legal mobilization for social rights and the role of 
beliefs about the legal system and the state in influencing when and how individuals 
make rights claims.  
 
Plan of the Dissertation 
 
Chapter 2 details my constructivist account of legal mobilization. Drawing on 
scholarship from multiple disciplines, ranging from judicial behavior to social 
movements and contentious politics to political psychology, it clarifies the ways 
                                                 
23 Several elite interviews involved two interviewees at a time, and many of the non-elite interviewees 
involved two or more interviewees. Often, this occurred because I sought out an interview with a 
particular individual who then invited a colleague or neighbor to join our conversation. 
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beliefs play a foundational, but underexplored, role in existing explanations of legal 
mobilization. Further, the chapter describes and justifies a dual focus on mobilization 
from above and below, or mobilization from the perspective of state actors 
(particularly judges) and from the perspective of societal actors, and in doing so, it 
highlights the advantages of the combined approach over a singular focus on either 
societal or state actors.   
Chapters 3 and 4 offer a historical discussion of constitutionalism in Colombia 
and South Africa. Chapter 3 focuses on the development of constitutional law in each 
country, while Chapter 4 examines more particularly the emergence of social 
constitutionalism in the early 1990s. Together, these chapters trace the development of 
the idea that law can and should be responsive to the needs of citizens, examining the 
macro-level process of transnational diffusion and the localized processes by which 
particular ideas emerged at particular times. In both Colombia and South Africa, 
perceived crises opened space for new ideas about the role of the state and the role of 
constitutional law to gain adherents and to become embedded in new institutions. 
Following these critical junctures, newly empowered actors, including the 
Constitutional Court and everyday citizens defended social constitutionalism, ensuring 
that it would be institutionally-embedded over the course of the 1990s and 2000s in 
both countries. 
Adopting a “from below” perspective, Chapters 5 and 6 assess how societal 
actors understand and use legal institutions in Colombia and South Africa, 
respectively. Drawing on original surveys, as well as interviews with claimants, 
potential claimants, and non-claimants in each country, these chapters investigate the 
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following questions. What is the relationship between perceptions and use of the legal 
system? When do individuals choose to advance claims in the legal system versus in 
other forums, and when do they instead choose to “lump” their grievances, to do 
nothing rather than making a formal claim? How does legal mobilization affect 
citizens – both in terms of access to the goods and services sought and in terms of their 
views on the state? Further, these chapters examine the disconnects between not only 
law on paper and law in practice, but also between law on paper and social 
understandings of the law. Importantly, Chapter 6 adopts a dramatically different 
empirical approach from the rest of the dissertation. It sets out and test hypotheses 
within a positivist framework. This difference in approach stems from differences in 
access to respondents, particularly access to individuals who had made social rights 
claims in the formal legal sphere.  
Chapter 7 explores the development and modification of these new legal 
institutions “from above,” specifically focusing on the impact of judicial interpretation 
on legal system change in the realm of social rights. How do judges interpret their 
changing roles in the context of new constitutional rights provisions? What are the 
determinants and consequences of these role conceptions? What explains the 
differential interpretation of constitutionally recognized social rights across countries? 
Why were judges willing to offer both individual and structural remedies beyond the 
scope of the written text of the constitution in Colombia and more hesitant to do so in 
South Africa, where they instead focused on the constitutionality of policy, rather than 
outcome? This chapter introduces the concept of judicial agency and demonstrates the 
ways in which constitutional judges in Colombia and South Africa have adjudicated 
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questions related to rights protections and affected the opportunity for legal 
mobilization for social rights.  
Chapter 8 engages a cross-national, cross-sector comparison, examining 
variation in health and housing rights claims in Colombia and South Africa, tying 
together the relationship between claimants, judges, and the various societal actors that 
mediate the process of legal mobilization. The chapter highlights the key role of 
contingent factors in explaining differential legal mobilization, calling for attention to 
be paid to the complex ways in which diverse societal actors – from pharmaceutical 
and insurance companies to advocacy networks to individual claimants – are able to 
create, capitalize on, adapt, and even manipulate opportunities for mobilization. 
Institutional design influences legal mobilization indirectly, through the ways in which 
its features are perceived by these societal actors. 
Chapter 9 follows with conclusions, laying out the broader lessons that can be 
taken from this study of the Colombian and South African contexts, and calling to 
light the limits of constitutionalism and rights discourse, as well the tensions between 
concrete advances for the few, enduring inequality, and the challenge of structural 
change.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ON LAW, BELIEFS, AND CHANGE 
 
This dissertation is fundamentally about how law influences lived experience, 
from the everyday to the exceptional, as well as the meaning of rights and the ways in 
which people struggle to improve their lives. Specifically, the project examines the 
constitutional codification of social promises as rights and the ability or willingness of 
citizens to make claims to those rights. For some, a “politics of rights” (Scheingold 
1974) is fraught, as the language and tools of rights claims appear to necessarily limit, 
moderate, and dilute challenges to existing modes of thinking and allocations of goods 
(Glendon 1991; Rosenberg 1991). Yet, as others have demonstrated, these concerns 
may have been overstated as individuals and movements deftly and selectively use 
rights talk and legal tools in pursuit of their goals (McCann 1994; Ewick and Silbey 
1998; Epp 2009; Lovell 2012).  
This chapter first defines legal mobilization and then overviews the various 
ways in which political scientists and sociologists have considered attitudes, beliefs, 
and ideas. Next, it introduces my constructivist account of legal mobilization and 
situates it with respect to social movement theory and scholarship on judicial politics 
and behavior. In contrast to existing explanations for the occurrence and frequency of 
legal mobilization, my constructivist account explicitly foregrounds how potential 
claimants, intermediaries, and judicial officials understand the law, rights, and the 
state. The chapter closes with methodological concerns related to the observation and 
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measurement of beliefs and a discussion about the link between beliefs and legal 
mobilization.  
 
Understanding Legal Mobilization  
 
Definitions of legal mobilization abound. For instance, Frances Zemans (1983: 
700) suggests that “[l]aw is mobilized when a desire or want is translated into a 
demand as an assertion of rights,” while Richard Lempert (1976: 173) offers that legal 
mobilization refers to “the process by which legal norms are invoked to regulate 
behavior.” More recently, Lisa Vanhala (2011) has proposed that legal mobilization 
encompasses “any type of process by which an individual or collective actors invoke 
legal norms, discourse, or symbols to influence policy or behavior.” Scholarship on 
legal mobilization has proliferated, though often in the absence of a clear 
operationalization of the term and not always in a coherent, additive research agenda. 
In this project, when I refer to legal mobilization, I mean the explicit, self-
conscious use of law involving a formal institutional mechanism (Lehoucq and Taylor 
2018: 4). In other words, legal mobilization corresponds to the intentional invocation 
of the formal legal sphere by claimants. The actions encompassed by the term legal 
mobilization then include administrative procedures, quasi-judicial procedures (such 
as those complaints processed by human rights or gender commissions and 
ombudsman’s offices), and litigation. This definition offers several concrete 
advantages. First, as Emilio Lehoucq and I detail elsewhere, this definition allows 
scholars to clearly distinguish legal mobilization from related concepts, like legal 
framing or legal consciousness. In doing so, it avoids the pitfalls of conceptual 
  34 
stretching and promotes systematic theory-building in the interdisciplinary subfield of 
legal mobilization (Lehoucq and Taylor 2018). The focus on legal claims made in the 
context of formal institutions rather than any number of activities potentially related to 
law – such as bargaining in the shadow of the law (Mnookin and Kornhauser 1979) or 
using the discourse of rights in everyday settings to frame problems as legal in nature 
– facilitates careful comparison across contexts, assuring that comparisons involve 
similar cases.24 The focus on the political dimension of legal mobilization 
acknowledges that legal claims in the aggregate (if not always individually) reflect 
disagreements about the proper distribution of resources and about the proper way or 
ways in which societal actors ought to interact, thus they imply political demands (see, 
e.g., Zemans 1983; Marshall 1998; M. Gallagher 2006, 2017; Gallagher and Yang 
2017), as well as particular understandings of the rights of citizens and obligations of 
states. Legal mobilization can involve a wide array of agents acting in apparently 
independent ways without overt or self-conscious political motive. They may not view 
themselves as mobilizing law, but they collectively are part of the mobilization of law. 
Second, as a practical matter, this definition is easily operationalized across contexts. 
Legal mobilization implicates an internal process (of defining a struggle in 
terms of legal language or symbols) and an external process (of sharing that definition 
with outside actors, through engagement with litigation).25 The process of legal 
                                                 
24 Importantly, such a focus does not foreclose the study of related but not sufficiently similar activities. 
The claim here is simply that these other activities ought not be considered legal mobilization. 
25 Per Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 69), “The conferral of new rights or legal protections is inevitably 
accompanied by considerable conflict and contention and the creation of a host of new state fields to 
safeguard the gains achieved. This has resulted in something of a self-perpetuating cycle of legal 
expansion – the creation of new strategic action fields by groups intent on taking advantage of the new 
opportunities open to them, which forces states to fashion new regulatory and compliance fields to 
oversee the resulting non-state fields.” Whether or not one draws on field theory, the insights that many 
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mobilization can take on many forms, whether individual (Zemans 1983) or collective 
in nature (Burstein 1991). In other words, we can observe both individual citizens and 
social movements engaged in mobilizing the law. When individuals or civic groups 
decide to mobilize, they must identify proximate and ultimate targets of their actions. 
In this project, I focus on when the judiciary is the proximate target. The ultimate goal 
might be, for example, to require healthcare providers to cover specific medications or 
procedures (here, the ultimate target would be the healthcare provider), or it might be 
to convince the state to change or enforce laws regarding the provision of primary 
education (here, the state). The disputing parties involved in each scenario differ, but 
the judiciary is the focal point for action.26  
Legal mobilization may vary in content, form, or character. Most studies of 
legal mobilization explicate the content of mobilization under investigation, focusing 
on, for instance, claims related to the right to health or claims falling under a specific 
regulation. Legal mobilization can also vary in form, for instance with the 
advancement of individual versus collective claims. At the cross-national level, this 
project investigates the form of legal mobilization, while at the sub-national level, this 
project investigates its content. The project also takes up the question of variation in 
the character of legal mobilization. By character, I mean the sentiment underlying 
legal mobilization. For example, while some may turn to the law because of their 
belief that the legal process is to be trusted and will adequately resolve their disputes, 
                                                 
different groups have a stake in defining, expanding, or limiting rights and legal mechanisms and that 
law is the site and means of strategic action are important in understanding mobilization. 
26 It should be noted, however, that this definition of legal mobilization also allows for the consideration 
of pseudo-judicial or administrative procedures that take place outside of the formal judiciary as such.  
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others may do so with ambivalence or at the failure of other options. The former 
example offers an idealized vision of legal mobilization. Yet, scholars have 
demonstrated that legal mobilization in practice may be ambivalent in nature instead 
(e.g., Hendley 1999, 2012; Gallagher 2006; Smulovitz 2010; Gallagher and Yang 
2017; Taylor 2018). 
What does it mean to engage in legal mobilization? Scholars have argued that 
the turn to legal strategies for claims-making is a “hollow hope” (Rosenberg 1991; see 
also Glendon 1991) or reflects the hegemonic status of law in everyday life (Ewick 
and Silbey 1998; Silbey 2005). The concern, in large part, is a practical one, that the 
use of legal language and tools reduces what is grievable, claimable, and changeable, 
that instead of resulting in tangible improvements in the lives of those most in need, 
existing power arrangements and allocations of goods will simply be recreated and 
reified. Yet, individuals or movements may advance legal claims strategically or 
partially, without fully endorsing the legal system, what it represents, or what it 
protects. For example, George Lovell (2012: xii), in a study of civil rights claims made 
in the late 1930s in the United States, concludes that at least some of the time, “people 
used idealized legal discourses not to express faith in the law but because those 
discourses could also accommodate and help to communicate resistance and 
contestation.” He goes on to say, 
… people used language of law, rights, and constitutionalism to make novel 
demands or contest official legal outcomes. People also used legal discourses 
to assert dignity, challenge the integrity of legal authorities, and express 
constitutional bases for alternative systems of justice. Many [] did these things 
as they expressed resistance in the face of towering injustice and shocking 
official indifference.  
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Lovell’s study provides further evidence of the varied role that the role law plays in 
particular struggles. Some of the time it may moderate or constrain claims makers, 
while other times, it may be a transformative or even revolutionary force. Legal 
institutions that normally protect elite interests may, in the face of pressure from 
below, yield outcomes autonomous from these elite interests. Still other times, law 
may simply be a tool that might help to solve a problem. The point here, however, is 
that the impact of law – and legal mobilization – is an open empirical question.  
 
Terminology: Beliefs, Attitudes, and Ideas 
 
Before detailing explanations of legal mobilization, a few words on 
terminology are necessary. Despite greater attention to the role of non-material forces 
on political outcomes, a shift termed “the ideational turn” in comparative politics 
(Jacobs 2009), relatively few scholars explicitly define what they mean by ideas or 
beliefs, while definitions of “norms,” “identity,” and “culture” abound. Similarly, 
ideas have taken center stage in work on international relations and foreign policy 
(Haas 1990; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Risse-Kappen 1994; Wendt 1999), as well 
as on international and comparative political economy (Hall 1993; Berman 1998; 
McNamara 1998; Blyth 2002). Within the field of judicial decision-making, 
substantial attention has also been paid to ideational factors, specifically to “judicial 
attitudes” (Rohde and Spaeth 1976; Segal and Spaeth 1994, 2002; Spaeth and Segal 
1999) and “judicial role conceptions” (Howard 1977; Hilbink 2007; Nunes 2010a, b; 
Couso and Hilbink 2011; Ingram 2012). 
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I argue that the terminology of “beliefs” better reflects colloquial descriptions 
of our mental states (“I believe…”) than either attitudes or ideas. The language of 
beliefs is flexible enough to describe the variety of mental states held by different 
actors, which is not the case for the term “judicial attitudes.” Further, it does not imply 
a standard of coherence that may or may not, in fact, characterize our mental states, as 
can be the case with the language of ideas. Belief, unlike idea, also implies an agent, a 
believer, reminding us of the contextual and embodied nature of the social world. In 
this project, I am interested not only in changes in patterns of claims-making (i.e., 
behavior), but also in how these claims are understood (i.e., the beliefs that shape 
behavior), who makes them and who does not, and how they are constructed, received, 
and responded to. This requires attention to institutional and social context as well as 
to the different actors involved. For these reasons, I use the language of beliefs 
throughout this dissertation. 
In short, beliefs refer to subjective truth-claims about the world. I adapt this 
definition from Neta Crawford (2002: 49), who defines beliefs as “arguments that we 
have become convinced of, whose conclusions we take for granted,” and Daniel Bar-
Tal (1990, 2013: 18), who refers to beliefs as “proposition[s] to which a person 
attributes at least a minimal degree of confidence.”27 Importantly, beliefs may be 
factually correct or incorrect, and they may or may not be grounded in moral 
                                                 
27 See also the social psychology upon which these accounts are based (e.g., Bem 1970; Fishbein and 
Ajzen 1980; Kruglanski 1989). I adapt these definitions because I am not convinced that beliefs must 
have “taken for granted” status – perhaps that is true of strongly-held beliefs specifically – and because 
I find the language of “a minimal degree of confidence” to be distracting rather than informative. “A 
minimal degree of confidence” refers to “the likelihood that the proposition will be valid and truthful 
from a personal perspective” (Bar-Tal 2013: 18), though it is unclear how confidence can be measured 
here.  
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assessments. Beliefs are socially constructed, but individually held. They form the 
constituent parts of a worldview and the basis for meaning-making, which is defined 
as the “social process through which people reproduce together the conditions of 
intelligibility that enable them to make sense of their worlds” (Wedeen 2002: 717). 
Further, every identifiable belief exists among (at the very least, implicit) alternative 
beliefs. Given the existence of alternatives, beliefs become more impactful when 
compelling to others, though a belief that is not compelling to many people might be 
particularly influential for a particular individual.  
Beliefs form the basis upon which individuals act, whether elite or grassroots 
actors. As Alan Jacobs (2009: 252) holds, “By leading them to reason about certain 
causal possibilities and data and to ignore and discount others, politicians’ and policy 
makers’ mental models can powerfully shape their causal belief sets and, in turn, their 
policy preferences.” This is true for all actors, politicians, policymakers or otherwise. 
Similarly, Elisabeth Wood (2003: 231) describes beliefs as “understandings of the 
probable consequences of various courses of action.” While causal beliefs are 
particularly illuminating when considering the relationship between beliefs and action, 
beliefs need not refer explicitly to consequences, to cause and effect logic. For 
example, each of the following statements are expressions of beliefs:  
(1) I should report this to the police.  
(2) I should report this to the police, because it is the right thing to do.  
(3) I should report this to the police, but it won’t matter, because they never 
investigate this type of case.  
 
The first statement is a simple assertion about appropriate behavior. The second adds a 
rationale for why the behavior is understood as appropriate. Only the third offers an 
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explicit (expected) consequence-driven claim. Yet, all three reflect an understanding 
an individual might have about how he or she should act in the world; as such, all 
three statements are truth-claims (adding “It is true that…” to the start of each 
statement makes this clear). 
In this project, I focus on beliefs regarding the kind of legal claims that can or 
should be made, or the kinds of issues that can or should be resolved through the legal 
system, as well as the way that the judiciary can or should respond to these claims. 
These beliefs will be described in more detail in the subsequent empirical chapters, but 
in short they define the contours of a legal citizenship regime, or a situation in which 
state-society relations are refracted through the legal system.28 This project centers on 
the intersection of social citizenship and a legal citizenship regime. In other words, the 
focus is on legal claims invoking social rights. This category of legal claims subsumes 
a wide range of grievances related to the allocation of goods and services, and, 
importantly, it is by no means a given that claims to these goods and services will be 
advanced using the language of rights or in legal forums. Any number of other 
strategies could be feasible. Citizens might opt to advance claims to these goods and 
services through appeals to political parties, lobbying in legislatures, or patronage ties 
to particular public officials, or they might turn to NGOs or civic organizations or 
even the market to try to attain access. Yet, at times, citizens advance legal claims to 
these social goods and services, and at times, judges respond positively to such claims. 
I turn now to extant explanations of legal mobilization. 
 
The Central Role of Beliefs in Explanations of Legal Mobilization  
                                                 
28 For a general discussion of citizenship regimes, see Yashar (2005). 
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In this section, I develop my constructivist29 account of legal mobilization, 
which is both prior to and constitutive of explanations focused on grievances, 
opportunity, and judicial behavior. Beliefs play a foundational, though often 
unacknowledged, role in legal mobilization. Through the constructivist account of 
legal mobilization, this project unearths the ways in which beliefs about the law, 
rights, and the state influence legal mobilization, and it clarifies how the recursive 
interaction of different types of actors impacts both the filing of legal claims and the 
response to those claims in the context of social constitutionalism. 
Grievance-based theories may yield important insights as to why claims are 
made about a particular issue in a particular context, but alone they cannot account for 
why claimants turn to one forum and not another to air those grievances. In this case, a 
theory that can account for the social construction of legal grievances is needed – in 
other words, the theory must be able to explain not only how a particular state came to 
be understood as objectionable but also how that particular situation came to be 
understood as legal in nature or as legally claimable. Theories based on institutional 
design or opportunity structures suffer from a similar limitation. Opportunity is best 
understood as a permissive condition. Though the lack of perceived opportunity could 
be sufficient to head off mobilization, its mere possibility does not imply the 
mobilization will, in fact, occur. Theories based on judicial behavior indicate when 
judges will be more or less likely to render rights-protective decisions, but these 
                                                 
29 Typically, international relations scholars working in the constructivist tradition focus on norms, 
rather than beliefs. I hold that norms are comprised by and enacted as a result of beliefs. In some ways, 
then, this divergence is a matter of the level of analysis. 
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explanations also miss the process by which cases come before the courts. For all three 
sets of explanations, an assessment about the beliefs relevant actors hold about the 
law, rights, and the state helps to fill these gaps.  
Further, in order to understand the process of legal mobilization, I hold we 
ought to consider it “from above” as well as “from below,” which is to say that we 
ought to consider those factors that influence not only the ways in which lawyers 
argue cases and judges decide them, but also the willingness and ability of citizens to 
turn to the legal system to make claims. In practice, the process of legal mobilization 
is both iterative and interactive. As Charles Epp (1998: 18) notes, judges cannot make 
cases or issues appear before them “as if by magic” – claimants must bring cases, they 
must make claims. This involves a prior process of identifying a problem as legally 
grievable, as one that can or should be advanced through the courts. In addition, 
claimants cannot realize their rights simply by making rights claims. They must 
navigate the legal system, which is often both complicated and expensive, to bring 
claims before judges, and judges must respond to those claims. Past judicial decision-
making will influence current claims-making, as knowledge and understandings of the 
judicial system change and spread, and current claims-making will influence future 
judicial decision-making, as judges are presented with new problems and new 
arguments. By integrating perspectives “from above” and “from below,” I attempt to 
capture this complex claims-making environment. I turn now to a discussion of 
grievance-based explanations for mobilization, before moving to explanations based 
on institutional design and opportunity structures, and then a discussion of various 
theories of judicial behavior.  
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1. Grievances and Legal Needs 
 
Early work on social movements and social mobilization drew attention to the 
amount or severity of grievances, “relative deprivation,” or “breakdown,” arguing that 
once grievances were felt to be sufficiently serious, mobilization would follow 
(Davies 1962; Smelser 1963; Gurr 1970; Gurney and Tierney 1982).30 Subsequent 
scholarship sought to integrate grievances into a comprehensive social movement 
agenda. This literature focuses less on material need as such than on the process of 
framing issues to facilitate mobilization around them, along with the mobilizing 
structures and political opportunities that allow grievances to be acted on (Snow et al. 
1986; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Oftentimes, the existence of grievances is 
taken as a given. For many scholars, the perpetual presence of grievances and 
relatively infrequent occurrence of mobilization of any kind indicates that there is little 
explanatory leverage to be gained with a specific focus on grievances (McCarthy and 
Zald 1977; Tarrow 1994; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988). More recent 
scholarship on social movements has sought to reconsider the role of grievances in 
mobilization processes, focusing on the meanings ascribed to grievances, rather than 
simply their material existence (Simmons 2014, 2016).31 
Similarly, early scholarship on access to justice and legal needs paid scant 
attention to the ways in which individuals understood the problems in their lives, 
instead demonstrating the existence of material grievances and the relatively 
                                                 
30 Quantitative studies that operationalize grievances as some measure of material need (e.g., poverty) 
implicitly make this argument. 
31 Simmons argues that threats to goods that tapped into notions of “quotidian communities” (as 
compared to Anderson’s “imagined communities”) spurred significant protest activity – specifically 
around water in Bolivia and corn in Mexico. 
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infrequent use of law to address those material grievances (see critiques in Cahn and 
Cahn 1964 and Zemans 1982). These works and the broader access-to-justice 
movement focused on how to streamline legal services and increase legal education. 
The underlying expectation was that if knowledge about the law, rights, and legal 
services increased, more and more people in need would turn to the legal sphere to 
make claims; however, no such deterministic link exists (e.g., Zemans 1982; Massoud 
2013). Moving beyond the work of Frances Zemans to studies focused on legal 
consciousness (e.g., Ewick and Silbey 1998), it becomes clear that both claimants and 
the claims they make exist in social context. This context can encourage a shift from 
viewing something as unfortunate to something legally objectionable (or a legal 
grievance). On the other hand, this context can also discourage such a shift.  
Thus, existing explanations for legal mobilization based on grievances are 
wanting for several reasons. First, they over-predict the occurrence of mobilization 
(especially in their material-centric forms), and as access to social goods tends to be 
highly correlated, they offer limited leverage on questions related to why mobilization 
differs significantly across issues. They also under-explain the forum in which a 
grievance is raised.32 Further, without acknowledging the interactive nature of the 
legal process, we may miss the impact of rights education campaigns on the social 
construction of grievance and legal framing on the development of a sense of 
                                                 
32 Generally speaking, grievances are not tied to any particular forum in which they might be expressed. 
For example, if I understand myself to be aggrieved by existing housing policy, it is not immediately 
clear that I should choose to pursue any particular claims-making strategy or combination of strategies 
over others. In theory, I could file a legal claim, lobby, protest, or take many other actions. Which of 
those actions I undertaken will be influenced by a number of factors (most of which are summarized as 
political and legal opportunity), but the occurrence of a grievance will not be a direct influence. 
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entitlement, and we may miss the impact of information about prior judicial decisions 
as well.  
An example from South Africa helps to illustrate these limitations. Between 
1996 and 2016, more than 200 social rights cases were heard (across the High Courts, 
the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Court). Around 60% of those cases 
advanced housing rights claims, just under 20% pertained to the right to education, 
about 8% each for social security and health, and 4% dealt with the right to water. To 
the extent that material grievances determine mobilization, we should expect the 
distribution of claims to match the degree of need. The 2014 Afrobarometer survey 
provide a rough measure of perceived need through a question asking respondents to 
select the most important problems facing the country (respondents may identify more 
than one problem). About 27% of respondents mentioned housing, while 22% pointed 
to education, and 13% singled out both health and water. Numerous reports put 
together by NGOs as well as scholarly analyses confirm widespread difficulties in 
each of these issue areas (e.g., Black Sash 2004; Mayosi and Benatar 2014; Pieterse 
2014; Fish Hodgson and Khumalo 2016; Dugard et al. 2018; Khunou 2018). Even if 
grievances related to housing significantly outnumbered those related to any other 
social right, the question of why legal claims rather than protests or other forms of 
claims-making would remain. 
Building on Erica Simmons’ insight about the key role of social meanings in 
grievance formation (2014, 2016), my constructivist account of legal mobilization 
seeks to remedy the limitations of grievance-based accounts of mobilization. In doing 
so, it draws out the two-stage process by which legal grievances are socially 
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constructed. First, a condition must be understood as objectionable, as a grievance, 
and second, that objectionable thing must be understood as (potentially) legal in nature 
or (potentially) claimable in the legal sphere. The argument here is not that every 
person who envisions a problem in his or her life as legal in nature will then proceed 
to initiate a court case. We know that most of the time people simply deal with or 
“lump” their problems (Levine and Preston 1970; Felstiner 1974; Engel 2010). 
However, in the aggregate, these beliefs will be associated with legal mobilization. 
Table 2.1 details the differences between extant grievance-based explanations for 
mobilization and the way grievances factor into my constructivist account of legal 
mobilization. The left-hand column summarizes extant explanations, while the right-
hand column offers the constructivist corrective. 
Table 2.1. Accounting for Grievances and Legal Needs 
Existing Accounts: Grievances, Legal 
Needs 
The Social Construction of Legal 
Grievances 
 
The greater the amount or severity of 
material need, the greater the claims-
making. 
 
[Material existence of grievance] 
 
A two-stage process of legal grievance 
formation, where each stage is the 
manifestation of a belief, allows for legal 
mobilization: 
 
(1) Something comes to be 
understood as objectionable. 
(2) That objectionable thing comes to 
be understood as (potentially) 
legal in nature or as (potentially) 
claimable in the legal sphere. 
 
However, accounting for legal grievance 
formation is not sufficient to explain 
legal mobilization. Both legal 
opportunity and judicial behavior must 
also be considered. 
The meanings ascribed to material 
conditions shape the social construction 
of grievances, resulting in certain issues 
catalyzing mobilization and not others. 
 
[Meaning of grievances] 
 
Knowledge of rights and the law leads 
to greater instances of claims-making.  
 
[Knowledge of grievances] 
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The constructivist account of legal mobilization, while focused more on the 
understandings actors have about the nature of the law and its place with respect to the 
relationship between citizens and the state, does not deny the importance of material 
grievances. It does, however, emphasize the importance of the meanings ascribed to 
the goods or services found lacking. Although individuals face challenges in realizing 
their social rights around the world, the difficulties faced are by no means uniform or 
understood in a uniform way. For example, issues related to access to housing take on 
special significance in South Africa given the history of apartheid. Present-day public 
housing developments located far from city centers are challenged not simply as 
inadequate but as the manifestation of spatial apartheid. This understanding, the 
ideational component of the grievance, becomes central to the legal claim advanced. It 
is not simply that many people are without adequate housing (though they are) and 
they advance claims related to their constitutional right to have access to housing 
(though some do), but that the lack of adequate housing is particularly meaningful 
considering the legacy of apartheid. In the constructivist account, the analysis hinges 
on the way potential claimants and legal elites consider this ideational component of 
the grievance relative to the duties and predilections of the state.  
2. Opportunity, Institutional Design, and Support Structures  
 
Law and society scholars have adapted the political opportunity structure 
framework from social movement studies (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994; McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) to focus more specifically on the conditions under which 
social actors are able to mobilize law to make demands (e.g., Hilson 2002; Andersen 
2005; Wilson and Rodríguez Cordero 2006; Vanhala 2012; Tam 2013). Legal 
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opportunity encompasses both institutional and contingent factors. Lisa Vanhala 
(2018a: 112) holds that while more systematic comparative study is needed, “at least 
three factors matter across jurisdictions and across policy areas: legal stock, standing 
rules, and rules on costs.” Legal stock refers to the existing body of law and delimits 
the kinds of legal arguments that can be advanced, while standing rules determine who 
can bring claims before the courts, and rules on cost set out the amount of risk litigants 
undertake when opening up a court case. In addition to these factors that limit both 
access to the courts and the types of claims that can formally (or reasonably) be 
advanced, scholars have also highlighted the importance of judicial receptivity and the 
social and material resources available to claimants (e.g., Epp 1998; Hilson 2002; 
Andersen 2005; Pedriana 2006; Keck 2009; Evans Case and Givens 2010; Vanhala 
2011). Cases do not simply come before judges out of nowhere, and navigating justice 
systems can be notoriously difficult (Galanter 1974). A support structure of “rights 
advocacy organizations, supportive lawyers, and sources of financing” facilitates 
litigation by helping to alleviate the knowledge-based and material barriers to access 
to the legal system (Epp 1998: 23; Epp 2009; Teles 2010; Tam 2013; Botero 2015). 
The Colombian case demonstrates how different features of legal opportunity 
combine, where the existence of certain features mitigates the need for others.33 With 
the acción de tutela procedure, an individual can initiate a legal case that advances a 
rights claim against a public or private actor without having to pay any fees 
whatsoever, as the claim can be delivered verbally and does not require the use of a 
                                                 
33 See Wilson (2009) for a presentation of this argument through a comparative study of Colombia and 
Costa Rica. 
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lawyer. Importantly, the claimant does not technically need to articulate a legal 
argument about their rights; the judge of first instance must make sense of the 
situation described by the claimant and determine whether or not a constitutional 
rights violation occurred. The formal rules regarding the tutela procedure – 
particularly those on standing, procedure, and costs – enable legal mobilization 
without the need for a support structure.  
Yet, the existence of an opportunity for legal mobilization, whether on the 
basis of liberal standing requirements or something else, is not sufficient for 
mobilization to actually occur. As Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly 
(2001: 43) hold, “no opportunity, however objectively open, will invite mobilization 
unless it is a) visible to potential challengers and b) perceived as an opportunity.” Still, 
many studies of mobilization have focused – perhaps to a fault – on the environment 
in which mobilization decisions are made, rather than on the decisions themselves and 
the agents who made those decisions.34 Lisa Vanhala (2012: 525) argues that, in 
contrast to “the static, snapshot image[s] of ‘structure’” prevalent in many 
opportunity-based theories, “movement activists are not passive actors simply 
responding to externally-imposed legal opportunities but instead play a role in creating 
their own legal opportunities” (see also Hilbink 2012). In fact, activists have been 
shown to advance specific legal cases to test opportunity, in addition to providing 
education and training services, thus deepening the future support structure and 
potentially convincing judges of new ways of understanding legal issues (Hollis-
Brusky 2015; González-Ocantos 2016; J. Gallagher 2017). Certainly, the concept is 
                                                 
34 See Jasper (2004) for more on this critique. 
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flexible enough in theory to take better account of the choices individuals, movements, 
and movement organizations make over time, how those choices are a response to a 
specific context, and how those choices, in turn, influence that context down the line. 
While discussions of political opportunity also incorporate notions of “threats” 
(e.g., McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Einwohner 2006; Maher 2010), studies of 
legal opportunity have focused exclusively on the opportunities side of the equation. 
Yet, in practice, actors may engage with the legal sphere not because they envision a 
successful outcome but because they must, because a case has been opened against 
them (a situation that Zemans (1983) terms “mandatory legal mobilization”) or 
because there is a legal threat to their identity, possessions, or livelihood. In these 
instances, the existence of threats is more consequential than whatever opportunities 
exist or do not exist in the formal legal sphere. For example, all evictions in South 
Africa are technically a matter of mandatory legal mobilization, as both constitutional 
and legislative provisions require that evictions proceed only after a court order 
(though this does not mean that evictions will always be litigated or that the proper 
procedure will always be followed). Significantly, an issue may be understood to fall 
within the scope of mandatory legal mobilization, even if it this is not technically true. 
An example of this situation is healthcare in Colombia. As will be detailed in Chapter 
5, Colombian citizens have come to understand the filing of legal claims as central to 
their ability to access healthcare services, though the Constitutional Court has clearly 
stated that the filing of tutela claims cannot be a formal requirement for accessing 
healthcare (C-950/07). 
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My claim here is not that the legal opportunity argument is necessarily wrong 
but that it is incomplete. Namely, the existence of widespread legal mobilization in 
Colombia through the tutela procedure in the absence of a clear support structure 
suggests the limited applicability of some of the constituent parts of this argument. My 
constructivist approach seeks to deepen the focus on agency, taking opportunity and 
resources not as static, but as ever-changing features, and not as determinative but as 
permissive conditions. Importantly, with respect to resources, threats, and opportunity, 
perceptions are key, a proposition increasingly recognized by scholars, but one that 
they do not always adopt. In short, an opportunity that is not perceived cannot be acted 
upon, and resources that are not understood as potentially available cannot be made 
use of, regardless of their actual availability. Without discounting the importance of 
“real” states (non-existent support structures cannot be made material simply by 
wishing), the constructivist approach seeks to account for the necessary role of 
individual beliefs and actions within the context of dynamic resources and 
opportunities. Table 2.2 summarizes expectations based on perceptions of legal 
opportunity, legal threat, and support structures, situating existing explanations 
relative to the constructivist corrective. 
 
Table 2.2. Accounting for Perceptions of Opportunity, Threat, and Support 
Existing Accounts: Legal Opportunity, 
Support Structures 
Combinations of Perceived 
Opportunity, Threat, and Support 
Where the judicial system is “open” to 
potential claimants – due to “stock, 
standing, rules on costs” and/or judicial 
receptivity – the ability of individuals or 
groups to advance rights claims in the 
courts is greater. 
 
Combinations of perceived legal 
opportunity, threat, and support serve 
as permissive conditions for legal 
mobilization. A particularly “open” 
opportunity structure can mitigate the 
need for a support structure, and a 
robust support structure can overcome a 
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[Legal opportunity] 
 
relatively “closed” opportunity 
structure. Legal threats may prompt 
mobilization even where neither legal 
opportunity structures nor support 
structures would indicate. 
 
However, accounting for perceptions of 
legal opportunity, threat, and support is 
not sufficient to explain legal 
mobilization. Both the formation of 
legal grievances and judicial behavior 
must also be part of the explanation. 
Where support structures exist, the 
proclivity and ability of individuals or 
groups to advance rights claims in the 
courts is greater. The key features, 
organization, or role of the support 
structure may vary: 
• Existence of rights advocacy 
organizations, supportive 
lawyers, and financing (Epp 
1998) 
• Combination of distinct types 
of support organizations (J. 
Gallagher 2017) 
• Provision of education and 
training in community-
building efforts (Hollis-
Brusky 2015; Gónzalez-
Ocantos 2016) 
 
[Support structure] 
 
 
In short, the constructivist account of legal mobilization holds that 
combinations of perceived legal opportunity, threat, and support serve as permissive 
conditions for – rather than determinants of – legal mobilization. None of these 
features are necessary in and of themselves for legal mobilization. For example, a 
particularly “open” opportunity structure can mitigate the need for a support structure, 
or a robust support structure can overcome a relatively “closed” opportunity structure. 
Further, legal threats may prompt – or require – mobilization through the courts even 
where neither legal opportunity nor support structures would indicate. Finally, the 
constructivist account also acknowledges both the prior process of the social 
construction of legal grievances, which then feed into opportunities, threats, and 
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support, as well as the subsequent process of judicial decision-making (as well as the 
possibility of feedback or recursivity between all three of these stages). 
3. Judicial Behavior  
 
In general terms, theories about judicial behavior consider the preferences of 
judges (attitudinal approaches), their institutional context (institutional approaches), 
the broader political incentive structure (separation of powers approaches), and/or the 
demands of particular audiences (reputational approaches).35 In an overview of 
judicial behavior, James Gibson (1983: 9) summarizes judicial decision-making as “a 
function of what [judges] prefer to do, tempered by what they think they ought to do, 
but constrained by what they perceive is feasible to do.” But which factors hold the 
most causal weight, how are judicial preferences constructed, and what influences the 
ways in which judges seek to realize those preferences? Each of these dominant 
approaches to judicial behavior stakes out a different position on these questions.36 
The attitudinal approach to judicial behavior has historically predominated in 
the United States context, particularly with respect to the Supreme Court (e.g., Rohde 
and Spaeth 1976; Segal and Spaeth 1994, 2002; Spaeth and Segal 1999). Attitudinal 
explanations suggest that judges attempt to implement their ideological and policy 
preferences when deciding cases. The argument is not that judges ignore the law or the 
particular facts of the case in question, but that within these constraints, the 
preferences of judges significantly affect which decision is ultimately taken. In these 
                                                 
35 Additionally, legalistic accounts focus on the theoretic judicial role, where apolitical judges simply 
apply the law to the particular set of facts in question. Because these accounts have been largely 
discounted by political science and law and society studies of judicial politics, I do not detail them here. 
36 Questions of judicial empowerment are beyond the scope of this project. See Hirschl (2000), 
Ginsburg (2003), Finkel (2008), and Brinks and Blass (2017) among others, on these debates. 
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models, judicial preferences are situated at the individual level, and judges act on their 
individual preferences sincerely, rather than strategically. Scholars, however, have 
pointed to the importance of unique institutional features, such as life tenure, formal 
judicial independence, and decisional discretion (rather than mandatory jurisdiction), 
in offering United States Supreme Court justices leeway in ideological decision-
making (Rodríguez-Raga 2011). These institutional features do not necessarily travel 
to either the lower courts in the United States or to most other countries. Tom 
Ginsburg (2010: 94) puts it bluntly: “the attitudinal model is unlikely to work as a 
basis for comparative research.”37 
Reflecting these concerns, a second set of explanations focuses less on the 
attitudes or preferences of judges as such and more on the institutional arrangements 
in which judges make decisions. According to this line of scholarship, institutions 
“mediate between preferences and outcomes by affecting the justices’ beliefs about the 
consequences of their actions” (Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 1999: 14). Lisa 
Hilbink (2007: 34, emphasis in original) highlights the importance of both 
“institutional structure, [or] the formal rules that determine the relationship of judges 
to each other and to the other branches of the state, and thereby offer incentives and 
disincentives for different kinds of behavior,” and “institutional ideology, [or] the 
understanding of the social role of the institution into which judges are socialized, the 
content of which is maintained through formal sanctions and informal norms within 
the institution.” In other words, in addition to formal features of institutions, social and 
                                                 
37 See Roux (2015) for a similar, though more nuanced, position. 
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cultural factors may affect the ways in which preferences are constructed, selected, or 
mediated within judicial institutions.  
In institutional accounts, judges may act strategically or sincerely on their 
preferences, but the key is that their preferences and their understandings of how best 
to realize those preferences are conditioned by the institutional arrangement in which 
judges find themselves (Knight and Epstein 1998). Formal institutional rules may 
constrain judicial behavior through, for example, the construction of precedent 
(Knight and Epstein 1998) or what are known as “jurisprudential regimes” (Richards 
and Kritzer 2002). Further, the appointment and tenure process,38 as well as rules 
regarding independence,39 discretion over workload and case selection, and even 
procedure may also influence the range of decisions open to judges and their proclivity 
to take particular decisions.  
Informal features of institutions may also influence judicial decision-making. 
Here, the concept of the judicial role orientation or conception is particularly 
informative. Woodford Howard Jr. (1977: 916) defines role orientations as “normative 
expectations shared by judges and related actors regarding how a given judicial office 
should be performed.” The focus is not on the issue-specific preferences of individual 
judges, but on a more general sense of what judges understand to be appropriate 
                                                 
38 See Ramseyer and Rasmusen (2001). 
39 Judicial independence can be separated into a negative and a positive component (Hilbink 2012). 
Negative judicial independence refers to the institutionalized recognition that the executive and 
legislative branches of government must refrain from interfering with judicial decision-making, 
whereas positive independence refers to behavior, nothing whether or not judges act as if they are 
independent from the other branches of government. Positive judicial independence can be more 
strongly stated as judicial assertiveness, which, according to Kapiszewski (2012: 11), occurs when 
courts challenge powerful actors in their rulings, issuing decisions “that seek to nullify, restrict, or 
change” the behavior of those actors. Independence is an important feature of both institutional and 
separation-of-powers accounts. 
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behavior. Role conceptions may sit at the level of the individual, but they also may be 
the product of socialization within the courts or selection into the courts (Hilbink 
2007, 2012; Nunes 2010a, b; Couso and Hilbink 2011; Ingram 2012). For instance, 
Hilbink (2007) illustrates the ways in which these mechanisms combined in Chile 
around the time of democratic transition, forming a judiciary that, while formally 
independent, conceived of its role as aggressively “apolitical,” rendering it a largely 
conservative, deferential, status quo oriented force, even after the country’s return to 
democracy. As such, both formal and informal institutional rules may affect judicial 
behavior. 
A third set of explanations, referred to as separation-of-powers accounts, 
emphasize the relative position of courts within the political regime and the incentives 
or constraints implied by that position. The main difference between these approaches 
and institutional ones is the primary focus not on the independent impact of 
institutions on judicial behavior but on power considerations and jockeying between 
the branches of government. Within these accounts, both politicians and judges are 
thought to act strategically, in contrast to the assumption of sincere motivations in 
attitudinal approaches. Exemplifying the separation-of-powers approach, John 
Ferejohn and Barry Weingast (1992: 263) hold, “if a court’s decision fails to reflect 
external political reality, it cannot stand for long. In this sense, interpretation is 
inevitably political whether consciously so or not.” The core claims are that judges 
want their decisions to stand, that judicial decisions are political matters, and that 
political matters are never fully settled. To the extent a judicial decision accords with 
the desires of dominant political actors, it will stand, and the to the extent it does not, 
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it will be challenged and potentially overturned. Following this logic, judges will 
attempt to decide cases with the preferences of the legislature (and the executive) in 
mind, rendering decisions as close to their optimal choice that will not be overturned 
or circumvented through the legislative process (Gely and Spiller 1990, 1992).  
The standard separation-of-powers argument would expect strategic pro-
government decision-making the majority of the time, or at least the majority of the 
time on matters important to the government, even if judges sincerely hold opposed 
preferences (Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002).40 Whether these decisions are 
“rights-protective” or not will depend on the position of the executive and legislature. 
Pro-government decision-making will not always rule the day, however. As Gretchen 
Helmke (2005) shows, judges may “strategically defect,” also in spite of any sincere 
preferences they hold, in an effort to signal allegiance to an incoming government and 
distance themselves from the failing sitting government. Without considering the 
broader political context, according to these accounts, conclusions about judicial 
behavior will be misguided. 
A fourth approach emphasizes the importance of specific audiences in 
influencing judicial behavior. Scholars have pointed to the social incentives implied 
by relationships between judges, courts, and various audiences (Baum 1994, 2008; 
Woods 2008; Garoupa and Ginsburg 2015; Hollis-Brusky 2015). For Nuno Garoupa 
and Tom Ginsburg (2015: 2), “courts need to establish some type of reputation with 
their audiences in order to facilitate compliance, influence and legitimacy,” and 
                                                 
40 An approach based on role conceptions would have similar observable implications here, assuming 
the judicial role in question involved a strong position on the appropriateness of judicial deference or 
restraint. 
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individual judges must also be attuned to their reputations, as their personal reputation 
may affect their professional prospects as well as their legacies. Lawrence Baum 
(2008) highlights the importance of audiences organized around a social identity, 
ideology, or interest. For example, a conservative male judge may not be overly 
concerned with his reputation among progressive feminist groups, though he may be 
particularly aggrieved by critiques from conservative social groups. These reputational 
concerns are not only important in encouraging judges to maintain steadfast in their 
ideological positions (or to moderate or otherwise change their ideological 
commitments over time), but also in helping them to rank preferences and even 
identify the stakes of a particular case or their view on the relevant issues (see also 
Hollis-Brusky 2015). Patricia Woods (2008) details a similar theory based on the 
notion of “judicial community,” though in her account, judges and lawyers who 
comprise the community influence one another through the spread of ideas and 
arguments or “legal norms generation,” not as the result of reputational pressures. 
These explanations of judicial behavior share an emphasis on the social context of 
judges and courts and their audiences. 
All four of these explanations of judicial behavior focus on what judges do 
once a case comes before them. However, as Patricia Woods and Lisa Hilbink (2009: 
746) observe, “courts cannot shape, influence, or constrain political outcomes unless 
judges are able to assert themselves in politically salient cases.” While this is true, the 
limits on courts go even further. Even where judges have control over their docket – 
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except in rare circumstances41 – judges are formally bound by the cases that come 
before them (and often formally or informally bound by the particular pleadings of 
those cases that come before them). In other words, cases do not come before judges 
out of nowhere or simply as a result of the preferences of judges, whether sincere or 
strategic. Further, implicit in many of the aforementioned accounts is the notion that 
potential claimants recognize the problems in their lives as grievances (that is, not 
only as something unfortunate, but as something that is understood to be something 
objectionable), and specifically as legal grievances, or grievances that should be aired 
in the legal sphere. Even after potential claimants have conceptualized an issue as 
legal in nature, they must then bring their claim to the courts, a process rife with 
challenges.  
Beliefs course through all of these explanations of judicial behavior, whether 
explicitly, as is the case with judicial attitudes, role conceptions, and communities, or 
implicitly, as is the case with perceptions of independence or social and political 
pressure – factors key to determinations of strategic judicial decision-making. The 
belief-based account of legal mobilization foregrounds the role of beliefs in driving 
judicial behavior, though it remains largely agnostic about the extent to which 
institutional factors, strategic political factors, and social factors influence decision-
making in any given situation. In short, the account holds that judges must decide 
cases in such a way to promote – or at least not inhibit – future claims-making, 
whatever the reason for decision-making. Further, the constructivist account seeks to 
                                                 
41 Consider the investigatory and initiatory powers of the Indian Supreme Court, as well as the 
possibility the exercise of ex mero motu powers in other jurisdictions. 
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integrate the complementary role of the social construction of legal grievances, legal 
opportunity, threats, and support, and judicial behavior in explaining legal 
mobilization rather than bracketing the question of the kinds of cases that come before 
the courts. Below, Table 2.3 summarizes four propositions related to the conditions 
under which judges may be likely to respond positively to rights claims, based on the 
four explanations of judicial behavior discussed in this section, and contextualizes 
these propositions relative to my constructivist account for legal mobilization. 
Table 2.3. Accounting for Judicial Behavior 
Existing Accounts: Judicial Behavior Beliefs and Judicial Decision-Making 
 
Judges who hold “sincere ideological 
and policy preferences” that encompass 
a rights-protective stance by the 
judiciary are likely to facilitate legal 
mobilization by accepting rights claims 
and deciding those cases in ways that 
promote further rights-claiming.  
 
[Attitudinal explanations] 
 
Under different conditions, judges may 
decide cases in rights-recognizing or 
rights-expanding ways. Such rights-
protective judicial behavior may hinge 
on: 
 
• Strategic responses to political or 
institutional incentives, 
• Understandings of the appropriate 
judicial role, 
• Attempts to appease specific 
audiences, and/or 
• Shared understandings of issues 
cultivated through judicial 
communities. 
 
The constructivist account does not 
privilege any one of these explanations 
for judicial behavior and is consistent 
with one or more operating in a given 
context at a given time. 
 
However, accounting for judicial 
behavior is not sufficient to explain legal 
mobilization. Both the formation of legal 
grievances and perceptions of legal 
Judges operating in a sufficiently 
independent institutional context will be 
likely to facilitate legal mobilization by 
accepting rights claims and deciding 
those cases in ways that promote further 
rights-claiming where precedent and 
jurisprudential regimes encourage such 
decision-making and/or where judicial 
role conceptions do so. 
 
[Institutional explanations] 
  
The political environment will influence 
judicial decision-making. In the context 
of a strong executive and aligned 
legislature, judges engage in strategic 
pro-government decision-making 
(whether that is rights-protective or not 
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depends on the stance of the executive). 
Where political fragmentation occurs, 
judges will “strategically defect,” 
rendering decisions that cut against the 
current (soon to be outgoing) 
government. 
 
[Separation-of-powers explanations] 
 
opportunity, threat, and support also must 
be considered. 
Where judicial audiences or 
communities that promote rights-
protective stances exist, judges are 
likely to facilitate legal mobilization by 
accepting rights claims and deciding 
those cases in ways that promote further 
rights-claiming. 
 
[Audience-based explanations] 
 
 
4. Tying it All Together: The Constructivist Account of Legal Mobilization 
 
In the preceding, I demonstrated how separately the existing explanations for 
legal mobilization based on grievances, opportunity, and judicial behavior offer at best 
a partial understanding of the process of legal mobilization. In other words, they are 
individually insufficient to explain legal mobilization. Figure 2.1 (below) situates 
existing explanations for legal mobilization relative to the part of the process of legal 
mobilization (and the actors involved) that each helps to explain. Figure 2.1 depicts a 
stylized representation of legal mobilization, where when faced with some kind of 
legal problem, potential claimants decide to reach out to lawyers or civil society 
actors, who then facilitate the filing of a legal case, which then comes before a judge.42 
                                                 
42 Of course, some of the time the directional arrows might be reversed or run in multiple directions, for 
instance, as lawyers or NGOs can initiate a case themselves, seeking out claimants for a test case or to 
fill out a class, or as potential claimants sidestep lawyers, NGOs, or other intermediaries and present 
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Grievance-based explanations help to explain who might be a potential claimant. 
Opportunity and support-based explanations offer insight into the role of 
intermediaries, such as lawyers and NGOs, in facilitating claims-making, as well as 
why some of the time particular judges might be more or less receptive to rights 
claims. Finally, judicial behavior-based explanations explore how and why judges 
render the decisions they do. 
Figure 2.1. Stylized Representation of Legal Mobilization 
 
 
 
 
 
As noted earlier, the constructivist account of mobilization seeks to remedy 
two gaps in these existing explanations for legal mobilization. First, it explicitly 
recognizes the crucial role of beliefs underlying the process of legal mobilization. 
Beliefs about the law, rights, and the relationship between the state and its citizens 
influence which issues are understood as legally grievable. These beliefs also 
condition how actors perceive both opportunities and threats in the legal sphere, as 
well as how judges decide rights cases. Second, in adopting a perspective both “from 
                                                 
their claims directly to judges (decidedly more common in Colombia with the tutela procedure 
compared to elsewhere). 
Potential 
claimants 
Lawyers, 
NGOs, 
etc. 
Judges 
Grievances 
Legal opportunity and support structures 
Judicial behavior 
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above” and “from below,” it underscores the interplay between different kinds of 
actors in social context. How potential claimants view their rights and the legal system 
is not independent from how judges and intermediaries, such as lawyers or NGOs, do. 
A fully-fledged explanation of legal mobilization must be able to account for the 
conditions under which potential claimants might want to advance rights claims, the 
conditions under which they are able to make such claims, and the conditions under 
which judges are likely to respond positively to such claims. Importantly, it must also 
recognize that these three sets of conditions influence one another. The constructivist 
account for legal mobilization offers such an explanation. 
In the discussion above, Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 presented the core 
components of existing explanations based on grievances, opportunity and support, 
and judicial behavior next to the relevant segment of the constructivist account for 
mobilization. Table 2.4 offers the three constructivist correctives to existing theory. 
Rather than simply examining the extent of material need, the constructivist account 
focuses on the social construction of legal grievances – examining not only how 
certain issues come to be understood as particularly meaningful or grievable, but also 
why certain issues come to be viewed as legal in nature or legally claimable. The 
constructivist account supplements existing explanations based on legal opportunity 
and support structures by drawing on the notion of threats, which featured prominently 
in the political opportunity structure theory from which the concept of legal 
opportunity was developed. It also acknowledges how different combinations of 
opportunity, threat, and support can combine to prompt similar outcomes. Finally, the 
constructivist account integrates judicial behavior into demand-side explanations of 
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legal mobilization. It does not claim that any one explanation of judicial behavior – 
whether based on perceptions of strategic incentives, role conceptions, or audiences 
and reputation – always or necessarily best explains rights-protective decisions.  
Table 2.4. The Constructivist Account of Legal Mobilization 
A two-stage process of legal grievance formation, where each stage is the 
manifestation of a belief, allows for legal mobilization: 
 
(1) Something comes to be understood as objectionable. 
(2) That objectionable thing comes to be understood as (potentially) legal in 
nature or as (potentially) claimable in the legal sphere. 
 
Combinations of perceived legal opportunity, threat, and support serve as 
permissive conditions for legal mobilization. A particularly “open” opportunity 
structure can mitigate the need for a support structure, and a robust support structure 
can overcome a relatively “closed” opportunity structure. Legal threats may prompt 
mobilization even where neither legal opportunity structures nor support structures 
would indicate. 
 
Under different conditions, judges may decide cases in rights-recognizing or rights-
expanding ways. Such rights-protective judicial behavior may hinge on: 
 
• Strategic responses to political or institutional incentives, 
• Understandings of the appropriate judicial role, 
• Attempts to appease specific audiences, and/or 
• Shared understandings of issues cultivated through judicial communities. 
 
The constructivist account does not privilege any one of these explanations for 
judicial behavior and is consistent with one or more operating in a given context at a 
given time. 
 
 
While convenient to display these three revised explanations as if distinct from 
one another, ultimately each one affects the others. For instance, judicial decision-
making may appear to come at the end of the process of legal mobilization,43 but prior 
judicial decisions may encourage potential claimants to understand problems through 
                                                 
43 However, see studies on impact, for instance, Keck and Strother (2016), for considerations of the 
lives of judicial decisions outside the courtroom.  
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legal or rights-based frames (or not to do so) and judicial decisions come to comprise 
part of legal opportunity (namely, judicial receptivity). Likewise, a support structure 
may feature prominently in the social construction of legal grievances, as NGOs reach 
out to potential claimants, running rights education workshops and/or offering legal 
aid services on some issues but not others (implicitly suggesting that the issues for 
which they offer services are more legally grievable). A support structure can also 
influence the ways in which judges understand their preferences or roles, and exposure 
to repeated claims-making about a specific grievance – whether propelled by a support 
structure or not – may encourage judges to rethink their opinions on that issue. My 
constructivist account of legal mobilization provides the tools to examine how these 
factors are related, as well as how they influence each other over time. 
Finally, it should be noted that the goal is not to predict when exactly 
individuals will turn to law and when they will not. Nor is the goal to explain why any 
one individual turns to law while others do not. Instead, I seek to identify and explore 
broad social patterns related to legal claims-making. I turn now to a discussion of the 
historical changes that led to the possibility of advancing legal claims to social rights 
in Colombia and South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW  
 
Historical accounts trace the development of legal systems to the changing 
nature of the relationships within groups. Formalized law derives from the informal 
rules fashioned to create or maintain social relationships, and this formalized law 
governs not just horizontal relationships between equals but also vertical relationships 
between rulers and those they rule. In other words, law as such emerged to regulate the 
behavior of members of a political community, limiting the relative power of leaders 
through a system that exchanged protection (from internal repression and external 
threat) for resources in the form of taxes (e.g., Tilly 1990) and developing standards to 
support economic growth (e.g., North and Weingast 1989). Others argue that rulers 
consent to constitutional regulation in order to avoid revolutionary overthrow (e.g., 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) or as a response to specific electoral pressure (e.g., 
Ginsburg 2003; Hirschl 2004). In none of these conceptions did the state need to 
ensure, through universal legal principles or “rights,” the basic welfare of its citizens. 
However, over time, understandings about the appropriate relationship between state 
and citizen have changed. 
Specifically, the fourth wave of constitutionalism (Van Cott 2000) marks a 
significant change in the thinking underlying the relationship between the law, the 
state, and the citizenry. Namely, this form of constitutionalism, which was prominent 
in the 1980s and 1990s, includes an expansive recognition of rights, particularly social 
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rights, and, often, broad review powers for the judiciary.44 Scholars have termed this 
model “social constitutionalism” (Brinks and Forbath 2014; Angel-Cabo and Lovera 
2015).45 In this conception, constitutional law is understood as an appropriate tool to 
address social ills, at least under certain conditions. At times, this shift in the function 
of constitutional law has been accompanied by the creation of mechanisms to allow 
citizens to claim their rights with relative ease.  
The rights implicated in social constitutionalism encompass not only the most 
immediate provisions necessary to make participation in political and social life 
theoretically possible (e.g., the right to assemble or the right to vote), but also those 
provisions necessary to make participation in social and political life actually feasible 
(e.g., access to healthcare, housing, and education). In many ways, social 
constitutionalism may be thought of as implying formal social citizenship in T.H. 
Marshall’s terms. Marshall (1950: 11) defines social citizenship as “the whole range 
from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to 
the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the 
standards prevailing in the society.”46 Here, social citizenship is described in relation 
to social and economic rights (or at least the right to participate in social and economic 
life – a minimum standard). The extent to which rights recognitions lead to changes in 
the social structure is debatable;47 however, it is important to note that this 
                                                 
44 None of this is to say that the recognition of social rights or declarations of state attention to citizen 
needs were necessarily absent before this period.  
45 Others have referred to these changes as new constitutionalism (Hilbink 2008) or social rights 
constitutionalism (Brinks and Gauri 2014; Brinks, Gauri, and Shen 2015). 
46 See also Powell’s (2002) interesting discussion of Marshall’s social citizenship and subsequent works 
on the topic. 
47 Marshall proclaims, “National justice and a law common to all must inevitably weaken and 
eventually destroy class justices, and personal freedom, as a universal birthright, must drive our 
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understanding of citizenship does not necessarily entail full equality – it simply poses 
limits on inequality. Formal social citizenship suggests only equality of opportunity in 
social and economic realms, while substantive social citizenship might go a step 
further, requiring some basic level of social welfare provision, though even 
substantive social citizenship does not imply complete equality.  
In this chapter and the one that follows, I trace the development of the idea that 
law can and should be responsive to the needs of all citizens, examining the macro-
level process of transnational diffusion of ideas about constitutional law and rights, the 
localized processes by which particular ideas took hold at particular times, and the 
political contestation that followed the emergence of social constitutionalism. This 
chapter focuses specifically on the historical development of constitutional law in 
Colombia and South Africa, while the next will consider more explicitly why and how 
social constitutionalism took hold in each country. In detailing these processes, I draw 
on semi-structured elite interviews, archival documents covering the debates at each of 
the national constituent assemblies, and secondary sources.  
The paths to social constitutionalism differed substantially in Colombia and 
South Africa. While Colombia featured a long history of constitutionalism and judicial 
review, the South African state, on the other hand, was long-characterized by 
parliamentary supremacy. Despite these differences, the political and legal institutions 
of both countries remained largely inaccessible to much of the population until the 
reforms of the early 1990s. As each country faced deepening political crises and calls 
                                                 
serfdom” (1950: 30). Later scholars do not necessarily share his optimism, pointing to the ways in 
which seemingly national, common, or equal law continues to benefit the already privileged at the 
expense of the poor, racial minorities, and others (e.g., Motta Ferraz 2011). 
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for the re-founding of the state in the late 1980s, would-be reformers turned to 
international legal models, ultimately deciding to adopt social constitutionalism. In 
short, domestic social pressure in each country accounts for the timing and form of 
constitutional change, while transnational ideas account for the content of the change. 
 
A Brief History of Colombian Constitutional Law 
 
“Colombianos, las armas os han dado independencia. Las leyes os darán libertad.”48 
- Francisco de Paula Santander (inscription on the façade of the Palacio de 
Justicia) 
This section describes the growth of social constitutionalism in Colombia, 
dividing Colombian constitutional history into four parts:  early constitutional history 
(pre-1886), the era of the Constitution of 1886 (1886 to 1970), crisis and failed 
reforms (1970s and 1980s) and the 1991 Asamblea Nacional Constituyente.  
1. Early Colombian Constitutional History 
In 1821, delegates at the Congress of Cúcuta drafted Colombia’s first national 
constitution, following years of regional constitutional orders.49 This constitution is 
alternately known as the Constitution of 1821, the Constitution of Cúcuta, or the 
Constitution of Gran Colombia. A commonly told story features the independence-
fighter and then-vice president Francisco de Paula Santander opening the 
constitutional text and laying it out over a sword, stating, “The swords of the liberators 
must now be subject to the laws of the republic.”50 Notably, this constitution called for 
the progressive emancipation of slaves. While the constitution remained a far cry from 
                                                 
48 “Colombians, guns have given you independence. Laws will give you freedom.” 
49 See, for instance, the Constitution of Socorro of 1810 and the Constitution of Cundinamarca of 1811. 
50 See El Tiempo (29 March 1992). President Simón Bolívar y Palacios was out of the country during 
this time, continuing to fight battles of independence against Spain throughout Latin America. 
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implementing social rights and protections, the Constitution of 1821 does mark the 
beginning of the intersection of national politics and constitutional law.51 
From 1821 to 1886, the country had seven constitutions, each marking 
intermediate points in conflicts between conservative and liberal political actors, 
where the victorious side was able to draft a guiding document to consolidate its 
power.52 None of these constitutions lasted more than 23 years. The longest lasting of 
these, the 1863 Constitution, which also known as the Constitution of Rionegro, was 
implemented by a Liberal government. The Constitution featured a sizeable bill of 
rights and introduced a federal governing arrangement, and is said to have been 
dismissed by Víctor Hugo as being “a constitution fit for angels,” rather than one fit 
for Colombia (Cepeda 2004: 532).53 The Constitution of 1863 abolished the death 
penalty, mandated the separation of church and state, and recognized many individual 
rights. 
2. The Conservative Constitution of 1886 and Early Reforms54 
Following yet another internal armed conflict, which culminated in the Battle 
of Humareda, Rafael Núñez came to power. In that moment, he is said to have 
declared, “The Constitution of 1863 has died.”55 A constituent assembly comprised 
                                                 
51 For more on the early history of constitutionalism in Colombia, see Restrepo Piedrahita (1993). 
52 These constitutions include went into force in 1821, 1832, 1843, 1853, 1858, 1863, and 1886.  
53 Juan Carlos Henao (2013), former magistrate of the Constitutional Court and rector of the 
Universidad Externado del Colombia, points out that historians have challenged whether or not Hugo 
actually said this, and importantly, notes that whether or not the quote is true, the constitution in fact 
“expressed the intellectual aspirations and convictions of people of flesh and blood, not angels, people 
who believed in freedom of conscience, in the free development of the personality, of the balance of 
powers, of freedom of expression and information.”  
54 For thorough histories of the 1886 constitution, see Valencia Villa (1987) and Cajas (2015) (both 
volumes). 
55 Or more colorfully, as Henao (2013) attests, “La Constitución de Rionegro ha dejado de existir, sus 
páginas manchadas han sido quemadas entre las llamas de la Humareda.” (The Constitution of Rionegro 
(1863) has ceased to exist. Its pages have been burned in the flames of Humareda.) 
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primarily of Conservatives drafted a new constitution, one that affirmed the power of 
the Catholic Church, defined a centralized state, and rolled back many of the liberal 
reforms of the 1863 Constitution. As Julieta Lemaitre notes, throughout the twentieth 
century, in Colombia, “there has been a consistent liberal and a consistent 
conservative identity. And the Constitution [of 1886] has been a symbol of this 
polarization.”56   
Judicial review in Colombia began with the 1886 Constitution, which 
empowered the Supreme Court to examine the constitutionality of legislative bills 
under certain circumstances. A 1910 reform introduced the public act of 
unconstitutionality, which allowed citizens to challenge the constitutionality of any 
law before the Supreme Court (Cepeda 2004: 538).57 The reform in 1910 is just one of 
the 74 reforms to the constitution in its 105-year existence. These reforms began to 
“introduce a series of guarantees, particularly with the reform of 1936, which brought 
social rights into the Constitution … [including the idea of] the social function of 
property and the first land reform law in Colombia.”58 The 1936 reforms, which 
included substantial changes in matters of agriculture, education, and taxes, and 
allowed the state to play a more active role in the economy, came at the initiative of 
Liberal president Alfonso López Pumarejo. Hernando Herrera traces the ideas behind 
these reform efforts to “the influence of the German [Weimar] Constitution and the 
Mexican Constitution of Querétaro [of 1917].”59 Lemaitre points to broader regional 
                                                 
56 Interview 160906_0020. 
57 For more on the 1910 reforms (as well as a general discussion of the development of administrative 
control in Colombia) see Malagón (2012). 
58 Interview160920_0028. 
59 Interview 160927_. 
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trends, arguing that Liberal efforts “to push through modernizing constitutional 
reforms … echoes the wider Latin American aspiration to modernity and development 
in the ‘50s and ‘60s. The 1936 reforms are part of social reforms all over the world, 
which include the New Deal. These are Western trends, and not particularly 
Colombian.”60 
Subsequent reforms in the 1950s recognized the right of women to vote (1954) 
and instituted a power sharing agreement between the Conservative and Liberal parties 
called the National Front (1957). This power sharing agreement was meant to stymie 
the continued expression of bipartisan violence, which had been a reoccurring feature 
of Colombian politics since the late 19th century. The 1957 reform also brought into 
effect a system of “co-option” on the Supreme Court, which meant that the Court 
would nominate new justices internally, as long as political balance was maintained 
between the two major parties (Cepeda 2004: 540). Amendments in 1968 paved the 
way for a transition out of the National Front and into competitive elections, in 
addition to modifying congressional rules on a variety of matters. The National Front 
came to an official end in 1974, when both the Conservative and Liberal Party ran 
competitive candidates for president.  
3. Continued Violence and Failed Reforms 
Institutional inadequacies became abundantly clear late 1970s and 1980s, as 
violence between the state, guerrilla groups, paramilitaries, and drug cartels continued, 
multiple attempted constitutional reforms flopped, and the country remained under an 
almost constant state of siege. Violence perpetrated by the state and paramilitaries in 
                                                 
60 Interview 160906_0020. 
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the name of combatting the guerrillas often took the form of human rights violations 
against ordinary citizens.61 Throughout this period, the infamous Medellín drug cartel 
grew in strength and prominence, wreaking havoc across the country through car 
bombings and other violent tactics, oriented both at state and non-state actors. The 
judiciary especially became the target of cartel violence, as a result of the possibility 
of extradition to the United States for drug-related offenses. This led to the creation of 
jueces sin rostro in the early 1990s, an effort to hide the identity of judges such that 
they would be able to decide cases having to do with the drug cartels without being 
subject to threats and homicide attempts.  
Further, in 1985, the M-19, an urban guerrilla group, stormed the Palacio de 
Justicia, home to the Supreme Court and the Council of State, taking hostage the 
sitting Supreme Court justices as well as hundreds of others. The standoff ended 28 
hours later, following what has been described as an “excessive and disproportionate” 
military raid.62 In the end, more than 100 people, including twelve of the Supreme 
Court justices, died, and about dozen guerrillas were disappeared. According to Julieta 
Lemaitre (2009: 66), the violence at the Palacio de Justicia became “a symbol of the 
reality of the war and the impossibility of peace.” Solidifying this perception of the 
impossibility of peace was the near-continual state of siege, which expanded 
presidential powers, but also indicated an inability of the government to respond to the 
challenges it faced. Mauricio García Villegas (2001) found that between 1970 and 
                                                 
61 See Palacios (2006) and Tate (2007) for additional information on the recent history of violence in 
Colombia. 
62 See Cosoy (2015) for the BBC. Cosoy cites historian David Bushnell, who suggests that the military 
may have acted on its own, rather than waiting for the orders of President Belisario Betancur.  
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1991, the Colombian government declared a state of siege more than 80% of the time, 
creating what he calls a “constitutional dictatorship.”63  
This violent context did not inspire faith in the ability of the state, including the 
judiciary, to respond effectively to citizen needs. Economic inequality and insecurity 
further exacerbated citizen mistrust in the state. As Donna Van Cott (2000: 49) notes, 
“economic dislocations made more apparent the extreme concentration of wealth, 
productive resources, and positions of authority in the hands of a small elite, and the 
extent to which this elite ruled in its own economic interest.” Further, efforts to 
address any of these concerns seemed futile. Two Liberal presidents – Alfonso López 
Michelsen in 1978 and Julio César Turbay Ayala in 1981 – attempted, unsuccessfully, 
to initiate constitutional reforms.64 The Supreme Court blocked both reforms on 
procedural grounds. In the case of the López Michelsen reforms, the Court argued that 
constitutional reform fell within the duties of the Congress, and that Congress could 
not delegate these duties. With the Turbay reforms, which had received Congressional 
approval, the Court pointed to other procedural problems. In 1987, the Supreme Court 
announced that future plebiscites would be prohibited. Plebiscites had in the past, for 
example in 1957, led to constitutional reforms. John Martz (1997: 248) notes that “by 
early 1988 the topic [of constitutional reform] was the single hottest political issue in 
the media.” That year, President Virgilio Barco proposed a plebiscite on the issue of 
plebiscites. In an interview, Fernando Cepeda, the Minister of the Interior under 
                                                 
63 See also Antonio Barreto (2011). 
64 One Conservative president, Belisario Betancur, was able to implement a proposed constitutional 
reform, which decentralized the Colombian state, creating local political participation mechanisms and 
allowing for the direct election of mayors. 
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President Barco, described this proposal by referring to a Colombian saying, “en 
derecho, las cosas ser rehacen como se hacen, [or] in matters of law, you un-make 
laws the way you make them.”65 The plebiscite was blocked by Congress, and other 
efforts by the Barco government to advance a constitutional reform were stymied by 
the Supreme Court and the threat of cartel violence (Van Cott 2000). 
Three presidential candidates were assassinated in 1989 and 1990, including a 
young, popular Liberal Senator by the name of Luis Carlos Galán.66 As Van Cott 
(2000: 53) states, Galán’s death “seemed to symbolize the deaths of hundreds of 
judges, politicians, journalists, and common citizens.” Inspired especially by Galán’s 
death, but also by the general climate of seemingly unending violence, students 
throughout the country protested, calling for constitutional reform. Alejandra Barrios, 
one of the leaders of the student movement recalls their motivation: 
This series of events caused us to mobilize for the right to live, for the right to 
die of old age … What we saw was no future, there was no way out. 
Impossibilities of negotiation, impossibilities of institutional changes. When 
we created the student movement, we were looking for a social pact. We 
understood the constitution not as a charter of rights or a legal agreement, but, 
in truth, as a new social pact … It was not so much about the content of the 
constitution as the chance to say, “This country has to find another way besides 
war.”67 
 
In 1989, the students organized a silent march to the Plaza de Bolívar, the site of the 
Palacio de Justicia and frequent culminating point for protest marches. The following 
year, the movement asked voters to fill out an additional, seventh ballot (séptima 
                                                 
65 Interview 160808_0010. 
66 Candidates Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa (Unión Patriótica) and Carlos Pizarro Leongómez (AD/M-19) 
were both killed in 1990. Another prominent member of the Unión Patriótica, Jaime Pardo Leal, had 
been assassinated in 1987. 
67 Interview 161019_0042. 
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papeleta) in support of the creation of a constituent assembly. Though the Barco 
government supported such an effort, the possibility of an official plebiscite and 
constitutional reform had to pass through the Supreme Court, which had blocked 
several previous reform efforts. Surprisingly, the Court accepted the Barco 
government’s arguments that the séptima papeleta represented the will of the people 
and that the president’s state of siege powers allowed him to convoke a constitutional 
assembly, as the country was in crisis. Voters overwhelmingly approved the proposed 
assembly.68 
4. The Asamblea Nacional Constituyente and the New Constitution69 
On December 9, 1990, Colombian voters elected 70 members to the 
constituent assembly, including 25 members of the Liberal Party, 19 of the 
demobilized Alianza Democrática M-19 (AD M-19), 11 from the Movimiento de 
Salvación Nacional (MSN), nine from the Partido Social Conservador, and two each 
from the Movimiento Unión Cristiana, the Unión Partriótica, and indigenous 
movements. Fernando Carrillo Flórez, one of the leaders of the student movement was 
elected from the Liberal Party list. The government appointed four additional 
members, two from the demobilized Ejercito Popular de Liberación, one from the 
Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores, and one from El Movimiento Armado 
Quintín Lame. Álvaro Gómez Hurtado of the MSN, Antonio Navarro Wolff of the AD 
M-19, and Horacio Serpa Uribe of the Liberal Party shared the presidency of the 
constituent assembly.70 Juan Carlos Esguerra, a constituent from the MSN list, notes 
                                                 
68 See Dugas (2001) and Lemaitre (2009) for more detailed accounts of the student movement. 
69 For more detail on the workings of the constituent assembly, see Van Cott (2000). 
70 See Banco de la República (n.d.) for more information on each of the constituents. 
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the importance of this diversity in composition of the assembly: “The one main 
difference between [the 1991] Constitution and all the others before … is the fact that 
it was drafted a group of Colombians that were representing the entire republic, that 
were directly elected by the people, and they were a very small but comprehensive and 
full picture of Colombia.”71  
The constituents divided themselves into five commissions, with each member 
deciding which of the commissions to participate in. All proposals had to be approved 
during two plenary debates. David Landau (2014: 89) argues that members of the 
constituent assembly “view[ed] solutions to the grave problems that the country was 
facing in 1991 in terms of judges and law” in large part due to the historical 
involvement of the Supreme Court “in a broad range of political disputes.” Even 
within the context of this legal focus, the constituents had a wide range of viable 
options from which to choose as they drafted a new constitution.  
The final draft of the Constitution enshrined social rights, created a new 
Constitutional Court, redefined the Colombian state as an estado social de derecho, or 
social state under the rule of law, and adopted an easy to use mechanism called the 
acción de tutela that allows citizens to make formal claims to their constitutional 
rights. With respect to the debates over social rights, Juan Carlos Esguerra recalls: 
When the systematization process of the constitution took part, we divided [the 
Bill of Rights] into fundamental rights, socio-economic, and then cultural 
rights, and then what we called the collective rights. They correspond mostly 
to what the experts call the first, the second, and third generation of rights … 
[Every right was] thoroughly discussed, and in some cases even aggressively 
discussed … There were debates about whether or not and to what extent to 
include the socio-economic and cultural rights. Some people said it was 
absolutely mandatory that they would be approved as fundamental rights. 
                                                 
71 Interview 160923_0035. 
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Others that they should be approved in other ways, and some others who said 
well, to put it in the constitution, but of course we have to understand, that the 
country has to understand, that that is like a dream for one day that might come 
when they are going to become reality, a carta al niño dios.72 
 
These debates over the content of the Bill of Rights could have ended differently, for 
instance with the decision not to recognize social rights at all. For example, some 
members of the constituent assembly, like Alberto Zalamea Costa, cautioned against 
over-inclusiveness in listing rights: a “list of the thousand and one rights is not 
necessary, but the enumeration of the essential ones plus the rights that, for certain 
reasons, have been more violated in Colombia are not necessary.” For Zalamea, the 
rights to life, equality before the law, free association, and the prohibition of torture 
were these key rights.73 Yet, these debates were resolved with the acceptance of 
enumerated social rights, a solution that is especially surprising given Colombia’s 
status as a highly conservative and oligarchic political system during the height of the 
Washington consensus for neoliberalism. The Constitution was promulgated on July 4, 
1991, and the newly-created Constitutional Court began to hear cases the following 
year.  
 
The Development of Constitutional Law in South Africa 
 
The following sections describe the major contours of South African 
constitutional law, a history of constitutional development that differs substantially 
from its Colombian counterpart. I start with the unification of the South African state 
                                                 
72 A carta al niño dios is roughly similar to a letter to Santa Claus. Interview 160923_0035. 
73 Tramite de Proyectos 34, Comisión Primera “Derechos y Deberes Humanos” (7 March 1991). 
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as the Union of South Africa in 1909 and move through to the post-apartheid adoption 
of social constitutionalism.  
1. The Construction of a National Legal Order and Apartheid 
In 1909, the South Africa Act codified the creation of the Union of South 
Africa, unifying four settler states in the process. This move solidified the geographic 
and political bifurcation of white and non-white South Africans at the 
recommendations of the Lagden Commission.74 Around this time, a group of white 
delegates met at the National Convention to determine the future of the Cape, Natal, 
Transvaal, and Orange River (or Orange Free State) colonies, as well as the status of 
non-white South Africans in the new united South Africa. As John Dugard (1990a: 
354) notes, these colonies had separately developed distinct constitutional traditions: 
First, there was the Orange Free State’s highly successful experiment with a 
binding United States-type constitution, with guaranteed rights (although 
largely for whites only). Second there was the Transvaal’s rejection of the idea 
of fundamental law in favor of the supremacy of the Volksraad [the People’s 
Council]. Third, there was the Cape and Natal experience of British 
Parliamentary institutions. 
 
Ultimately, the National Convention favored the Cape-Natal-British model, though a 
prominent judge by the name of John Gilbert Kotzé had pushed for a constitution with 
a bill of rights and some measure of judicial review prior to the convention (Klug 
2000: 32). Dugard (1990a: 355-56) shows that a plurality of delegates at the 
Convention were trained as lawyers trained under the parliamentary system and that, 
with the exception of Judge Kotzé, most viewed the US constitutional order with 
skepticism. The 1910 Constitution of the Union of South Africa had many features of 
                                                 
74 For a more detailed assessment of race and racial classification in pre-apartheid and apartheid-era 
South Africa, see Posel (2001). 
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Westminster-based constitutions; however, it also included severe limitations on the 
franchise.  
Among other changes, the Union of South Africa sought to dramatically 
reframe land access and ownership with the passage of the Native Land Act of 1913, 
which caused the mass dispossession of black South Africans of land and 
implemented the foundation of territorial segregation. This mass dispossession helped 
to perpetuate black poverty throughout South Africa. The national government, 
however, was concerned more with white poverty, which endured in parts of the 
country. The Carnegie Commission of Investigation on the Poor White Question of 
1932 served as a platform to address this situation. Francis White, a labor economist 
involved in the second Carnegie inquiry in the 1980s described this first commission 
as having been “hijacked” by the National Party and used as an “intellectual source” 
for apartheid (Carnegie Commission Oral History Project: 118-19). The Commission’s 
report led to the creation of a government department for social welfare. No similar 
effort was made to understand and ameliorate the conditions contributing to black 
poverty in South Africa.75 Instead, pre-apartheid and apartheid-era laws served to 
institutionalize black poverty and subjugation (in the name of “separate 
development”). 
 In 1948, the National Party came to power and implemented a series of laws 
further distinguishing between the rights of South Africans of different races, 
establishing the apartheid system. Throughout this period, the constitutional order 
remained the same, while the state became both more and more exclusionary and more 
                                                 
75 See also Nattrass and Seekings (2011) on this point. 
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and more interventionist (particularly through efforts to create and maintain so-called 
“homelands” as well as the system of pass laws76). Undoubtedly, two of the most 
destructive and disruptive features of apartheid involved the theft of land and 
restriction of access to cities and centers of employment, but apartheid also 
precipitated the inequitable allocation of resources for health, education, housing 
support, and social security. While constructing systems of state support for white 
South Africans, these resources were diverted away from or were severely limited for 
black and other non-white South Africans.77 These exclusionary measures were 
developed within a legal framework, one that recognized parliamentary sovereignty 
above else, but a legal framework nonetheless. 
2. A Widening Debate about Constitutional Law 
These legal developments did not proceed unchallenged. In 1955, the African 
National Congress, along with the other members of the anti-apartheid coalition 
known as the Congress Alliance, drafted the Freedom Charter at the Congress of the 
People in Kliptown, which set out a vision of an inclusive, rights-protective state ruled 
by and for the people. The ANC solicited input from residents of both townships and 
rural areas (Mandela 1995: 170-76), and the Congress of the People involved nearly 
three thousand delegates. Ultimately, the Freedom Charter included demands for 
democracy, equality before the law, human rights protections, access to land and 
work, education, housing, and peace. Although the Freedom Charter – unsurprisingly 
                                                 
76 For more on the pass law system specifically, see Abel (1995: chapter 3). For a detailed history of 
homelands or “Bantustans,” see Phillips (2017). 
77 For more detailed discussions of the construction of and life in the apartheid state, see Abel (1995), 
Mandela (1995), O’Meara (1997), and Clark and Worger (2011), among others. 
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– did not influence the National Party’s stance on constitutional questions, the legacy 
of the Freedom Charter is significant. For one, the Freedom Charter impacted the 
organization of the resistance movement. In 1959, the Pan-African Congress split off 
from the ANC, citing displeasure with the Freedom Charter as one of their primary 
rationales for the move. Additionally, the Freedom Charter impacted the policy 
platform of the ANC as the country transitioned out of apartheid. In fact, the ANC 
adapted the Freedom Charter into a document entitled “Ready to Govern,” and it 
featured heavily in the ANC’s policy platforms as it began to lead the country.  
 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, even as apartheid deepened, the debate about 
constitutional law widened, particularly with respect to the inclusion of a Bill of 
Rights.78 Specifically, an opposition party known as the Progressive Party routinely 
pressed for the addition of a bill of rights to the South African constitution.79 In 1960, 
following the advice of the Molteno Commission, the Progressive Party adopted the 
policy goal of drafting a bill of rights. Members of the United Party also voiced 
support for this proposal. In the following year, the country left the Commonwealth, 
developing a new constitution and renaming itself the Republic of South Africa. This 
new constitution did not bring with it the addition of rights recognitions or the 
possibility of judicial review. Instead, the Parliament continued to reign supreme, 
passing new national security laws that allowed for detention without trial and 
abolished habeas corpus protections. In 1973, as John Dugard (2015: 48) recalls, “a 
                                                 
78 Importantly, throughout this period, South Africans contested apartheid law through the legal system 
(Abel 1995). As Meierhenrich (2008: 142) observes, “Black South Africans could not be voters under 
apartheid, but they could be plaintiffs – and successful plaintiffs at that.” 
79 This paragraph and the next draw heavily on Dugard (1990b) and (2015). 
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group of South Africans of all races, comprising most black leaders, Progressive Party 
representatives, newspaper editors, and academics, adopted a declaration of consensus 
which proposed that ‘the rights of each individual be protected by a bill of rights 
entrenched in the federal constitution.’” This expanded debate, though, had yet to 
influence the National Party’s position. 
Popular calls for consideration of a bill of rights continued to grow through the 
early 1980s, as South Africa moved toward the creation of another constitution. The 
resulting 1983 Tricameral Constitution did not feature either judicial review or a bill 
of rights. Surprisingly, the state’s policy toward a bill of rights shifted, when in 1986, 
“with no explanation the Minister of Justice, Mr. J. H. Coetsee, announced in 
Parliament that he had requested the South African Law Commission to investigate 
the role of the courts in protecting group and individual rights and to consider the 
desirability of instituting a bill of rights” (Dugard 1990b: 448). In 1989, the same year 
that F.W. de Klerk assumed the presidency, the Commission released a report which 
recommended a draft bill of rights that included civil and political rights recognitions 
for all South Africans, regardless of race or gender, but did not include any social 
rights recognitions. During the following year, the National Party released Nelson 
Mandela from prison and “unbanned” the African National Congress and other 
opposition parties, signs of progress that indicated the likelihood of some kind of 
transition and a new legal order. Still, the content of the new legal order and the extent 
to which the transition would be peaceful were unknown. Even to the extent that 
external pressure, whether through civil society-led boycott campaigns or economic 
and diplomatic sanctions, pushed for South Africa to move toward democracy and 
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support of human rights, there remained substantial choices within these broad 
categories about how to design and orient the new South Africa. 
3. “We Want Freedom and We Want Bread” 
Building from the Freedom Charter as well as the “Ready to Govern” 
pamphlet, the ANC began to more frequently and in greater detail outline its 
preferences as apartheid drew to a close. In 1990, the ANC announced a working 
document on its vision of “A Bill of Rights for a New South Africa,” which argued: 
… we do not feel that it is necessary to make a constitutional choice between 
having freedom or having bread. We do not want freedom without bread, nor 
do we want bread without freedom. We want freedom, and we want bread … 
Our approach has been to identify certain needs as being so basic as to 
constitute the foundation of human rights claims, namely, the rights to 
nutrition, education, health, shelter, employment and a minimum income. In 
South Africa, it is not just a question of dealing with poverty such as you might 
find in any country, but with responding to the social indignities and 
inequalities created as a direct result of State policies under apartheid. The 
strategy proposed for achieving the realization of these rights is to 
acknowledge them as basic human rights, and require the State to devote 
maximum available resources to their progressive materialization (vii-ix). 
 
Thus, the ANC’s commitment to some kind of constitutional framework that would 
guarantee access to social goods (though not necessarily as justiciable social rights) is 
readily apparent. Further, the choice of constitutional design was not one belonging to 
the ANC alone. 
The constitutional negotiations took place between 1990 and 1993, and they 
included the Conventions for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA I and II) and the 
Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP).80 The resulting Interim Constitution of 1993 
introduced judicial review, created the Constitutional Court, and established a Bill of 
                                                 
80 For more detailed accounts of these negotiations, see Mandela (1995), Sparks (1995), Klug (2000: 
chapter 4), and Meierhenrich (2008), among numerous other sources 
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Rights.81 This Bill of Rights did not include robust social rights protections, but 
neither did it preclude them from being added later in the Final Constitution, which is 
precisely what occurred. Following the establishment of the Interim Constitution, a 
Constitutional Assembly consisting of both houses of the newly-elected Parliament 
was convened to draft a Final Constitution, which would be certified by the newly-
created Constitutional Court. 
As part of this final drafting process, the major political parties established 
several theme committees, which were tasked with providing expert advice on 
constitutional design questions, including on the inclusion and scope of rights 
protections. Theme Committee 4 handled these rights questions. The First Report of 
Theme Committee 4 in January 1995 notes that all of the parties to the Constitutional 
Assembly agreed in principle that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
and International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (1966) could “be used as important references for identifying 
universally accepted fundamental rights,” that “[t]he Bill of Rights should be 
entrenched, justiciable and enforceable,” and that the final list of included rights 
should not be limited to the rights listed in the Interim Constitution (41-42). This last 
point was important in that the Interim Constitution recognized a rather limited set of 
                                                 
81 For Ginsburg (2003: 55), South Africa’s adoption of judicial review was a “textbook example of the 
insurance theory,” wherein minority veto players seek out judicial review to protect their interests from 
a dominant majority in the future. Yet, insurance theory cannot account for the shift to social 
constitutionalism in particular – white South Africans may have sought limits on the ANC’s power, but 
they were not expressly concerned with the broad realization of the rights to health, housing, or 
education, for example. 
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social rights (including basic education and an “environment which is not detrimental 
to… health or well-being”). 
All of the major parties submitted documents outlining their preferences 
regarding constitutional rights protections to the Theme Committee 4. The ANC’s 
preliminary submission to the committee, entitled “Our Broad Vision of a Bill of 
Rights for South Africa,”82 indicated deep support for a substantive set of social rights, 
as well as a clear role for the courts in helping to realize those rights (48-49). The 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and Pan African Congress (PAC) also advocated for the 
inclusion of justiciable social rights, expressly noting that the Bill of Rights should be 
geared toward supporting the wellbeing of citizens. The IFP’s proposal suggested that 
the constitution should allow for “the updating and evolution of human rights 
protection, which are historically an ever changing field of law,” and called for the 
constitution to recognize “all fundamental human rights and all those other rights 
which are inherent to fundamental human needs and aspirations as they evolve with 
the changes and growth of society …” (59).83 The PAC called for the creation of “an 
institution modeled along the lines of the European Human Rights Commission” to 
help with what they called the “practical enforceability” of rights.84 
The Democratic Party, on the other hand, raised a number of concerns about 
the separation of powers and enforceability of rights. Their submission held that 
                                                 
82 This document is distinct from the document, “A Bill of Rights for a New South Africa,” referenced 
at the start of this section. Part of the Constitutional Assembly Theme Committee 4 Fundamental Rights 
Report on Block 1 (Constitutional Court archives, 46-48). 
83 Part of the Constitutional Assembly Theme Committee 4 Fundamental Rights Report on Block 1 
(Constitutional Court archives, 57-62). 
84 Part of the Constitutional Assembly Theme Committee 4 Fundamental Rights Report on Block 1 
(Constitutional Court archives, 68-71). 
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“policy formation – from the detailed provision of health services to the allocation of 
housing – is preserve of parliament, not the constitution” and suggested that relatively 
few civil and political rights be explicated in the Bill of Rights. They also noted, 
however, that “because the promises of a Bill of Rights could be empty, cruel words 
echoing in a wasteland of deprivation and denial, the Bill must provide for a standard 
of justification which empowers the citizen to obtain from government the 
entitlements to the means of survival” (51).85 The National Party also raised strong 
concerns about social rights, stating “the inclusion of more socio-economic rights 
[presumably beyond those included in the Interim Constitution] in the bill of rights 
itself, is legally untenable and will, moreover, give rise to immense practical problems 
for government” and advocated for the use of “alternative mechanisms” to address 
issues related to social rights, such as “directive principles” (66-67).86 
While there was significant disagreement as to the scope and application of the 
Bill of Rights in these initial submissions, it is important to note that all parties framed 
their proposals in terms of international human rights discourse, not as a result of 
coercion or even explicit suggestion by external actors, but as a result of a shared 
understanding among domestic elites of the legitimate sources of constitutional 
examples. Further, these debates were less heated than those regarding the question of 
land and property. As one expert involved in the drafting process as a member of the 
                                                 
85 “Submission on Constitutional Principle 2: Fundamental Rights,” part of the Constitutional Assembly 
Theme Committee 4 Fundamental Rights Report on Block 1 (Constitutional Court archives, 49-56). 
86 Part of the Constitutional Assembly Theme Committee 4 Fundamental Rights Report on Block 1 
(Constitutional Court archives, 63-67). The Vryheidsfront Party also expressed skepticism about 
socioeconomic rights – specifically whether or not they were “universally accepted” and whether or not 
they were enforceable in practice. The African Christian Democratic Party submission noted that the 
party would support rights of any generation, as long as they were “not condemned by the Word of 
God” (Constitutional Court archives, 45). 
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Technical Committee to advise the Constitutional Assembly on Drafting of Bill of 
Rights noted, “The debate on property rights was much more vigorous and intense … 
Social and economic rights went through quite easily. The ANC supported social and 
economic rights, and the Technical Committee was unanimous in its support … We 
did keep that very separate from the property rights issue.”87,88 In fact, the Technical 
Committee achieved early consensus. The same expert recalled, “The Committee 
unanimously supported the inclusion of socioeconomic rights in the Bill of Rights. 
That is how the decision was taken. And then came the drafting … We relied heavily 
on the Covenant [on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights].” He went on to say, 
“There was no great philosophical debate … We were all lawyers.”89  
Further, by the time that the Constitutional Assembly negotiations were in full 
swing, another expert advisor on the Technical Committee holds that “the debate at 
that point focused on the justiciability issue and where the courts should have a 
specific role” in the adjudication of social rights. That same expert further notes that 
for some, including many ANC members, “the idea was to see the Bill of Rights as a 
tool to transform society.” Others, including members of the National Party and the 
Democratic Party, were more skeptical (for various reasons). However, there “was a 
convergence because they also saw [that] the more you’ve got in the Bill of Rights, the 
more protection there would be for minority group as well.”90 Generally speaking, 
then, elite political actors seemed to agree on the language of debate (oriented toward 
                                                 
87 Interview 170825_0141. 
88 Though land and property may logically fit within the conceptual category of social and economic 
rights, they have typically been referenced separately in discussions of rights in South Africa. 
89 Interview 170825_0141. 
90 Interview 180514_.  
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existing international human rights law), and the experts appointed to advise these 
political elites expressed even less variance in their views on the potential Bill of 
Rights. 
These robust protections were a cause of consternation for some black South 
Africans at the time, however, who expressed displeasure or skepticism at the strength 
of these protections for minorities, calling the Bill of Rights “the Bill of Whites.” 
Relatedly, as Stephen Ellman (1995: 473) writes, “The transitional agreements the 
ANC endorsed are the product of compromise rather than a simple expression of the 
ANC’s preferences. Moreover, they are the product of a process in which lawyers – 
whose disposition toward legal arrangements may not have been shared by those they 
represented – played a major role.” Not everyone agreed that judges should play this 
role in protecting social rights, as former justice Albie Sachs noted in an interview: 
[T]here [was] some concern about whether the rights to health, education, 
housing and so on should be left in the hands of the judges who … I think it 
was by training, by social background inherited thinking from a rather 
conservative section of society and who wouldn’t have that kind of vision to go 
along with the vision in the new constitution. However, at that stage, we were 
already thinking on having a Constitutional Court and a new kind of judiciary 
responsive to understanding of the all-around development of human beings.91 
 
Thus, while the inclusion of social rights as justiciable rights was not a foregone 
conclusion, it was not a particularly contentious issue either, certainly not among those 
experts tasked with recommending an approach to the Constitutional Assembly. While 
these experts and elites may have drawn heavily from existing international law and 
legal thought, the specific arrangements that resulted were not externally imposed so 
much as chosen. 
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The commitment of the ANC with respect to justiciable social rights is perhaps 
more debatable than the previous sections have let on. On the one hand you have 
people like Albie Sachs arguing that “to understand socioeconomic rights in South 
Africa, you’ve got to understand the importance the Bill of Rights in our whole 
constitutional order … It was central to the opposition [to apartheid].”92 Additionally, 
another justice on the first bench of the Constitutional Court suggested, “It was almost 
taken for granted that there would be socioeconomic rights. It wasn’t seriously 
contemplated that there wouldn’t be. I think the attitude – certainly as I understood [it] 
– of the ANC was that if the Constitution was to mean anything to the people, it 
wouldn’t be sufficient just to deal with [civil and political rights].”93 On the other 
hand, a prominent lawyer involved in the transition noted: 
The ANC supported [the inclusion of social and economic rights], even though 
it was obvious that they were going to bear the burden … And the ANC has 
not been particularly enthusiastic about implementing social and economic 
rights [since then] … But I think even at that stage the ANC realized that they 
would be the party that would be in charge of enforcing these rights and I don’t 
think they were particularly enthusiastic about that. They had no option.94  
 
Additionally, as Fowkes (2016: chapter 8) holds, the ANC had been internally divided 
on the issue of social rights, not about their importance, but about the relative role of 
elected representatives and judges on their protection and promotion. He attributes 
some of the pushback the Constitutional Court would face from the ANC in the 2000s 
to this division. Overall, there seems to have been overall support for the development 
                                                 
92 Interview 171003_0170. 
93 Interview 170718_0115.  
94 Interview 170825_0141. 
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of a constitutional order that featured justiciable social rights protections prominently, 
despite certain points of contestation.95  
The Constitution was adopted in May 1996, with the support of nearly 90% of 
the members of the constitutional assembly, though it was almost immediately 
challenged in court, and the Constitutional Court refused to certify the text. The Court 
instead asked the constitutional assembly to review and revise eight sections of the 
constitutional text. In December, the Court certified the revised text, which entered 
into force early the following year. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described the development of constitutional law in Colombia 
and South Africa, from exclusionary constitutional structures established in the 18th, 
19th, and 20th centuries, up through the adoption of social constitutionalism by each 
country in the early 1990s. Despite an early history of repeated constitutional 
replacement, Colombia has had a long tradition of constitutional supremacy and 
judicial review. Even so, conservative understandings of the role of courts, combined 
with political arrangements that affected the appointment process and the enduring 
threat of violence against judges, meant that the courts did not historically serve as a 
viable forum for rights claims-making. The late 1980s brought a social and political 
crisis that left Colombians with the perception that some kind of foundational legal 
change was necessary. Members of a national constituent assembly in 1991 drafted a 
                                                 
95 One of the particular concerns of many South Africans was how the new government would approach 
land restitution and property rights. I bracket the question of land and property rights, focusing on social 
rights, and the broader category of socioeconomic rights. See Hall (2004) and Klug (2016) for 
discussions of the debates on land during the transition and in recent years. 
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new, social constitution. In contrast, South Africa’s political system featured long-
standing parliamentary sovereignty and a legal system that at once served to 
implement the structures of apartheid and provided tools for occasional successes in 
the fight against it. With resistance to apartheid coming to a head in the late 1980s, the 
sense that some kind of fundamental change to the structure of the state was necessary 
prevailed. During the negotiated transition to democratic rule, members of the 
constitutional assembly adopted a new social constitution. The next chapter considers 
how we ought to understand the adoption and institutionalization of social 
constitutionalism in Colombia and South Africa, considering various models of the 
institutional change. 
  
  94 
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CHAPTER 4 
CRITICAL JUNCTURES AND THE EMBEDDING  
OF SOCIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM  
 
The previous chapter detailed how crises, which shook popular confidence in 
the underlying structure of the political system, opened space for new ideas about the 
role of the state and the role of constitutional law to gain adherents and to become 
recognized in the new constitutions of Colombia and South Africa. The crises in 
Colombia and South Africa, though different in structure, were similar in effect, 
giving way to calls for modernization of the legal systems of each country and to calls 
for a solution to specific social problems in the form of the creation of new 
constitutions.  
This chapter focuses on how we ought to understand the institutional changes 
that came with these new constitutions in the aftermath of perceived social and 
political crises. I demonstrate that new options about how exactly to modernize the 
legal system and to address these social problems suddenly became not only feasible 
but desirable in these moments. The confluence of domestic crises, which led to the 
perceived need for a re-founding of the state – including the drafting of new 
constitutions – and the ideas about constitutions and constitutionalism that happened 
to be prominent at the time of these crises formed the critical juncture from which 
social constitutionalism emerged in these two countries. Stated differently, the 
antecedent conditions for social constitutionalism included crises that had been 
propelled to the fore by domestic social pressure, which provided the incentive for 
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constitution-making, as well as a specific set of transnational ideas. These 
transnational ideas served as the set of examples from which constitution-drafters 
would cull as they constructed these new constitutions. Popular and elite 
constituencies proved receptive to the rights and mechanisms embedded in the newly-
drafted constitutions, ensuring the constitution’s relevance to subsequent social and 
political struggles. 
Yet, I argue that it was by no means inevitable that either Colombia or South 
Africa would adopt social constitutionalism in the aftermath of these crises, nor was it 
inevitable that the turn to social constitutionalism would endure. These crises led to 
critical junctures, or “moments in which uncertainty as to the future of an institutional 
arrangement allows for political agency and choice to play a decisive causal role in 
setting the institution on a certain path of development, a path that then persists over a 
long period of time” (Capoccia 2015: 148). In these moments, individual choices leave 
a lasting impact on institutional forms, forms that at other points in time may seem 
natural or immutable. While the adoption of social constitutionalism had before 
seemed impossible considering the exclusionary political systems that existed in each 
country, this move became possible and even came to be seen as inevitable itself, after 
the fact. Political contestation around the newly-created and newly-empowered actors, 
institutions, and mechanisms of social constitutionalism would determine the precise 
legacy of this change. 
In these cases, several historically plausible alternative outcomes existed, 
including the adoption of liberal constitutionalism, the inclusion of social rights 
protections as parchment promises or directive principles, and even failed 
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constitutional negotiations. Considering the conservative, oligarchic structure of the 
Colombian political system and the preferences of the still-powerful South African 
white elite, constitutional change could just have easily resulted in liberal 
commitments to democratic governance and the rule of law without social 
commitments to recognizing the rights to health, housing, education, and social 
security. In addition, neighboring countries that adopted new constitutions during 
these times did not necessarily turn to social constitutionalism – for instance, the 1990 
Namibian Constitution does not include protections for social rights like health and 
housing, and the 1993 Peruvian Constitution recognizes a much more limited set of 
rights than does the Colombian or South African Constitution. A watered-down social 
constitutionalism, featuring the inclusion of social rights simply as directive 
principles, was also plausible in each country. Finally, in the case of South Africa, 
constitutional negotiations were fraught, and analysts at the time repeatedly cautioned 
that failed negotiations and a descent into all-out civil war were not only plausible, but 
likely. Yet, what occurred in both Colombia and South Africa was the adoption of 
social constitutionalism.  
This move to social constitutionalism reflects the result of contingent choices 
during critical junctures, though the juncture in Colombia differed somewhat from the 
one in South Africa. Rachel Riedl and Ken Roberts (2019: 11) distinguish between 
activating and generative critical junctures, where a greater degree of antecedent 
conditioning features in activating junctures, while a greater degree of choice prevails 
in generative junctures. The Colombian case better reflects an activating juncture, 
while the South African case is emblematic of a generative juncture. The difference 
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between the two types is not one of magnitude but of the degree of contingency during 
the juncture itself. In Colombia, there was greater predisposition toward 
constitutionalism particularly and certain features of constitutionalism, such as the 
recognition of an estado social de derecho, or social state under the rule of law, in 
particular.96 In South Africa, on the other hand, the turn to any kind of 
constitutionalism was foreshadowed by fewer pre-existing conditions, as Heinz Klug 
(2000) details. Importantly, in both countries, we see that, as Riedl and Roberts (2019: 
27) anticipate, the antecedent conditions – whether the juncture is activating or 
generative – “influence institutional innovation during the critical juncture, yet take on 
new values and shape possibilities in new ways given the transformed context.” 
The rest of this chapter details different models of institutional change that 
could explain the emergence of social constitutionalism, before demonstrating that the 
critical juncture model best applies to these cases. It closes with a discussion of the 
events that ensured the institutionalization of social constitutionalism in each country. 
 
Perspectives on Institutional Change  
 
In comparative studies of institutional development three models predominate: 
gradual institutional change, chronic instability, and critical junctures. The model of 
gradual institutional change involves relatively continuous, minor changes that 
cumulatively result in consequential changes to institutional outcomes. In other words, 
this model highlights the enduring quality of institutions while also noting that not all 
                                                 
96 In short, the estado social de derecho distinguishes between a state that is simply bound by the rule of 
law and one that also recognizes some kind of social commitment. For more on the concept of estado 
social de derecho in Latin America, see Brinks (2012). 
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institutional changes are drastic shifts following exogenous shocks; instead, changes 
may result from “endogenous developments that often unfold incrementally” 
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 2). The mechanisms of gradual institutional change 
include displacement, layering, drift, and conversion (Streeck and Thelen 2005). 
Displacement involves the replacing of old rules or institutions with new ones and can 
be an abrupt or slow process. Layering, by contrast, refers to revising, updating, or 
adding to existing rules or institutions. In cases of institutional drift, the rules or 
institutions are the same in form, but differ in consequence. Similarly, conversion 
involves rules or institutions that do not change in form, but that are interpreted in new 
or different ways (see also Schickler 2001; Thelen 2004; Hacker 2005). The likelihood 
of each mechanism occurring at a given point in time depends on characteristics of the 
political context (specifically who can block change) and characteristics of the 
targeted institution (namely the amount of discretion in the interpretation and 
enforcement of institutional rules). 
The second set of accounts of institutional change includes chronic instability 
(Bernhard 2015) and serial replacement (Levitsky and Murillo 2013). Chronic 
instability refers to “multiple, frequent, and connected episodes of disjunctive change” 
(Bernhard 2015: 977). An emblematic example of this phenomenon is the repeated 
cycling between democracy and dictatorship experienced by many countries in both 
Europe and the Global South. In these cases, political institutions were short-lived, and 
institutional changes were both radical and abrupt. Chronic instability results when an 
institutional arrangement does not become self-reinforcing. Exogenous shocks, the 
existence of confounding conditions, and unexpected behavior by the actors involved 
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in the institutions in question may all serve to inhibit institutional perseverance. Steven 
Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo (2013: 96) detail the similar process of “serial 
replacement” in their examination of constitutional reforms, economic liberalization, 
electoral reforms, and decentralization in Latin America. Where institutions are not 
“born strong (or in equilibrium)” meaning that they are not “designed more or less in 
line with (1) domestic power and preference distributions and (2) existing social and 
political norms,” serial replacement or chronic instability are likely to occur. 
The third model emphasizes critical junctures. A critical juncture refers to “(1) 
a major episode of institutional innovation, (2) occurring in distinct ways, (3) and 
generating an enduring legacy” (Collier and Munck 2017: 2). Critical junctures 
involve discontinuous change, where the weakening of institutional environments 
during moments of perceived crises allows for the possibility of substantial abrupt and 
enduring change (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007).97 An important part of the analysis of 
critical junctures is the identification of critical antecedent conditions. Some 
antecedent conditions may simply serve as background context and may not provide 
empirical leverage on a case, while others may actually be best understood as rival 
hypotheses, potentially accounting for the outcome of interest directly (Slater and 
Simmons 2010). The assessment of critical antecedents, in contrast, is necessary to 
understand the choice set available to actors during a critical juncture (see also Riedl 
and Roberts 2019).  
                                                 
97 Importantly, as Roberts (2014: 46) holds, these other models of institutional change “are not 
necessarily antithetical to a critical juncture approach. They may, in fact, represent alternative 
institutional legacies of a critical juncture that also produces patterns of discontinuous but self-
reinforcing institutional change – that is, the conventional punctuated equilibrium model – in a specified 
set of cases.” 
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Also integral to the study of critical junctures is the existence of alternative 
outcomes that are “not simply hypothetically possible,” but, more importantly, 
“historically available” (Capoccia 2015: 159, emphasis in original). Here, it must be 
conceivable that the critical juncture could have precipitated an alternate institutional 
arrangement than the one that emerged. Contingent choices result in radical 
institutional changes, and following these changes, “new rules become 
institutionalized and actor autonomy contracts due to constraints posed by new 
structures” (Bernhard 2015: 976). The extent to which these new institutional 
arrangements endure depends on mechanisms of production and reproduction, reactive 
sequences, and the results of political contestation about these new arrangements. As 
Ken Roberts (2019: 7) describes, “institutional legacies do not necessarily crystallize 
during the critical juncture itself.” Reactive sequences may take years or even decades 
to fully unfold, making it difficult for analysts to ascertain the full consequences in the 
immediate aftermath of the critical juncture.  
Key to distinguishing between these models of institutional change are two 
factors: (1) whether the change was continuous or discontinuous, and (2) whether the 
change leaves an enduring institutional legacy or not (Roberts 2019). Roberts (2019: 
2) notes that the “essential hallmarks [that] distinguish critical junctures from other 
models of institutional change [are their] discontinuous character and the enduring 
quality of the institutional transformations they produce.” Gradual institutional change 
may leave an institutional legacy, but it is better conceptualized as continuous rather 
than discontinuous. Chronic instability and serial replacement suggest repeated 
discontinuous change, but these situations do not leave enduring institutional legacies. 
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As I will detail in the sections that follow, institutional change in the form of the 
adoption of social constitutionalism occurred abruptly in Colombia and South Africa, 
and in each country, reactive sequences resulted in the embedding of social 
constitutionalism – factors that together indicate that the emergence of social 
constitutionalism can be best understood through the framework of critical junctures. 
 
How Should We Understand Social Constitutionalism in Colombia?  
 
In contrast to much of the rest of Latin America, after 1886, constitutional 
change in Colombia was limited to amendments rather than abrupt and repeated 
replacement – up until the drafting of the 1991 Constitution, which remains in effect 
today. Thus, the logic of chronic instability or serial replacement does not offer much 
insight into Colombia’s adoption of social constitutionalism. In the sections that 
follow, I consider first whether the turn to social constitutionalism reflected gradual 
institutional change or a rupture in Colombian constitutional development. I then 
consider the plausibility of something other than social constitutionalism emerging 
from the 1991 constituent assembly. I finish with a discussion of the legacy of the 
adoption of social constitutionalism, examining in particular the reaction – and 
interaction – of relevant constituencies, including political elites, judges, and everyday 
citizens.  
1. Incrementalism or Rupture 
One might interpret the historical antecedents of the 1991 Constitution as a 
demonstrating evolutionary, incremental change with social commitments being 
gradually layered atop of liberal constitutionalism. The 1886 Constitution did not by 
any means include widespread recognitions of social rights, but a series of reforms 
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expanded the scope of this liberal constitution.98 The most significant change related 
to social rights came with the 1936 reform package. This reform was “practically a 
new constitution,”99 and it introduced the idea that property and other rights may have 
“social functions” as well as some basic protections for workers, agrarian reform, and 
changes to the educational system. As Julio Ortiz, who formerly served as a justice on 
the Supreme Court, described it, these reforms could be understood as a “restricted 
social constitutionalism.”100  
However, the 1936 reforms were quickly undermined. For one, they did not 
impact judicial decisions.101 In other words, these rights were not claimed in the legal 
sphere, and judges did not expand the scope of these rights through decisions. As one 
Colombian lawyer colorfully described, “it was a case of sterilization by judicial 
interpretation.”102 In addition, conservative elites opposed to President López 
Pumarejo attempted to initiate a constituent assembly to remove the legal foundation 
for these reforms. While these elites were unsuccessful in their efforts to once again 
reform the constitution, they did manage to roll back the reforms in the legislature.103 
Further, Gustavo Gallón, the founder of the Colombian Commission of Jurists, argues 
that “not only did [the reform of 1936] not become a reality, but it also gave rise to a 
very strong reaction on the part of the landowning sectors and was later translated into 
the violence of the ‘50s and the [violence] which we have lived until today.”104 Thus, 
                                                 
98 Importantly this is “small-l” liberalism – the 1886 Constitution was an artefact of the Conservative 
Party. 
99 Interview 160906_0020. 
100 Interview 160922_0032. 
101 Interview 160908_0021. 
102 Interview [number redacted]. 
103 Interviews 160906_0020, 160916_, and 160921_00300. 
104 Interview 161104_0053. 
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while the 1936 reforms can be thought of as “constitutional antecedents” to the 1991 
constitution, as Hernando Herrera put it,105 these reforms did not set off a period of 
gradual movement toward the robust recognition of social and economic rights or the 
sense that the judiciary ought to play a significant role in promoting and protecting 
social and economic rights. 
 Between 1936 and 1991, popular and legal debates largely turned away from 
the issue of social constitutionalism or social rights recognitions. On the one hand, the 
two main political parties coalesced around a power-sharing agreement, which 
stymied efforts at institutional reform. As the power-sharing agreement broke down in 
the 1970s, various elected officials attempted to initiate constitutional reforms, though 
these were almost all blocked by either other elected officials or the Supreme Court.106 
On the other hand, this period saw the emergence of several leftist guerrilla groups, 
who preferred extra-institutional contestation. These groups also attempted to promote 
non-government-driven social restructuring (ultimately combined with significant and, 
at times, indiscriminate violence). The closed nature of the party system and the 
“opting-out” of traditional politics by the guerrilla groups made incremental moves 
toward social constitutionalism highly unlikely. 
2. Alternative Plausible Outcomes of the Constituent Assembly 
When we take a close look at the ideational considerations of the constituents, 
we see that the adoption of social constitutionalism was neither inevitable nor 
necessarily expected by actors involved in the constitutional debates. Constituents 
                                                 
105 Interview 160927_. 
106 Chapter 3 describes these reform efforts in greater detail. 
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evaluated many approaches to constitutional law, and, perhaps more importantly, they 
did not always anticipate the consequences of the choices they made as they drafted a 
new constitution. 
Manual José Cepeda, describes the preparation he and other advisors to 
President Gaviria undertook before the constituent assembly: 
[E]very Saturday morning we had a discussion on comparative constitutional 
law with the President. From 9:00 am to 12:00 or 1:00 pm, we discussed how 
different problems were approached in different countries, problems that were 
relevant for Colombia. And we didn’t look only at the text of the constitution 
but [also] at the decisions rendered by the respective courts.107  
 
Hernando Herrera, who worked as an assistant during the assembly, explains that the 
“primary function [of the assistants] was investigative, looking at comparative law and 
what happened in other countries,” especially with respect to “how certain institutions 
in Colombia could work better.” In assessing the resulting constitution, Herrera 
estimates that, in terms of rights protections, “one could say that about 25% come 
from Germany, 15% from Mexico, another 15% from Spain, 10% from North 
America, and the rest from Colombia.” He further recalled that “a fundamental 
element was the jurisprudence of the high courts of the United States, Germany, 
Mexico, and Spain.”108 Diana Fajardo confirms this comparative law approach within 
the assembly, and points specifically to the constitutions of Spain, France, and the 
United States as having inspired different parts of the resulting 1991 Colombian 
Constitution.109 In addition, constituents referenced international law, including the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in their draft proposals. 
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Rodolfo Arango holds that the “German and Spanish Constitutional Courts 
were the motor of constitutional development in the post-war period … and, in fact, 
Spanish law – due to language – was perhaps most influential [on Colombian law].” 
Arango points specifically to Spanish author Eduardo García de Enterría and his book, 
La constitución como norma y el tribunal constitucional (1982) as key in developing 
the ideas that constitutions could have normative form and immediate, direct 
application, rather than serving as programmatic guides.110 Mario Cajas adds that 
“Manuel Aragón Reyes and other Spaniards had some influence on the constitution … 
[The constituents] were looking at the Spanish model of estado social de derecho, and, 
in fact, the definition [of estado social de derecho] is the same” in the constitutions of 
both countries.111 Still others point to Manuel García Pelayo – a prominent Spanish 
jurist and expert in comparative constitutional law – in tracing the connection between 
German legal thought (specifically that of Carl Schmitt), Spanish legal thought, and 
Latin American legal thought. Constituent Jaime Ortiz (1991), drawing on the French 
constitutional theorist Georges Burdeau, defined the modern constitution as the proper 
guide for the 1991 assembly:  
The modern constitution draws the contours, not of the existing order, but of 
the future. They indicate the place of the individual, the family, [and] the 
intermediary groups, define the rules to govern economic activity, the role of 
limits of property, indicate to the state the activities to be undertake and the 
needs to be met. They specify the extent and nature of the help [a citizen] can 
expect from the society as well as [his or her] duties within it. This idea of the 
future society that the text lays out is nothing other than the ‘idea of right’ that 
power must be dedicated to realizing. 
 
                                                 
110 Interview 160825_0016. 
111 Interview 160916_. 
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These guides suggest a forward-looking constitution and one that pays some attention 
to social needs, but not necessarily a commitment to social constitutionalism.112  
During this perceived crisis, citizens also pushed for change from below, and 
one might imagine that this pressure from below included concrete ideational 
directives for how to change the existing constitutional order. In fact, however, this 
was not the case. Citizens did not necessarily advance a specific ideology or legal 
agenda other than change from the existing constitutional foundation. Julieta Lemaitre 
(2009: 74) holds that:  
Colombian legalism, the inheritance of Santander (‘el hombre de las leyes’), 
had been attacked and questioned by the right and the left since the middle of 
the 20th century … For the right, this legalism signaled the inability to 
understand the urgency of the defense of life and property. For the left, liberal 
rights were an illusion; they were the masked face of oppression. As such, both 
positions despised the foundation legalism (of Colombia). 
 
As a result, social groups on both sides of the political spectrum felt the need for legal 
reform. Several guerrilla groups, including the M-19 and El Movimiento Armado 
Quintín Lame, demobilized around this time as well and were granted the opportunity 
to participate in the constituent assembly directly as constituents. In addition to these 
political actors who sought changes to the existing legal infrastructure, students 
formed a student movement for constitutional reform. Rodolfo Arango explains, “the 
student movement opened the door for constitutional change that had not been 
possible before.”113 However, this pressure focused on the need for constitutional 
change toward equality, democracy, and peace without necessarily going into 
                                                 
112 In fact, though the concept of the estado social de derecho is often associated with social 
constitutionalism, the idea that the state is limited both by social concerns and the rule of law does not 
imply a robust recognition of social rights per se. 
113 Interview 160825_0016. 
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details.114 It would be a stretch to relate directly this social pressure for change and 
any specific model of government responsiveness.  
Importantly, however, as Eduardo Cifuentes recalls, the constituent assembly 
took place in the context of several other constitution-drafting experiences in Latin 
America, referencing explicitly to the Brazilian constitution of 1988: 
[T]hese constitutions generally introduced a very broad charter of fundamental 
rights … and the new Latin American constitutions recognized of economic, 
social, cultural rights as well as collective rights, together with fundamental 
rights. This was not an innovation of the 1991 constituent assembly, but it 
follows the current trend that was then in fashion in Latin America.115 
 
This context provided a set of examples of other states in the region exploring social 
constitutionalism, in whole or in part. Still, the Colombian constituents often went 
further in terms of rights recognitions and the development of mechanisms or 
institutions meant to promote and protect rights than their neighbors. For instance, the 
1993 Peruvian Constitution did not include the right to housing or shelter, and the 
1988 Brazilian constitutional reform did not involve the creation of an entirely new 
court to hear rights claims (though it did include the creation of a new constitutional 
chamber within the existing Supreme Court). While these ideas related to social 
constitutionalism were being experimented with in neighboring countries, constituents 
still made choices about whether and how to implement these ideas in the Colombian 
context. Rather than expanding these ideas, they just as easily could have adopted 
more restrictive versions, such as expressly non-justiciable social rights, a position 
favored by many experts on human rights law.  
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Further, Colombia had long been a holdout relative to the rest of Latin 
American legal development, most clearly in their late adoption of a mechanism 
similar to the amparo (a writ of protection for constitutional rights found throughout 
Latin America).116 While Mexico adopted the mechanism in 1857, Guatemala (1879), 
El Salvador (1886) and Honduras (1894) followed suit soon after. In the early 20th 
century, Nicaragua (1911), Brazil (mandado de securança, 1934), Panama (1941), and 
Costa Rica (1946) adopted similar mechanisms. Next came Venezuela (1961), Bolivia, 
Paraguay, Ecuador (1967), Peru (1976), and Chile (recurso de protección, 1976). 
Colombia adopted the acción de tutela a full 15 years after Chile, and 134 years after 
Mexico. In other words, it was by no means obvious, in historical perspective, that 
Colombia would adopt regionally or inter nationally trending ideas about 
constitutional law at any particular point in time. 
One could imagine the constituent assembly instead embracing a new vision of 
liberal constitutionalism, revising the rules governing the Congress and its duties 
(which it did in part), and stopping there. Considering Colombia’s historically 
conservative political sphere, as well as the interests of still-powerful elites, and the 
violence that ensued after the previous attempt at social reform in 1936, the drafting of 
a liberal constitution seems to have been highly plausible. While the 1991 constituent 
assembly was more representative than any previous constituent assembly in 
Colombia, more than 30% of delegates came from the Liberal Party, more than 11% 
from the Conservative Party, and more than 15% came from the Movimiento de 
Salvación Nacional, whose delegates largely came from circles of political and legal 
                                                 
116 For more on the development of the amparo and its legacy in the region, see Brewer-Carías (2009). 
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elites. The assembly did include many “non-traditional” members, including delegates 
from demobilized guerrilla groups, but traditional political elites still maintained a 
majority. Instead of doubling down on liberal constitutionalism, however, the 
constituent assembly embraced a robust social constitutionalist rights discourse and 
empowered new institutions (including the Constitutional Court and the Defensoría 
del Pueblo) to defend these rights.  
Some view the 1991 Constitution as the unlikely combination of neoliberal 
economic policy and social constitutionalism, at once affirming the value of non-
interference in the market and the state-led protection of social rights – with the 
implicit suggestion being that a liberal constitution and a neoliberal economic policy 
would be more typical. On average, interviewees distinguished between a tension or 
contradiction in the Constitution in terms of its economic orientation and its social 
rights commitments – President Gaviria, after all, was an economist by training. Some 
respondents, however, hold that the Constitution does not necessarily set forth an 
economic orientation, suggesting that this tension might be overstated.117 Either way, 
the twin pressures of neoliberalism and social constitutionalism were undoubtedly 
present in Colombia in the early 1990s.  
Thus, a variety of sources – in terms of legal thinkers as well as international, 
national, and regional legal traditions – came together and influenced the environment 
surrounding the constituent assembly, specifically with respect to how constituents 
understood which promises and rights-protections belong in modern constitutions. The 
preceding political crisis that led to the creation of the constituent assembly gave 
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constituents the opportunity to examine these diverse sources of legal thought – some 
of which had existed for decades and even centuries – that previously had not been 
possible to incorporate into the Colombian constitutional order, whether because of a 
lack of imagination or political impediments. While liberal constitutionalism had been 
the only conceivable option prior to this crisis, new possibilities were suddenly 
imaginable.  
Contingent choices made by constituents during the assembly had significant, 
and sometimes unexpected, downstream effects.118 For example, Juan Carlos Esguerra 
uniquely proposed the acción de tutela instead of the more common amparo 
procedure to protect the newly-enshrined constitutional rights. Rodolfo Arango, who 
worked with Manuel Jose Cepeda on the government’s constitutional assembly team, 
recalls that many groups proposed some version the amparo procedure, intended to 
“give teeth to constitutional rights,” arguing that “it was in the air.”119 Yet, it was 
Esguerra’s proposal that made its way into the constitution. Esguerra clarifies what set 
his proposal apart: 
The tutela was intended to be the remedy for those rights who have no remedy 
at all … there was a reason for that, a reason for which has been disappeared 
over time unfortunately, and that is the following. We had to recognize that we 
had lots of very effective [and] some less effective remedies for the protection 
of rights … The Mexican amparo is a very generic remedy. We needed a very 
specific remedy. And so I didn’t want people to think that we were going to 
bring that generic remedy, which would be good for almost everything. But a 
specific one which would be good for those cases and rights were there was no 
remedy.120 
                                                 
118 Alberto Zalamea, a member of the constituent assembly, criticized the process, suggesting that these 
choices were not well thought out: “I considered that it had been an unsuccessful, improvised 
experiment, in which out of the first articles, which correspond to [fundamental] rights… are an 
important part, [but] I believe that the rest was done on the run (Peña 2011). 
119 Interview 160825_0016. 
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The unexpected development with the tutela was its expanding scope. Esguerra 
summarizes:  
At the beginning, if you would look at the Constitution, the first answer would 
be tutela is not for social rights. Because for tutela is constructed for the 
fundamental rights and fundamental rights are chapter number one and the 
social rights are chapter number two in title number one. So tutela is 
[technically] not for them.121 
 
Julieta Lemaitre noted how surprising the growth of the significance of the tutela was, 
stating that “I don’t think in 1991 anybody could have seen the importance of tutela, 
but by 1994, 1995, certainly, people were starting to get it. By the end of the decade, it 
was clear that it was important, the only game in town.”122 Another example comes in 
the story of how the proposal for a new constitutional court gained steam. Cepeda 
(2004: 550) highlights President Carlos Gaviria’s leadership:  
[The initial] arguments [in favor of a new Court] were not enough to build a 
solid majority within the Constituent Assembly in favor of creating a 
constitutional court. Nonetheless, a blunt, timely, and persuasive address by 
President Gaviria to the delegates, in which he encouraged them to redefine the 
system of constitutional judicial review in order to preserve the new 
Constitution, changed the minds of many delegates. 
 
These key features of Colombian social constitutionalism, then, resulted from political 
agency and contingent choice during the constituent assembly. 
Perhaps the best way to conceive of the connections between the Colombian 
Constitution of 1991 and its historical antecedents is as follows. Colombian legal 
thought owes much to traditions developed in Germany, France, and Spain. However, 
as Isabel Cristina Jaramillo notes, “Ideas travel, but [there has to be] some fertile 
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ground for them to [take] hold.”123 President Gaviria called on his team of 
constitutional advisors, as well as on the constituents of the constituent assembly to 
investigate potential solutions to the problems plaguing Colombia through a study of 
comparative constitutional law. While few provisions of the Spanish or German 
constitutions were adopted without strong modifications, the ideas undergirding these 
constitutions – that the state ought to serve a social role, protecting citizens beyond 
simply offering the right to vote every few years – were available to the delegates and 
advisors at the constituent assembly, who had unique freedom to debate and adopt a 
new model of constitutionalism due to the existence of a social and political crisis. 
Political agency and contingent choice led to the unique institutional form of 
Colombian social constitutionalism. 
3. The Legacy of Institutional Transformation 
The mere adoption of social constitutionalism did not guarantee that it would 
become institutionalized. Examples of constitutional false-starts and neutralization by 
political reactions or “sterilization by judicial interpretation” abound globally. Here, 
an examination of reactive sequences and political contestation clarifies why and how 
social constitutionalism became both embedded and strengthened in Colombia. 
This new institutional arrangement clearly empowered the Constitutional Court 
(and gave the justices the opportunity to empower themselves even more), and it had 
the potential to empower everyday citizens through the tutela, but it was not clear how 
exactly citizens would view constitutional law or the types of legal claims they would 
bring. With respect to the Constitutional Court, Landau (2014: 128) shows how the 
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first set of justices and their law clerks came together to shape “the doctrines of the 
Court in a way that would maximize its influence over the rest of the political and 
judicial system.”124 Mario Cajas shares a similar view: 
If one goes to the debates of the constituent assembly looking for how they 
attributed meanings to a series of articles and clauses to then understand the 
jurisprudential development of the [Constitutional] Court, one realizes that the 
Court built a narrative beyond what the constituents said.125 
 
More specifically, the Court asserted its primacy in the judicial system, while also 
expanding the nature of rights protections through the tutela procedure. The tutela had 
seemed to be limited to a defined set of “fundamental” (in this case civil and political) 
rights in the text of the constitution. As Esguerra describes, however, this changed: 
But, what happened? The Constitutional Court and people started to [think], 
wait, let’s, let’s make the social rights real, and [they did this] first through 
what they called the idea of connecting rights. There are, they said, rights that 
are connected to fundamental rights and through that way they kind of must be 
treated as fundamental.”126  
 
Chapter 7 provides greater detail on the mechanics of these judicial innovations, but 
what is most important here is that the expansion of rights protections furthered the 
social constitutionalist ideological visions of at least a core faction of the 
Constitutional Court justices (see also Nunes 2010b; Landau 2014), visions that were 
not necessarily shared by drafters of the constitution. The furthering of these visions 
also resulted in the strengthening of the Court with respect to other organs of state, 
especially the rest of the judiciary. 
                                                 
124 Landau (2014, chapter 4) further identifies the importance of a set of justices and advisors connected 
to the Universidad de los Andes.  
125 Interview 160916_. 
126 Interview 160923_0035. 
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 In addition to facilitating tutela claims related to social rights, the 
Constitutional Court also expanded its role by allowing tutela claims against judicial 
decisions (the tutela contra sentencias) and by developing the idea of an 
unconstitutional state of affairs (estado de cosas inconstitucionales), which would then 
be remedied through structural decisions. The Court issued structural decisions in 
cases about the healthcare system, the prison system, and the status of internally 
displaced people. With the tutela contra sentencias, not only does the hierarchy of the 
judiciary shift, but, as Juan Carlos Esguerra noted, essentially, “lawsuits do not end in 
Colombia … [because there are] seven opportunities to decide the same thing.”127 
Members of the judiciary recoiled at the notion of the tutela contra sentencias, in a 
move commonly described as a “choque de trenes” (literally, a train crash). Landau 
(2014: 160) notes that in response, “the ordinary courts complain[ed] openly about the 
Constitutional Court and demand[ed] reforms” by way of eliminating the tutela contra 
sentencias.128 Further, the Court began to strike down emergency decrees and ruled 
that while President Uribe could run for a second consecutive term, he could not take a 
third term. 
 The Court could not have made such aggressive moves, especially with respect 
to the tutela, had citizens not embraced the mechanism. In the early 1990s, citizens did 
not necessarily understand the purpose, promise, or limits of the tutela, but nonetheless 
experimented with it. As Julieta Lemaitre describes, “It was more an expression of 
despair and hope than anything.”129 Subsequent chapters detail how exactly the tutela 
                                                 
127 Interview 160923_0035. 
128 See also Quinche (2007) and Olano (2013). 
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came to be ubiquitous, particularly in the realm of health. For now, though, what is 
most significant is that the citizenry embraced the tutela, which rendered the tutela 
politically untouchable (which in turn ensured a large role for the courts in Colombian 
life), despite political coalitions that included President Álvaro Uribe and his Minister 
of the Interior, Fernando Londoño, that were strongly in favor of eliminating the tutela 
or at least limiting its scope. Proposed limitations to the tutela included ending the 
possibility of the tutela contra sentencias and the tutela for social rights claims. The 
President of the Court at the time, Eduardo Montealegre, gave an interview with El 
Tiempo, in which he critiqued one of Londoño’s proposals to reduce or eliminate the 
tutela, holding that Londoño’s real goal was to:  
… end the Constitutional Court. But the road goes further: Minister Londoño 
intends to break the Constitution, with a clear strategy of dismantling the 
fundamental principles of the Constitution of ‘91. I say dismantle because he is 
doing in parts, in pieces. If one begins to join those pieces, one discovers that 
he is going after a totally different model of state.130 
 
However, as Landau (2014: 129) demonstrates, the Court was able to weather these 
proposals, with current and former justices going on the offensive, alongside various 
supporters. He further explains that: 
… the Court cultivated a number of different bases of support, and these bases 
of support – elements of the academic community, civil society, and the 
general public – have protected the Court at key moments. The Court’s 
aggressive exercises of judicial review, in other words, were supported by 
communities of actors with the ability to maintain continuity within the Court 
and to protect the Court against political backlash. 
 
Thus, the combination of the newly empowered Court and newly empowered citizens 
safeguarded the expansive model of social constitutionalism in Colombia. 
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In more recent years, as many of the lawyers and legal academics I interviewed 
noted, members of Congress seem to have developed a new strategy to try to reduce 
the power or effect of the Constitutional Court, through “mediocrity-packing.” In other 
words, rather than trying to limit the Court through changes in the institutional 
structure or through the nomination of formalistic or conservative judges,131 Congress 
has tried to cut off the sense of connection between the Constitutional Court and the 
people by nominating judges who are not viewed as “superstars.”132 It remains to be 
seen whether or not this strategy will pay off. For now, though, the reactive sequences 
following the adoption of social constitutionalism have stabilized in such a way that 
social constitutionalism endures – or perhaps more accurately, the Constitutional 
Court and its proponents have won social and political battles throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s that have ensured that social constitutionalism has endured in Colombia. 
 
What Explains the South African Adoption of Social Constitutionalism? 
The proposition that social constitutionalism would not have been adopted had 
apartheid not ended seems impossible to dispute, but this does not mean that the same 
configuration of factors that led to the end of apartheid also resulted in the adoption of 
social constitutionalism. As other scholars have described and debated in depth, the 
end of apartheid had to do with a combination of many factors, including the role of 
specific individuals, namely Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk; as well as social 
                                                 
131 Some commentators have documented a clear conservative shift in the preferences of nominated 
judges (Graaff 2012), however, it remains to be seen the extent to which that shift translates into 
Constitutional Court decisions. As Néstor Osuna (Interview 160808_0009) suggested, “There is a 
tradition in the [Constitutional] Court of progressivism from day one. Judges of the conservative 
tradition who came to the Court became moderates at least.”  
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pressure from domestic, transnational, and international sources; and the demands of 
political compromise (Klotz 1995; Mandela 1995; Sparks 1995; Mbeki 1996; 
Waldmeir 1997; Meierhenrich 2008; Skinner 2010; among many others). I will leave 
the question of the relative importance of each of these factors to these other scholars 
and instead focus on the emergence of social constitutionalism. As was the case with 
Colombia, the logic of serial replacement or chronic instability does not offer much 
insight into the adoption of social constitutionalism in South Africa, because the prior 
legal order primarily featured stability, not flux. Therefore, in the sections that follow, 
I examine first whether the turn to social constitutionalism reflected gradual 
institutional change or a rupture in South African constitutional development. I then 
evaluate the likelihood of something other than social constitutionalism emerging 
from the constitutional negotiations of the early 1990s. I close with a consideration of 
the legacy of the adoption of social constitutionalism in South Africa.  
1. Incrementalism or Rupture 
Although certain judges did offer rights-protective positions on occasion 
during the apartheid era, the system itself before the end of apartheid in the 1990s was 
profoundly discriminatory and the modal legal system official did nothing to challenge 
that.133 Even so, as Jens Meierhenrich (2008) argues, the system conformed to specific 
legal principles, which despite their myriad flaws established the foundation necessary 
for a relatively peaceful transition. He notes, “in apartheid’s endgame, the memory of 
formally rational law – and agents’ confidence in its past and future utility in the 
                                                 
133 See Abel (1995) for a detailed accounting of law and legal struggles under apartheid. 
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transition from authoritarian rule – created the conditions for the emergence of trust 
between democracy-demanding and democracy-resisting elites” (Meierhenrich 2008: 
4). In other words, a shared belief in the idea of law allowed these otherwise 
diametrically opposed elites to negotiate together the end of apartheid and the start of 
democratic rule.  
What resulted from these negotiations was the adoption of a social 
constitutionalist model, with the constitutional recognition of a robust set of justiciable 
social rights and the development of an independent court to hear claims to those 
rights. Looking at the negotiations in isolation, one might be tempted to consider the 
1996 Constitution as an incremental development layered on top of the 1993 Interim 
Constitution – moving from a racially-inclusive constitution that included relatively 
few rights to one that with all the core features of social constitutionalism. After taking 
a step back, however, it becomes clear that the phased negotiations together represent 
a break with the past. Even though apartheid supporters and apologists remained in 
positions of power through the early 1990s, the argument that the country could move 
forward without substantial changes had become increasingly indefensible. The notion 
that the constitution would be racially inclusive in itself indicated a radical change. 
Add to that the end of parliamentary sovereignty, the creation of a new constitutional 
court, and the massive expansion of rights protections and it becomes even more clear 
that the adoption of social constitutionalism should be thought of as an example of 
discontinuous change (Klug 2000).134 
                                                 
134 Klug (2000) develops this argument that the adoption of constitutionalism in South Africa ought to 
be thought of as a clear break with the past. Where I depart from Klug is my focus on social 
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2. Alternative Plausible Outcomes of the Constitutional Assembly 
The need to break with the past offers little by way of a roadmap for the 
changes that would come; a break with the past could have come in many different 
ways. In fact, several alternative outcomes of the constitutional negotiations are not 
only imaginable today, but seemed likely at the time. These alternatives included 
failed negotiations and all-out civil war, the development of a racially-inclusive but 
liberal constitution, and the recognition of social rights as non-enforceable directive 
principles (what might be considered a partial move toward social 
constitutionalism).135 
The fear that the constitutional negotiations would end with something other 
than constitutional commitment was palpable. As Allister Sparks (1995) documents, 
the National Party and the ANC had diametrically opposed preferences about the role 
and functioning of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). While 
the National Party sought long, drawn-out negotiations that would determine as many 
provisions of the constitution as possible, the ANC sought short, broad-strokes 
negotiations. The first phase of negotiations came to end an in December, and the 
Convention reconvened five months later for CODESA II. Despite a move to the 
standard of “sufficient consensus” (i.e., agreement between the government and the 
ANC), this set of meetings ended in failure. Working Group Two, which dealt with 
                                                 
constitutionalism rather than constitutionalism generally. The turn to any form of constitutional 
supremacy in South Africa would have been dramatic considering its prior commitment to 
parliamentary supremacy, but the adoption of a constitution with explicit social features merits 
explanation in its own right. 
135 In an article published in 1991, Albie Sachs identified five potential constitutional outcomes, or 
“schemes,” that were under discussion. Four of these schemes retained the basic features of apartheid. 
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matters related to the compromise between power-sharing and majority rule, could not 
come to an agreement. Some delegates lamented that the sitting government sought a 
“permanent interim constitution” (Sparks 1995: 105).  
Further, during each set of negotiations, racially- and politically-motivated 
violence, including violence between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the ANC, 
continued, while police reportedly did little to nothing to ensure order or public safety 
in townships.136 As the Truth and Reconciliation Commission reports, more than 
14,000 were killed and “many more thousands” injured in the early 1990s (TRC 
Volume 6, 1999: 579). Many viewed this reticence as evidence of a “third force” 
effort directed by the military and the police to destabilize the ANC and inhibit the 
negotiated transition. State security forces debated the possibility of creating a “third 
force” that would run parallel to the military and the police in the late 1980s and early 
1990s (O’Malley n.d.). While officially a third force was never constructed, the 
popular belief at the time was that the military and police forces went ahead with these 
plans. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Volume 6, 1999: 584) found “little 
evidence of a centrally directed, coherent or formally constituted ‘Third Force’” but 
suggested that sufficient evidence of a “network of security and ex-security force 
operatives, frequently acting in conjunction with right-wing elements and/or sectors of 
the IFP” to provoke violence, including both indiscriminate and targeted killings, did 
exist. Most pointed, however, was the assignation of Chris Hani, who had been both 
the head of the Communist Party and Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC’s armed wing, in 
                                                 
136 See also the Goldstone Commission report. The Commission investigated political violence during 
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April of 1993 – just after the Multi-Party Negotiation Process had begun. A far-right, 
anti-communist white man by the name of Janusz Walus shot Hani, using a gun lent to 
him by Clive Derby-Lewis, a MP from the Conservative Party. Walus was 
immediately apprehended, but many people were killed and hundreds injured in the 
ten days following the assignation of Hani. The Washington Post ran a story quoting 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu saying, “I fear for our country” (Taylor 1993). Yet, rather 
than dissolving the constitutional negotiations, the negotiating parties signed a new 
Declaration of Intent and soon after set the date for the 1994 elections. 
Another plausible alternative outcome was liberal constitutionalism. 
Considering that the ANC could reasonably expect to win both the presidency and a 
clear majority in the legislature (and maintain a strong hold on those offices in the 
medium-term), a strategic view might suggest that the ANC would be in favor of 
retaining parliamentary sovereignty, or at least limiting judicial oversight of its 
actions. There may be some credence to this view, at least early in the negotiations. As 
Hugh Corder, who served on the Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights during 
the Transition as a nominee of the ANC, recalls, “the ANC wanted a minimalistic Bill 
of Rights … I remember bumping into Arthur [Chaskalson]137 in the passages of the 
World Trade Center [where CODESA took place] and he said to me, with some 
sarcasm, he said, ‘have you reached a hundred [rights] yet!’” (Patel 2012: 8). Further, 
popular concern that the Bill of Rights would protect the interests of white South 
Africans at the expense of black South Africans (exemplified by the advent of the 
                                                 
137 Chaskalson would go to become the first Judge President (later termed “Chief Justice”) of the 
Constitutional Court. 
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pejorative term “Bill of Whites”). In addition, white South Africans may have had an 
interest in adopting judicial review, as well as clear language rights provisions, but to 
the extent that any other rights recognitions might prompt changes to the existing 
economic order or distribution of resources (especially land), this group could be 
expected to oppose these rights recognitions vociferously. The combination of these 
interests could have led to the adoption of liberal constitutionalism in the new South 
Africa, where robust civil and political rights protections were accompanied by limited 
judicial oversight and substantial space for the ANC-dominated parliament to pursue 
its own policy prerogatives, but that did not occur. 
Yet another outcome of the constitutional negotiations seemed probable: a 
constitution featuring social rights as non-justiciable directive principles. Many South 
African lawyers, judges, and intellectuals had expressed doubts about justiciable social 
rights in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Etienne Mureinik stands as a notable 
exception.138 He argued that “the formal content of a bill of rights is often less useful 
than the fact that it brings under scrutiny the justification of laws and decisions” 
(1992: 471). Considering this feature of constitutional review, why not include social 
rights? However, the more common approach was one of skepticism. For example, 
John Didcott, a South African judge who would go on to serve on the Constitutional 
Court bench, in a symposium on the Bill of Rights held at the University of Pretoria in 
1986 declared that social and economic rights should not be included in the 
Constitution in any capacity, as they were not justiciable.139 The South African Law 
                                                 
138 The same goes for Nicolas Haysom (1992). 
139 Cited in Dugard (1990: 460, at fn. 127). 
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Commission echoed this view in a working paper from 1989.140 Another camp 
advocated for the recognition of non-justiciable social rights. Prior to the 
constitutional negotiations, Albie Sachs (1991), a member of the ANC, who like 
Didcott would go on to serve as a justice at the Constitutional Court, argued that the 
realization of social and economic rights should be pursued through state policy, 
backed by constitutional support, but not constitutionally-recognized justiciable social 
and economic rights. Similarly, Kate O’Regan, another Constitutional Court justice-
to-be, helped draft a proposal on social and economic rights with other legal 
intellectuals based in the Western Cape province, including Hugh Corder, that 
advocated for their inclusion as directive principles (Corder 1992). Corder would go 
on to be part of the Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights during the Transition 
(i.e., during the CODESA negotiations). Further, John Dugard (1990a: 461) pointed to 
the Indian Constitution, which includes justiciable civil and political rights and non-
enforceable social and economic rights as a potential model (see also De Villiers 1992 
and Davis 1992). Many experts, thus, pushed for the inclusion of social rights as 
directive principles. Still, as one member of the Technical Committee to advise the 
Constitutional Assembly on Drafting of Bill of Rights recalled, by the time the 
Committee came together, the idea of including social rights as directive principles 
“was not considered,”141 and the approach did not find its way into either the Interim 
or Final Constitution. 
So how exactly did social constitutionalism replete with enforceable social 
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rights come to be? Although societal groups that pushed for an end to apartheid also 
often highlighted the importance of ensuring adequate standards of living or access to 
social goods (“bread”) and not only civil or political rights (“freedom”) and some even 
participated in the constitutional process by creating individual or group submissions 
on the Bill of Rights,142 the proposal of justiciable social rights limited by progressive 
realization did not emerge from below. No systematic report on the public submissions 
was ever drafted, and no organized collection or archive of these submissions exists 
either. If the submissions had any impact, that more likely had to do with emphasizing 
the importance of an issue already on the table or with providing negotiators with 
additional sources of support for their favored arguments. Experts offered divergent 
opinions on the advisability of including social rights recognitions early on, but by the 
time of the Constitutional Assembly, there seemed to be a convergence of opinions 
among those involved in the negotiations on the question of social rights.  
In South Africa, as in Colombia, transnational ideas about rights and 
constitutionalism – specifically regarding the entrenchment of social rights and the 
creation of Constitutional Courts – found fertile ground following domestic social 
pressure for legal and social change (Klug 2000).  Moving toward the various 
constitutional negotiations, the language of internationally- or “universally-accepted 
rights” had become commonplace. Political elites and appointed experts explicitly 
sought examples from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenants, as well as from the Canadian Charter and the German Basic 
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Law, but they did not necessarily interpret these documents or rights commitments in 
exactly the same way.143 Members of the Constitutional Assembly, experts advising 
on the Bill of Rights, and elites otherwise involved in these debates tended to agree on 
the importance of international human rights law, including the covenants 
corresponding to social rights. Importantly, as Heinz Klug (2000: 82), concludes, “the 
architects of the ANC Constitutional Guidelines [that indicated support for justiciable 
social rights] did not see the entrenchment of a bill of rights as altering the 
fundamental power of the democratically-elected legislature.” An initial debate came 
to the fore regarding whether social rights should be recognized as justiciable in 
themselves or simply as directive principles, but that debate fell away over time, due 
to the stated commitment of the Technical Committee (even the experts appointed by 
parties that initially opposed the justiciability of social rights) and the ANC to the 
inclusion of justiciable social rights in the new Bill of Rights. 
Contingency in the midst of a “crisis-driven negotiating process” also played 
an important role in the emergence of social constitutionalism (Sparks 1995: 102).  
For example, as Hugh Corder recounts: 
People used others there [at CODESA] whom they knew in order to put their 
arguments, for example, a sexual orientation bit is there [in the Interim 
Constitution], because Edwin [Cameron] is a close friend of mine and because 
Edwin spoke to me. And then there was a guy called Kevin Botha, who was 
running something called the Equality Foundation of South Africa, which is 
again a Gay and Lesbian equality organization. I remember a long telephone 
conversation with him … and I then went to the committee and we’d originally 
said, no unfair discrimination whatsoever on any ground. Then the politicians 
said to us, but where[?] …[Y]ou haven’t outlawed race, sex, and gender 
discrimination. So we had to start listing. So when we started listing, that’s 
                                                 
143 As described by several interviewees (e.g., interviews 180514_ and 170814_0133). 
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when Edwin phoned me and we had these conversations and I said to the guys, 
I think we should put sexual orientation in there.144 
 
People cared about many issues in South Africa during the early- to mid-1990s, but 
only certain individuals or groups had close ties to negotiators or advisors. Further, 
certain issues were more fundamentally contentious than others. A phone call from an 
old friend likely would not have resulted in a change to the text outlining the right to 
property, for instance, as any such change could have threatened not only the 
constitutional negotiations, but the political transition itself.  
Another example of contingency influencing these negotiations and the 
emergence of social constitutionalism comes by way of the choice to include 
enforceable social rights rather than social rights as directive principles. The Freedom 
Charter and pressure from below may have provided incentives for the recognition of 
social rights in some way, but neither explain the choice of justiciability over directive 
principles. Etienne Mureinik’s argument in favor of justiciability won out, and even 
some experts who had promoted the directive principles approach before the 
negotiations came to push for justiciable social rights once they served as advisors 
during the negotiations. As was the case in Colombia, political agency and contingent 
choice, along with the existence of transnational ideas that could serve as partial 
constitutional models and a perceived social and political crisis that opened the space 
for consideration of ideas previously unimaginable led to the adoption of social 
constitutionalism. 
                                                 
144 Patel (2012: 10). 
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3. The Legacy of Institutional Transformation 
Again, that social constitutionalism was adopted does not necessarily imply 
that it would become institutionally embedded. The shift to social constitutionalism 
empowered certain actors, like the Constitutional Court (and potentially everyday 
citizens), while threatening the power of other actors. How the ensuing political 
contestation played out determined that social constitutionalism would endure in 
South Africa. 
One important set of actors that felt threatened by the emergence of social 
constitutionalism was the business community. As an expert advisor on the Technical 
Committee remembers: 
[A]t the point of the Constitutional Assembly, there wasn’t really active 
opposition coming to their inclusion [social and economic rights] from NGO 
groups but at that time of the certification of the Constitution there was then an 
objection from groups like the Free Market Foundation … But, you know, they 
didn’t make very active submissions at that time of the drafting of the 
Constitution.145 
 
The Constitutional Court rejected these arguments in the decision certifying the 1996 
Constitution. Here, we see efforts to limit the institutionalization of social 
constitutionalism that were ultimately stymied by key actors empowered by the 
adoption of social constitutionalism. Arguably these business-oriented actors missed 
their opportunity to influence the new constitutional order – it might have been much 
easier to contest the constitutional recognition of social and economic rights during the 
constitutional assembly, a period of time during which a much more liberal 
constitution (the Interim Constitution of 1993) prevailed. Once these rights were 
                                                 
145 Interview 180514_.  
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recognized, and once specific actors were empowered to adjudicate these rights, it 
became less likely that relatively limited, factionalized contestation would lead to their 
dismissal. It both fit the strategic interests (if we assume an institutional drive to 
expand or increase its power, as power fragmentation accounts do) and the ideological 
interests of the Constitutional Court justices to reinforce the commitment to social 
constitutionalism through judicial decisions. Chapters 7 and 8 explore these judicial 
decisions in greater detail. 
 In addition, there was a sense of a shared constitutional project on the part of 
the Constitutional Court and the executive that seems to have set out the parameters 
for inter-branch relations in South Africa, at least through the presidencies of Nelson 
Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. As James Fowkes (2016: 70) meticulously documents, 
early Constitutional Court decisions reflected an effort to “start as actors jointly 
working to build a new and better system – an utterly defining, and widely neglected, 
feature of the post-1994 South African polity.” Fowkes refers to this as a 
“constitution-building approach,” in which judges weighing the costs and benefits of 
intervention not only against their preferences, the likelihood of an immediately 
desirable outcome, or the political survival of the institution. Instead, judges 
considered also “the building work that can be done by letting other institutions do 
their jobs and by expressing trust in them” (70). Thus, the new institutional framework 
empowered the Constitutional Court, but the Constitutional Court under the guidance 
of Judge President Arthur Chaskalson also sought to avoid unnecessary conflicts with 
the executive branch.  
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Likewise, President Mandela demonstrated deference to the Constitutional 
Court’s rulings. Just months after the justices of the Constitutional Court had been 
sworn in, the Court struck down two presidential proclamations and the act of 
parliament that had authorized the president to issue proclamations (thus deciding 
against both of the other branches of government at once).146 President Mandela 
publically accepted the Court’s decision. Albie Sachs (2016: 159) refers to that day as 
equally “significant in the life of the nation as the day when we all voted as equals for 
the first time.” In responding that way, President Mandela recognized the legitimacy 
of the Constitutional Court and the new constitutional order.  
 Early interactions between newly-empowered and newly-constrained actors 
formed the reactive sequences that stabilized and institutionalized social 
constitutionalism in South Africa. The Constitutional Court carefully expanded and 
protected its role, while being mindful of its relationship with the executive branch. 
Especially under the leadership of President Mandela, the executive branch 
reciprocated with deference to the courts, a precedent that the executive branch under 
President Mbeki’s would follow in the Treatment Action Campaign case regarding the 
court-mandated provision of anti-retrovirals to HIV-infected mothers across the 
country, despite the Mbeki administration’s AIDS-denialism. As Chapter 8 
demonstrates, citizens turned to the courts frequently to make claims about their social 
rights, especially regarding the right to adequate housing. The continued use of the 
                                                 
146 Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature and Others v President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others (1995). 
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courts further empowered the judiciary and especially the Constitutional Court, which 
in turn helped to cement social constitutionalism in South Africa.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has documented how the constitutional assemblies in both 
Colombia and South Africa served as critical junctures, in which the countries adopted 
social constitutionalism. The adoption of social constitutionalism represented a clear 
break with past modes of constitutionalism in each country, and it came about as a 
result of contingent events following a perceived crisis. In both Colombia and South 
Africa, perceived crises created the opportunity for new ideas about the role of the 
state and the role of constitutional law to come to the fore. As Chapter 3 showed, the 
crises differed substantially in form – with apartheid and the resistance to it defining 
the South African case and the context of war, criminal violence, and government 
ineffectiveness defining the Colombian case – but both spurred a sense of the need for 
fundamental legal, political, and social change.  
During the constitutional assemblies, political elites and their legal advisors 
considered various models of constitutionalism and – in South Africa – sought to 
avoid the seemingly likely possibility of failed negotiations. Transnational ideas and 
domestic pressures influenced the set of models examined in constitutional debates. In 
Colombia, prominent models included the Spanish and German traditions, as well as 
more local legal forms (namely the amparo/tutela). In South Africa, these models 
included the Canadian and German traditions, and, more importantly, the international 
human rights regime (with the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR). Still, these models had 
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existed for years without being incorporated into either country’s legal order. Without 
the preceding crises and the relaxing of institutional constraints, the move to social 
constitutionalism would not have been possible. Contingent events and political 
contestation following these crises paved the way for the adoption and 
institutionalization of social constitutionalism. Reactive sequences in which newly 
empowered actors sought to protect social constitutionalism ensured that social 
constitutionalism would be embedded in each country. 
These were the basic contours of constitutional debate in each country and the 
basic features of the constitutional orders adopted in the early 1990s. Still, as Klug 
(2000: 3) notes, “Even if we accept the empirical evidence that more and more nations 
have adopted written constitutions with bills of rights and have empowered their 
courts to uphold these new charters as the supreme law of the land, it is not self-
evident that the outcome, or even the meaning of these new institutions, is the same in 
all these societies.” The crystallization of the legacies of social constitutionalism in 
Colombia and South Africa has come through agentic practices, as a result of the 
effects of legal mobilization for social rights in each country. In the chapters that 
follow, I detail the constructivist account of legal mobilization, in the process 
exploring how the meaning(s) of these new legal institutions have been constituted 
and reconstituted over time in both Colombia and South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE USE OF THE TUTELA IN COLOMBIA 
 
Legal Mobilization “From Below” 
The changes to the constitutional architecture outlined in the previous chapters in 
theory provided new opportunities for Colombians and South Africans to enact and 
contest the bounds of the legal citizenship regime, examining the extent to which these 
new legal promises, institutions, and actors would meaningfully impact their lives. 
This chapter and the next focus on legal mobilization “from below,” or the perspective 
of citizens of Colombia and South Africa as they chose – or chose not to – seek 
resolutions to their problems in the formal legal system. This “from below” 
perspective is a vital part of my constructivist account of legal mobilization, providing 
information about how, why, and the conditions under which particular kinds of 
claims come before the courts. These two chapters weave together a consideration of 
the formation of beliefs about rights, law, and the state, as well as the consequences of 
those beliefs for patterns in mobilization.  
Chapter 5 uses evidence drawn from 74 interviews and a 310-person survey to 
examine the relationship between legal consciousness and legal mobilization in 
Colombia. In the Colombian case, we see that beliefs encourage citizens to file legal 
claims through the tutela procedure, not because they firmly have confidence in the 
legal system, but because they see the tutela procedure as their only option for seeking 
redress. Thus, legal mobilization results not from a legal consciousness defined by 
admiration for the law, but from a sense of ambivalence. Chapter 6 investigates the 
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micro-foundations of legal claim-making in South Africa, drawing on a 551-person 
survey that assesses when South Africa citizens turn to the formal legal sphere when 
they face problems accessing social welfare goods. The survey indicates that peoples’ 
beliefs about when they should file a legal claim differ from when they actually do file 
claims, and that this difference derives from citizens’ beliefs about what are 
encompassed by constitutional rights and their beliefs about the purpose of the courts. 
Although Chapter 6 diverges from Chapter 5 in that it does not examine legal 
consciousness as such, both chapters demonstrate the centrality of beliefs to 
understanding when citizens turn to the formal legal sphere to air their grievances. I 
turn now to the Colombian case. 
 
 
  136 
Legal Mobilization “From Below” in Colombia147  
 
We have rule of law, but I say anything can be said on paper, because [the law 
as it is written] is wonderful, but we have a very, very deep problem in terms 
of the application of justice, because we have a lot of corruption… Justice is 
crap, of course.148, 149 
 
So responded an upper-class resident of Bogotá, Colombia, when asked to evaluate the 
country’s legal system. National surveys indicate that the negative view expressed 
above is far from unique.150 These perceptions give reason for alarm, according to 
long-standing theories about the judicial role in democratic states. Specifically, the 
triadic logic of conflict resolution sets out that the impartiality of courts directly feeds 
into their legitimacy, giving reason for both parties to the dispute to consent to the 
court’s involvement and, in particular, for the loser to accept the judgment (Shapiro 
1981). This legitimacy then reinforces judicial independence, as the executive and 
legislature are both less able and less willing to place undue pressure on the courts, 
allowing the courts to continue to decide cases impartially, which results in a virtuous 
circle.151 In the Colombian case specifically, David Landau (2010a: 153, 2010b) 
                                                 
147 This chapter is adapted (slightly) from Taylor (2018). “Ambivalent Legal Mobilization: Perceptions 
of Justice and the Use of the Tutela in Colombia.” Law & Society Review 52 (2): 337-67. 
148 Bogotá interview 34. “Pues estamos en un estado de derecho, pero yo digo el papel aguanta todo 
porque es una maravilla, pero sí, tenemos un problema muy, muy profundo en términos de la aplicación 
de la justicia, porque tenemos una corrupción muy, muy grande… la justicia es una porquería, 
evidentemente.” 
149 All translations in this chapter are my own. Quotations are presented in English with the Spanish in 
footnotes to preserve each respondent’s actual words. Minor edits were made to facilitate 
understandability. 
150 For instance, Latinobarometer surveys between 1996 and 2015 show that between 22.8% and 41.3% 
of Colombian respondents reported “some” or “a lot” of confidence in the judiciary, with the 20-year 
average sitting at 32.5%. A study of judicial needs conducted in fourteen urban areas in Colombia 
between 2011 and 2013 found that 81.8% of respondents thought that justice came at a “slow” or “very 
slow” pace, and 54.8% of respondents evaluated judicial officials as either “corrupt” or “very corrupt” 
(La Rota, Lalinde, and Uprimny 2014: 80). 
151 See also Benesh (2006) on the importance of public support for the courts in bolstering the rule of 
law. 
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demonstrates how the emergence of the Constitutional Court as a “workhorse for 
middle-class claims” and its ensuing popularity bolstered its power and its ability to 
sidestep political influence. Here, we might expect this reported lack of confidence in 
the judiciary overall, which is by no means limited to Colombia, to translate into 
limited use of the courts.152 Yet, this is not so. 
Each year, the number of citizens filing legal claims grows, even after 
accounting for population growth. The most common legal mechanism used is the 
acción de tutela, which was created with the 1991 Constitution, alongside various 
other institutional reforms meant to address what has been called a “crisis of 
representation” (Mainwaring 2006) and to bolster an ailing, inefficient, and untrusted 
legal system. The tutela, which is an appeal for immediate relief, allows citizens to 
make claims to their constitutionally protected fundamental rights without need for a 
lawyer. In theory, an individual – verbally or in writing – can simply detail a problem 
in his or her life to a judge, whose job it is to assess whether or not a rights violation 
may have occurred, whether or not the individual characterized the problem as one 
related constitutional rights. All judges in the country must hear tutela claims and must 
respond to each claim within ten days in the first instance, making the tutela a 
relatively cheap, easy, and quick legal mechanism. Still, filing a tutela claim is not 
costless – individuals must travel to the courthouse during business hours and often 
wait in long lines to submit their paperwork. These time and resource costs pale in 
comparison to the costs of filing other kinds of legal claims, but they are not negligible 
                                                 
152 See Hendley (1999, 2012) on Russia, Benesh (2006) on the United States, Gallagher (2006) and 
Gallagher and Yang (2017) on China, and Smulovitz (2010) on Argentina, among others.  
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for those of relatively little means. The Constitutional Court has the power to review 
every tutela decision, though given the sheer quantity of tutela claims, the Court only 
formally reviews a small fraction of cases.153  
In the early 1990s, the Colombian government engaged in a multi-pronged 
educational campaign, featuring a television program, smaller advertising spots, board 
games, and comic books – in addition to mandatory teaching in schools – to spread 
information about the new constitution and the tutela. Regional-level bodies in some, 
but not all, departments have also held outreach programs, from the early 1990s to the 
present day. Even so, it is not immediately clear why citizens who express a near total 
lack of confidence in the judiciary would seize upon this tool to air their grievances. In 
this context, the volume of constitutional claims advanced by Colombian citizens is 
shocking. Thousands upon thousands of Colombian citizens turn to the judiciary every 
year to demand the protection of their rights through the use of the tutela procedure – 
from claiming the right to receive a response to a petition request to the right to a 
minimum standard of living. By 2014, nearly 500,000 tutelas were filed, which is 
roughly equivalent to 1% of the total Colombian population.154 As is clear, Colombian 
citizens often turn to the courts to make claims to their constitutional rights. 
Drawing on 74 interviews155 and an original 310-person survey, this chapter 
examines this apparent disconnect between expressed assessments and action, moving 
                                                 
153 Fidelity to existing jurisprudence and proper legal reasoning are understood to drive the revision 
process, but the decision about whether or not to review is ultimately subject to the discretion of the 
magistrates of the Constitutional Court, specifically whichever magistrates are “on duty” in a particular 
week.  
154 According to data collected by the Defensoría del Pueblo. 
155 With 93 total interviewees. 
  139 
from the aggregate to the individual level to examine the dynamics of mobilization 
decisions. The data under investigation fall under three categories: perspectives shared 
by the general population, by a marginalized community (or a “least likely” group), 
and by claimants. Together, these three sources of data allow for the analysis of two 
foundational research questions. Why does profound skepticism of the ability of the 
judiciary to provide justice and fair treatment seem to coexist with high levels of use 
of the legal system? How do perspectives on rights and the legal system relate to this 
observed mobilization of the law?  
A robust literature on legal consciousness has demonstrated the complicated 
and sometimes contradictory nature of beliefs about and mobilization of law (Feeley 
1979; Engel 1984; Bumiller 1988; Sarat and Felsinter 1989; Yngvesson 1988; Sarat 
1990; Ewick and Sibley 1998). Though initial studies concentrated primarily on legal 
consciousness in the United States, subsequent studies have expanded this focus both 
in terms of geography (Gallagher 2006; Engel and Engel 2010; McMillan 2011; 
Boittin 2013) and substantive area (Nielsen 2000; Hoffman 2003; Hull 2003, 2016; 
Wilson 2011; Young 2014). This chapter further expands the geographic and thematic 
scope of these studies.  
In addition, this chapter makes two primary substantive contributions. First, 
unlike most previous contexts studied, Colombia is what we might call a high 
mobilization environment. That is, individuals (and groups) have turned with great 
frequency to the legal system to make claims. This frequency of claims-making is 
made possible by a uniquely permissive institutional arrangement (whose core feature 
is the tutela procedure). Not only has legal consciousness in this kind of setting not 
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previously been studied, but it is also a setting in which the contours of beliefs about 
law are perhaps most paradoxical. While Colombian citizens express little to no trust 
in the legal system, they continue to file constitutional rights claims at unheard of 
rates. Second, the chapter pinpoints the concrete pathways through which legal 
consciousness affects individual mobilization decisions. In doing so, it builds on 
Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey’s (1998) foundational work on legal consciousness. 
A central claim of legal consciousness scholarship is that it matters how people 
understand their worlds and their relative positioning in those worlds, specifically that 
these understandings affect the actions people take. Yet, relatively little is known 
about the process by which legal consciousness – a complex, dynamic phenomenon – 
translates into individual action or inaction. This chapter seeks to fill that gap. 
Specifically, I investigate how beliefs about the state, legal system, and rights 
in Colombia relate to the use of the tutela procedure to make claims about 
constitutionally protected rights. In other words, the focus of this chapter is on the 
relationship between legal consciousness and legal mobilization in the realm of 
constitutional rights, expressly identifying the constituent parts of legal consciousness 
– beliefs – that encourage or discourage the use of legal tools to make claims. 
Throughout this chapter, whenever I use the term legal mobilization, I am referring 
specifically to the individual use of the tutela procedure.156 Following Frances Zemans 
(1983), I consider legal mobilization as a form of political participation. Importantly, 
the use of the legal procedures to make rights claims is a political act, not only a legal 
                                                 
156 See Chapter 2 for a more detailed – and more general – discussion of the concept of legal 
mobilization. 
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one. When citizens make claims on the state, they are implicitly calling for changes in 
relationship between state and society, in the provision of goods by the state, and in 
the protection of rights. While the claim in question may be purely personal in nature 
for the individual claimant, the consequences of that claim – or the aggregation of 
many individual claims – are political.157  
I find that in Colombia, understandings of law and the state encourage the use 
of the tutela procedure, not due to the realizable promise of the state to protect rights 
or the majestic power of the law, but because the tutela offers one possible ray of hope 
in an otherwise limited choice set. The tutela is understood to be the only mechanism 
through which citizens can access their rights – the goods that they absolutely need or 
that have been constitutionally promised to them. In other words, there is no other 
alternative.158 In what follows, I present a discussion of the scholarship on legal 
consciousness and behavior, before introducing three sources of originally collected 
data. Next, I offer an assessment of these data and a discussion of the consequences of 
this paradoxical relationship between beliefs about the law in Colombia. Conclusions 
follow. 
 
Legal Consciousness, Logics of Behavior, and Legal Mobilization 
 
This section first defines what consciousness is, before specifying the meaning 
of legal consciousness and connecting legal consciousness with legal mobilization. 
Within the discussion of legal consciousness, I summarize the three ideal types – 
                                                 
157 While in some ways, this understanding pushes contemporary thinking on legal mobilization, which 
tends to focus on group claims, often in the form of strategic litigation, this approach is consistent with 
the roots of legal mobilization theory (Zemans 1983). 
158 Thanks to Ben Manski for this phrasing. 
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“before the law,” “with the law,” and “against the law” – first introduced by Ewick 
and Silbey (1998). I then describe the conceptual and methodological challenges in 
connecting consciousness, which operates at the collective level, with individual 
behavior. Finally, I introduce three expectations, or working hypotheses, that explore 
how legal consciousness and legal mobilization might be connected. 
Consciousness, as Ewick and Silbey (1998: 39) explain, refers to: 
…a reciprocal process in which the meanings given by individuals to their 
world become patterned, stabilized, and objectified. These meanings, once 
institutionalized, become part of the material and discursive systems that limit 
and constrain future meaning making…Through language, society furnishes 
images of what those opportunities and resources are:  how the world works, 
what is possible, and what is not. 
 
Here, consciousness is not reducible to the sum of individual experiences and 
understandings. Consciousness, instead, operates at the collective level, though it is 
comprised by and can be demonstrated in the beliefs and actions of individuals. These 
experiences, understandings, and beliefs – and the actions they prompt – come 
together in a reciprocal and inter-subjective process to form consciousness. 
Before moving on to the idea of legal consciousness, a discussion on beliefs is 
necessary. Beliefs refer to subjective truth-claims about the world. They may be 
factually correct or incorrect, and they may or may not be grounded in moral 
assessments. They form the constituent parts of a worldview – or consciousness – and 
the basis for meaning-making, which is defined as the “social process through which 
people reproduce together the conditions of intelligibility that enable them to make 
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sense of their worlds” (Wedeen 2002: 717).159 Further, every identifiable belief exists 
among (at the very least, implicit) alternative beliefs. Given the existence of 
alternatives, beliefs become more impactful when compelling to others, though a 
belief that is not compelling to many people might be particularly influential for a 
particular individual. Historical contexts and present-day power relations impact the 
likelihood and viability of specific beliefs and their alternatives. Beliefs form the basis 
upon which individuals act, whether elite or grassroots actors.  
In everyday life, we point to beliefs as motivators or justifications for actions, 
even when we do not use the language of beliefs. Take, for example, these two 
sentences: I voted because it is my duty to vote. I did not vote because my vote does 
not matter. Each sentence declares two things, 1) that an action did or did not occur, 
and 2) that the decision about whether or not to act was prompted by a belief that 
voting is a duty or that voting does not matter. Social life – personal experiences or the 
experiences of similarly situated individuals in terms of race, class, gender, or other 
social categories – may encourage one person to believe that voting is a duty and 
another that his or her vote does not count. Even so, individuals may have a near 
infinite number of beliefs upon which they do not act (Lane 1973). The mere presence 
of a belief is not sufficient to provoke any particular action. Further, neither beliefs nor 
individuals exist in social vacuums. No crisp causal arrow moves unidirectionally 
from beliefs to actions all the way up to the construction of the social world; instead, 
                                                 
159 Importantly, all beliefs held by individuals or shared across a group need not always be entirely 
coherent or logically consistent with one another, though Festinger (1957) suggests that individuals who 
hold discordant beliefs or behaviors experience a feeling of discomfort and subsequently aim to remedy 
their inconsistencies.  
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these relationships are characterized by feedback and co-constitution. Again, the 
emergent construct that derives from the expression and interaction of beliefs, through 
language or nonverbal action, is consciousness.  
Legal consciousness is commonly defined as “the ways people understand and 
use the law … the way people conceive of the ‘natural’ and normal way of doing 
things, their habitual patterns of talk and action, and their common-sense 
understanding of the world” (Merry 1990: 5). Thus, beliefs about law that emerge 
from individual and collective experiences in the world form legal consciousness. It is 
crucial to note that legal consciousness is not synonymous with legal knowledge. The 
veracity of the beliefs that make up legal consciousness is, relatively speaking, less 
important than the fact that those beliefs are held. For example, whether or not one 
actually is required to have a lawyer to file a particular claim is, in a given moment, 
less significant than whether or not a potential claimant believes a lawyer is necessary. 
Legal consciousness research seeks to explain “how the different experiences of law 
become synthesized into a set of circulating, often taken-for-granted understandings 
and habits” (Silbey 2005: 324).  
Ewick and Silbey (1998) offer three ideal types of legal consciousness – 
“before the law,” “with the law,” and “against the law.” “Before the law” refers to a 
context in which law is understood to exist outside of, separate from the messiness of 
everyday life – “law is majestic, operating by known and fixed rules in carefully 
delimited spaces” (28). In the “with the law” model, law takes on a game-like form. 
Here, one can strategically manipulate the rules of the game to attain personal benefits. 
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“Against the law” refers to a setting in which individuals are subject to “arbitrary and 
capricious” power, though that does not preclude the possibility of resistance. The 
conventional wisdom is that more marginalized populations are more likely to 
experience this arbitrary and capricious power of the law and view the law as a 
peripheral force in their lives.160 While these ideal types delineate specific 
understandings that individuals have about the ways in which law broadly interpreted 
affects their worlds, these understanding are neither fixed nor unitary within or across 
groups or over time, nor are these ideal types mutually exclusive. 
The focus, consequently, is not simply on formal legal institutions, but on the 
ideas, beliefs, and perceptions individuals and groups have about the purposes of legal 
actors, institutions, and mechanisms, as well as the impacts they have. These ideas, 
beliefs, and perceptions need not be fully articulated to be impactful. As Kathleen Hull 
(2003: 653) finds, “social actors can engage in practices that both reflect and produce 
legality without necessarily describing or recognizing those practices as in any sense 
‘legal’.” Further, as Laura Beth Nielsen (2000: 1059, emphasis in original) argues: 
Legal consciousness also refers to how people do not think about the law; that 
is to say, it is the body of assumptions people have about the law that are 
simply taken for granted… Thus legal consciousness can be present even when 
law is seemingly absent from an understanding or construction of life events. 
This unconscious or subconscious level is especially significant for the study of legal 
consciousness. Still, even consciously negative or ambivalent views on law may 
correlate with legal mobilization. Kathryn Hendley (1999, 2012) finds that in the 
                                                 
160 See Sarat (1990) on this point. See Boittin (2013) and Mellema and Levine (2001) for case studies 
challenging this conventional wisdom. 
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Russian context a profound sense of apathy toward the broader legal system can exist 
in conjunction with high levels of litigation, where resignation, not hope, defines the 
views of litigants toward the legal process.161 Similarly, in the case of Argentina, 
Catalina Smulovitz (2010: 238) shows that “although in the last twenty years 
normative perceptions about the law and evaluations about performance of the 
judiciary have worsened, the use of legal procedures and the process of judicialization 
has intensified.” In sum, studies of legal consciousness investigate not only what 
people say about their worlds – whether explicitly in terms of law or not – but also 
how people act in their worlds (Merry 1990; McCann 1994; Ewick and Silbey 1998).  
This chapter builds on the legal consciousness tradition, taking as its starting 
point that while seemingly objective conditions such as institutional design, structural 
inequalities, and responsiveness or openness of both governmental and non-
governmental agencies may impact mobilization, this impact will be indirect, through 
the way various actors interpret, subjectively and inter-subjectively, those very 
conditions. This line of reasoning leads to a specific claim about legal consciousness, 
that beliefs held by potential claimants condition when and on which issues legal 
mobilization occurs. In other words, individuals make rights claims on the basis of 
their understandings of the law and the state, and these views are reinforced by the 
experience of making rights claims. Importantly, neither beliefs nor potential 
claimants exist in a vacuum. The proposition here is not that a particular belief causes 
rights mobilization, but that one’s understanding of the world – which, again, is 
                                                 
161 See also Baxi (1985), Gallagher (2006), and Gallagher and Yang (2017) on disenchantment with the 
legal system. 
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socially constructed but individually held – encourages and discourages certain sets of 
actions, rendering X thinkable and doable, while Y unthinkable and therefore 
undoable. More specifically, the way individuals understand the state, the legal 
system, and their rights has the effect of inspiring them to make (or not to make) a 
given legal claim.  
Many studies point to structural and institutional variables rather than legal 
consciousness as drivers of mobilization. If this were the case, we would see a 
relationship between the severity of grievances, openness of formal judicial 
institutions, openness of other state institutions, and/or strength of civil society actors 
and legal mobilization, regardless of the way citizens think about and understand their 
rights, the legal system, and the state. Undoubtedly, grievances matter for the process 
of legal mobilization. The question for an explanation based on the severity or 
frequency of grievances is what explains legal grievance formation, or how something 
unfortunate comes to be understood as something legally objectionable. Much of the 
time, grievances go unclaimed, or even unrecognized. With respect to institutional 
openness, perceptions of openness are key. Yes, formal institutional rules matter, but 
if citizens do not view institutions as potentially open, responsive, useful, then it is 
unlikely that they will turn to those institutions. In the Colombian case, it is 
fundamental that the tutela procedure exists in the form that it does – its design allows 
citizens to utilize it relatively easily. Still, formal design alone cannot explain why 
citizens use the tutela to make claims to some right in some situations but not to other 
rights in other situations. Finally, legal clinics as well as several state institutions, such 
as the Personería and the Defensoría del Pueblo, do help citizens file legal claims, 
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suggesting that civil society may have an important role to play. However, while these 
organizations may facilitate the ability of citizens to present tutelas, they do not 
explain why citizens come to view the legal system option as the correct way to pursue 
the solution to their problems. Thus, I hold that the linkages between beliefs about the 
law and the state and mobilization should be explored in greater detail, and I set out to 
do that here. 
Drawing on inductively gleaned insights – in dialogue with existing literature 
on legal consciousness and legal mobilization – I generate three behavioral 
expectations from studies of legal consciousness and broader theories of political 
behavior. These expectations should not be taken as hypotheses to be formally tested, 
but rather as propositions to be explored. Importantly, as scholarship on both legal 
consciousness and legal pragmatism indicates, individual behavior cannot reasonably 
be separated from the social context in which it is embedded (Ewick and Silbey 1998; 
Baum 2008). The goal here is to identify pathways along which individuals might 
make decisions about how to proceed with their lives. Some of the time, these 
decisions in Colombia might result in turning to the formal legal system to file tutela 
claims, and sometimes these decisions might not. These context-specific decisions 
have implications for the individuals making the decisions as well as for the social 
contexts in which they operate. 
The first behavioral expectation draws on the idea that behavior is the 
manifestation of how individuals understand themselves relative to their social 
contexts, or what I call here their “orientation.” Certain orientations catalyze certain 
behaviors and foreclose others. I add the qualifier “naïve” to indicate the rather 
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simplistic logic linking ideal types of legal consciousness and behavior, which 
discounts the possibility of complicating beliefs, needs, or experiences from 
intervening in behavioral decisions. This expectation should be thought of as a 
baseline. The second expectation suggests that individuals engage in cost-benefit 
calculations when deciding whether or not and how to mobilize, where material 
concerns, or more specifically expected material gains weighed against the expected 
difficulty of making claims, determine strategic mobilization decisions (Gallagher 
2006; Hendley 2012).162 The third expectation, on the other hand, suggests that 
common sense about what one does – or what one ought to do – drives behavior. It 
may be useful to consider expectations 2 and 3 in light of the logics of consequences 
and appropriateness (March and Olsen 1988) as well as in the logic of practice 
(Bourdieu 1977).163 Each of these expectations refers to a different set of beliefs. The 
table below lays out these three behavioral expectations in more detail. 
Table 5.1. Legal Consciousness Behavioral Expectations 
Naïve Orientation Expectation 
(1) 
Individuals must view themselves as “before the 
law” or “with the law” in order to engage in legal 
mobilization. Those who understand themselves to 
be situated “against the law” do not turn to the 
courts to make rights claims. 
Outcome Expectation (2) Prospects for a remedy are good if I pursue this 
kind of claim in the courts, or it will not be overly 
difficult for me to make this kind of claim in the 
courts.  
                                                 
162 As Gallagher (2006: 803) notes, this strategic calculus reflects the “with the law” ideal type 
described by Ewick and Silbey (1998), wherein actors consider the law as a sort of game that can be 
played effectively or poorly and whose rules can (sometimes) be manipulated. 
163 Often the logics of practice and appropriateness are separated into two distinct explanations for 
behavior. I combine them here for the sake of simplicity. Neither explanations focuses on the expected 
outcome, which would be the case following a logic of consequences (the outcome expectation), or on 
how the actor understands him- or herself (the orientation expectation).  
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Practice Expectation (3) Making this kind of claim in the courts is simply 
what one does, or it is appropriate for me to make 
this kind of claim in the courts. 
 
The naïve orientation expectation (1) suggests that the way an individual 
understands him- or herself relative to the law will strongly influence their likelihood 
of mobilizing, specifically that individuals who understand themselves to be situated 
“against the law” at a given moment will be more likely to view formal legal 
institutions as sites of, at best, the replication of inequalities or, at worst, sites of 
punishment, rather than as sites of promise, thus making them less likely to turn to the 
courts under any circumstances.164 In other words, the implication is that those who 
fall within the lower class or are otherwise marginalized are expected both to express 
less confidence in the organs of the state and to make legal claims using the tutela 
procedure less often. In the outcome expectation (2), a means-end calculation drives 
decisions about whether or not to air grievances in the courts. Importantly, the focus 
here is on the way individuals understand the process and expected outcome of legal 
mobilization, not on “objective” measures of access to the legal system. Claimants 
must believe that they have a high probability of success or that the process of making 
the claim will be relatively easy. This calculation might involve, for example, an 
assessment of whether or not the state seems to be inherently biased against the 
claimant and whether or not rights are meaningful in real life, and not just on paper. In 
real terms, then, the expectation is that an association between confidence in the legal 
                                                 
164 The argument is not that certain individuals or groups always understand themselves as “against the 
law.” These understandings are both dynamic and contingent, but even so, they have real consequences 
in specific situations.  
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system and in propensity to file tutela claims will emerge. Instead, however, it could 
be that mobilization has assumed a taken-for-granted quality, and individuals simply 
do not make the assessments implicated in the second expectation; in other words, 
mobilization becomes what one does, which is the practice-based expectation (3). 
Here, the expectation is not that claimants will exhibit an unthinking acceptance of the 
tutela, but rather will suggest that it is appropriate, right, or common sense to file such 
a claim. The logic underlying this explanation is further detailed below. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
This chapter draws on three sources of data collected in the three largest cities 
in Colombia – two sets of interviews and an original survey. One set of interviews was 
conducted in Bogotá in February and March 2017. With the help of a Colombian 
research firm, the Centro Nacional de Consultoría, respondents were randomly 
selected within three class categories (lower, middle, and upper). Interviews were 
conducted in locations chosen by the respondent – usually the respondent’s home. 
Over the course of an hour-long semi-structured interview, respondents were asked to 
share their views on their neighbors and neighborhoods, on any difficulties they or 
their family members had in terms of topics ranging from healthcare, housing, 
education, social security or pensions to minor disputes between neighbors, and, at the 
end of the interview, on the Colombian legal system.  
I conducted the second set of interviews – 24 unstructured individual and 
group interviews with 43 people – in Comuna 14 of Aguablanca, Cali during April and 
May of 2017. Aguablanca is a marginal district of Cali, comprised of several smaller 
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units called comunas. The district is densely populated and is home to approximately 
700,000 people. Disproportionately high levels of violence and poverty characterize 
the district. These interviews took place in respondents’ homes and more often than 
not took the form of informal conversations about justice in Aguablanca or in 
Colombia. A local interlocutor connected me with each interviewee and was present 
for the majority of these interviews – as such, interviewees were primarily part of her 
social network and are not necessarily representative of the district as a whole. 
Frequently, family members, friends, or neighbors of the primary respondent 
wandered into the room in which we were conducting the interview. At times, some of 
them would decide to join in.  
After transcription, both sets of interviews were organized, coded, and 
analyzed. I grouped responses by question to facilitate comparisons across gender, 
class, and location. From there, I created sub-groupings that corresponded to the 
implications of each of three behavioral expectations outlined in the previous section, 
looking specifically for patterns of support as well as statements that did not accord 
with these expectations. I translated illustrative quotations, which appear in the 
discussion below. 
The survey was based on a convenience sample of people waiting in line 
outside the Palacio de Justicia in Medellín to file a tutela claim in April 2017. As such, 
they reflect the views of individuals who have already decided to file a legal claim, 
rather than the views of the general population. In total, 310 respondents were 
surveyed. Importantly, this survey only includes claimants – individuals who had 
already recognized something in their lives as problematic and who had decided to 
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turn to the legal system to address that problem. These individuals are not necessarily 
representative of the broader population. 
Together these three sources of data offer a far-reaching perspective on how 
Colombians view the law, their rights, and the legal system, in addition to the times in 
which they have, in fact, used the courts to make legal claims. By conducting 
interviews in Aguablanca, I was able to examine how marginality, and the violence 
and economic difficulties that accompany it, affect both beliefs about the law and legal 
mobilization. People living in Aguablanca might be more likely to face difficulties 
accessing their rights and thus have a higher rate of grievances than other 
communities. On the other hand, people living in Aguablanca may also be more likely 
to hold negative views on the state and the judiciary due to more frequent experiences 
with the state’s coercive power. The survey allows me to focus in on the experiences 
of claimants – those individuals who have decided to make legal claims – and the 
randomly sampled in-depth interviews give me an overview perspective on how 
individuals of different socioeconomic statuses who may or may not have filed a legal 
claim view these issues. I turn now to an analysis of these data. 
 
Assessing Beliefs and Action 
 
In the following section, I examine the expectations described above, drawing 
on data from each of these sources. First, however, I make the case that individuals 
who fall within the samples of interviewees and survey respondents have, in fact, 
made constitutional rights claims in the courts. Importantly, individuals across all 
three sources of data reported having used the tutela procedure to claim their 
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constitutional rights. Respondents across class categories in the Bogotá sample said 
they already had filed a tutela claim, or that someone close to them had. Only one 
respondent who had used the tutela previously said that he would not in the future. 
Around 10% of respondents said they would not use the tutela procedure, and 13% 
responded that they were unsure. More than three-quarters of respondents said they 
would – generally adding the condition “if necessary” and generally interpreting the 
question with respect to a hypothetical health problem (though the question itself 
offered no such specification). Residents of Aguablanca reported less experience with 
the tutela than interviewees in the Bogotá sample, though most did state that they 
would file a tutela claim in the future if need be. Those who said that they had filed 
tutela claims exclusively had filed with respect to a health rights claim. Of course, all 
individuals surveyed were planning to file a tutela claim – that was a condition of their 
selection for the survey. Two-thirds of survey respondents identified themselves as 
belonging to the lower class, while just about one-third reported middle class status. 
Only two respondents belonged to the upper class.165 Interestingly, just 8% of those 
surveyed were filing a tutela claim for the first time, and the average number of tutelas 
filed per person was 3.7. About 55% of respondents were filing a tutela claim related 
to a healthcare need, just over one-quarter were filing an information request (derecho 
de petición), and nearly 17% were filing to claim victim status or benefits. The use of 
the tutela procedure as reported by interviewees and survey respondents largely 
reflects national-level statistics – health claims make up a large percentage of all 
                                                 
165 Following the substantive questions, respondents were asked about the estrato that appears on their 
electric bill. Cut coarsely, estrato 1 and 2 are considered lower class, 3 and 4 middle class, and 5 and 6 
upper class. 
  155 
tutelas filed each year, as do derecho de petición claims. I turn now to a discussion of 
each of the three behavioral expectations in light of these data. 
1. Naïve Orientation Expectation 
 
The naïve orientation expectation suggests that individuals who understand 
themselves as situated “against the law,” facing an arbitrary and powerful state 
institution, will be relatively-speaking not very likely to turn to the courts to make 
rights claims. As such, this section begins with an examination of the perspective of 
residents of the marginal sector of Aguablanca, where the presence of the state has 
generally been limited to a police presence understood as both coercive and 
capricious, before moving on to a discussion of the views expressed in the Bogotá 
interviews. 
Across the interviews in Aguablanca – whether with men or women, relatively 
better or worse off individuals, Afro-Colombians or mestizos – respondents noted that 
money determines treatment by the state in several senses. In one sense, money 
matters insofar as corruption rules. In the words of one respondent, “Corruption is 
blatant; it’s everywhere in the justice system.”166 Several interviewees shared a story 
about a young man from the neighborhood who had been beaten up by someone from 
another neighborhood. This young man and his mother filed a legal complaint. The 
story continues with the second man’s family hiring a good lawyer and paying off 
both the police and the judge. Ultimately, the first young man was cast as the 
aggressor and threatened with jail time. Instead of finishing the legal process, he fled 
                                                 
166 Aguablanca interview 5. “La corrupción tan verraca que hay. Por todo lado [en el sistema de 
justicia].” 
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to the countryside. While I cannot verify the details of these events, this story speaks 
to the widespread perception that the justice system, from the police to the courts, is 
unjust, capricious, and driven by money rather than truth or fairness. In another sense, 
money matters because the legal system is complicated, the public defenders are 
inadequate, and having a good lawyer will change your outcome. Further, as one 
respondent held, “The public defenders are thieves, not all of them, but the 
majority.”167 The perception is that they charge even though they are supposed to 
represent clients for free. Other lawyers are so costly as to be out of reach for most 
residents of Aguablanca. Finally, in a third sense, money matters because it confers 
respect; poor people are simply not respected by state authorities.168 Here, among 
residents of Aguablanca, the “against the law” positioning is clear. Yet, as mentioned 
above, Aguablanca is not characterized by the absence of legal claims, as would make 
sense given the naïve orientation expectation. Residents routinely file legal claims 
(including those who were interviewed) – though they only discussed the tutela in 
relation to health, and some stated (inaccurately) that the tutela could only be used to 
make claims about healthcare.169  
Interestingly, many of the views espoused by residents of Aguablanca were 
echoed in the interviews conducted with residents of Bogotá, regardless of class, 
though the expectation would be that those who are worse off would be more likely to 
understand themselves as situated “against the law.” Almost no one reported a belief 
                                                 
167 Aguablanca interview 1. “Los abogados del estado … son ladrones, no todos, pero la mayoría.” 
168 Aguablanca interview 23. 
169 They also file demandas or lawsuits related to police conduct and report crimes like theft. The 
dynamics of these claims are beyond the scope of this project, but should be the object of study in 
future research. 
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close to the “before the law” positioning, instead pointing to wide gaps between law 
on paper and law as it is applied or to external factors that rendered the legal system 
unjust. One respondent from the lower class said, “It seems to me that the justice 
system is something terrible … For example, a person who steals a yogurt serves four 
years, and a person who goes and kills someone else or rapes a girl serves two years 
… I say that is not justice.”170,171 Similarly, an interviewee from the middle class 
remarked, “[The application of justice] must be the same for all, not that there is 
justice for some in one way and for others, another. As they say, ‘a los de ruana unas 
leyes y a los privilegiados otra’ [for the poor, some laws, and for the privileged, 
others]. That should be the same for everyone. There should be one law.”172 An upper 
class respondent echoed this perception, also referring to the saying “la ley es para los 
de ruana.” She continued, “The people who have more money have more ways to 
solve their problems.”173 Here, across class categories, the dominant assessment of the 
legal system points not to its majesty, but to its fundamental inequity. Still, as noted in 
the previous section, most interviewees either had filed legal claims themselves or a 
friend or family member had. These interviews, combined with the Aguablanca 
interviews, indicate that a simple linkage between one’s positioning and expected 
                                                 
170 Bogotá interview 36. “Me parece que [el sistema de justicia] es algo terrible … Por ejemplo una 
persona también se roba un yogur y va y paga 4 años y una persona va y mata a otra o viola una niña y 
va y paga 2 años … digo yo eso no es justicia.” 
171 This quote in particular maps on to a subset of law and society scholarship known as “gap studies,” 
which demonstrate in various contexts the substantial differences between law in theory and law in 
practice (see discussion in Sarat and Kearns 1995). 
172 Bogotá interview 4. “[La aplicación de la justicia] debe ser igual para todos, no que haya justicia 
para unos de una forma y para otros de otra. A las personas como dicen a los de ruana unas leyes y a los 
privilegiados otra. Eso debe ser igual para todos. La ley debe ser una sola.” 
173 Bogotá interview 34. “La gente que tiene mucho dinero, tiene más posibilidades de solucionar 
muchas cosas.” 
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behavior offers an incomplete story about the relationship between beliefs about law 
and legal mobilization.  
2. Outcome-Based Expectation 
 
The outcome-based expectation holds that individuals rely on means-ends 
calculations about whether or not to engage in legal mobilization. These calculations 
involve an assessment of the ease of making claims and the likely effectiveness of 
doing so. Almost everyone in the Bogotá sample evaluated the legal system 
negatively. One lower class respondent stated simply, “It would be better to say that 
Colombian law does not exist,”174 and an upper-class respondent likewise noted, 
“Justice here in Colombia does not function; there are no laws.”175 Isolating the 
differences of rights on paper and how the law functions in everyday life, one lower-
class interviewee noted that “in some ways, one is sold the image that things have 
tended to improve [with the Constitution of ’91], but one does not see that change,”176 
a view echoed by the upper-class interviewee quoted at the outset of this chapter. 
Another lower class woman further stated, “Realistically, people of few resources 
have not been the beneficiaries of any constitution,”177 questioning the idea that law 
anywhere helps the poor. Yet another lower class respondent noted that corruption 
impedes the judiciary from being a useful forum in which to seek justice, perhaps 
especially for the worst off: “Corruption takes over the whole world … The one who 
                                                 
174 Bogotá interview 29. “Mejor dicho la ley Colombiana no existe.” 
175 Bogotá interview 6. “La justicia acá en Colombia no sirve; no hay leyes.” 
176 Bogotá interview 11. “En cierto modo a uno le venden la imagen de que tienden a mejorar [con la 
Constitución del 91] pero uno no ve ese cambio.” 
177 Bogotá interview 39. “Pues realmente digamos que las personas de bajos recursos no han estado 
muy beneficiados, digamos que con ninguna constitución.” 
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gives the most money is the one who is right. The people who have the least resources 
are vulnerable, and they are not given justice.”178 Members of the upper class shared 
similar views. One reported, “This is how I see it; it is money everywhere. Judges are 
bought. Magistrates are bought. Prosecutors are bought. Everything is money. There is 
no justice here!”179 By and large, assessments of the judiciary’s inefficacy do not 
appear to vary along class lines.  
Interviewees in Aguablanca reported similar views on the large gap between 
rights and laws as they are written in the Constitution and in the codes and how they 
work in practice. As one respondent described, the major problem facing the legal 
system is that “There is the absence of the application of the laws as they are. Here we 
have laws, but they are not applied as they are [or as they should be],” and that the 
same applies to rights.180 This perception contrasts to that of other residents who 
tended to state things like, “There is no law,” or, “The law does not exist.”181 These 
views are not necessarily incommensurate, as the former is a statement of objective 
fact (there are technically laws in Colombia) while the latter offers a subjective, 
experiential view (residents rarely experience the law outside of delegitimizing factors 
such as violence and corruption). Another resident explicitly referenced the 
differences between the constitutional text and everyday life: “It is one thing what the 
                                                 
178 Bogotá interview 13. “La corrupción se lleva a todo el mundo… Al que le entre más dinero es él que 
tiene la razón. Las personas que tienen menos recursos son vulnerables ante que no se les de justicia.” 
179 Bogotá interview 50. “Así es como yo lo veo, es dinero por todos lados. Se compran los jueces, se 
compran los magistrados, se compran los fiscales. Todo es con dinero. ¡Aquí no hay justicia!”  
180 Aguablanca interview 6. “Falta aplicar las leyes como son. Aquí hay leyes, pero no se aplican como 
son.” 
181 Various Aguablanca interviews). “No hay ley. La ley no existe.” 
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Constitution says and another what happens … the rights, every day they are violated. 
All of them are violated.”182  
Few respondents in Bogotá gave any suggestion that they viewed their 
constitutional rights as effective tools in and of themselves. Instead, interviewees 
appeared to have more confidence in the idea that rights could have real consequences 
on their everyday lives only through the use of the tutela procedure. One respondent 
from the middle class, for example, pointed to the key role of the tutela in 
transforming what is written in the Constitution into substance: “I think it is important 
to know what [the tutela] is, to know that it is a right that is in the Constitution that, in 
fact, allows us to fight for the rights we all have. The tutela allows us to assert what is 
constitutionally written.183 An upper-class respondent similarly reported that he 
viewed the tutela as “an excellent mechanism to access and assert my rights.”184 
Across classes, interviewees shared views that suggested skepticism about the value of 
their rights, especially in the absence of the tutela.  
Survey respondents reported very similar views. Nearly 70% stated that they 
were unconfident or very unconfident that the judiciary treated all citizens equally. 
Only 19 out of 310 respondents said there were confident in the judiciary, and zero 
respondents reported that they were very confident. Thus, respondents reported little 
confidence in encountering a fair judiciary. Twenty percent of respondents pointed to 
                                                 
182 Aguablanca interview 5. “Una cosa lo que dice la Constitución y otra cosa lo que hacen … los 
derechos, todos los días los violan. Todos los violan.” 
183 Bogotá interview 35. “Creo que es importante saber lo que es [la acción de tutela], conocer que es un 
derecho que está en la Constitución, que pues que de hecho nos permite luchar por los derechos que 
todos tenemos. Una acción de tutela nos permite hacer valer lo que constitucionalmente está escrito.” 
184 Bogotá interview 32. “[La acción de tutela es] un excelente mecanismo para poder acceder y hacer 
valer mis derechos.” 
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the view that the state should protect their rights as the primary reason for filing a 
tutela claim, which could be interpreted as minimal support for the idea that their 
constitutional rights are “real” or claimable. The nature of the survey does not allow 
for the same level of nuance that emerges in responses to open-ended interview 
questions; however, the survey does yield evidence that the evaluations of the general 
population in questions about the judicial system carry through to individuals who use 
the legal system. Here, claimants do not appear to be fundamentally different from 
non-claimants in their assessments of the state and the judiciary.  
In this context of general lack of faith in the state, the judiciary, and rights, 
perhaps citizens view the tutela as distinct from the rest of the state’s legal apparatus, 
as an effective tool in an ineffective system. During a group interview in Aguablanca, 
members of one family (living in extreme poverty, even for Aguablanca) explained 
that “We have filed many legal claims, and they do not care [or respond],” no matter 
what type of claim, whether to obtain access to government services or to report the 
excessive use of force by the police.185 One woman described the process of filing a 
tutela claim for the right to health as follows: 
You do not need a lawyer, but when you go to the Palace of Justice, there is a 
man in front who does everything for 10.000 or 15.000 COP [$3-5 US] – a 
processor. And you say, “Good morning, what happened is … [I would like] to 
place a tutela,” and the man processes it for you. You have to have a copy of 
your ID and wait in line … and after a few days, you get the response. If you 
do not pay a processor here, nothing happens.186 
 
                                                 
185 Aguablanca interview 1. “Ponemos una cantidad de demandas y ellos no les importa.” 
186 Aguablanca interview 6. “No necesitas un abogado, pero vas al frente del Palacio de Justicia y hay 
un señor en frente que hace todo por 10 o 15 mil – un tramitador. Y tú dices buenas señor, lo que pasa 
es … para colocar una tutela y el señor tramite. [Tienes que tener una] fotocopia de la cédula y [esperar 
en] la fila … y después unos días, la respuesta. Si usted no paga un tramitador aquí, no hacen nada.” 
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Ultimately, the judge found in favor of this woman’s right to health claim; however, in 
the decision, he declared that she should have access to diapers and creams, not the 
24-hour nurse she had requested. In Aguablanca, citizens rarely, if ever, reported 
believing that the tutela was effective in protecting their rights. 
In the Bogotá sample, however, views on the tutela procedure were mixed. 
One respondent of the middle class described that the tutela the following way: 
[The tutela] gave the ordinary citizen the possibility to enforce their rights or 
show difficulties in the fulfillment of some fundamental right … Before the 
tutela, there was nothing one could do. It was necessary to wait for a politician 
to be elected, and if he cared about that community, wait for him to intervene 
in some way. Not now. Now, an individual, a single person, can file a 
complaint with the tutela.187 
 
An interviewee from the upper class similarly considered that “[The tutela] helps, it is 
a tool that makes those responsible respond to what one is asking for.”188 Further, a 
middle class respondent held, “[The tutela] is the only thing that works – we use it 
because it works.”189 On the other hand, some respondents critiqued the way the tutela 
procedure functions in practice. As one member of the lower class noted, “The tutela 
is good, but what happens is that they do not comply … the people do not comply.”190 
Others argued that too many tutelas have been filed, that judges are overburdened by 
tutelas and that sometimes people abuse the procedure. An interviewee from the lower 
                                                 
187 Bogotá interview 9. “… le dio la posibilidad al ciudadano común de hacer cumplir o de mostrar que 
hay dificultades en el cumplimiento de algún derecho fundamental … antes de la acción de tutela no 
había nada que hacer, tocaba esperar a que un político se eligiera y que le importara esa comunidad para 
que interviniera de alguna manera, ahora no. Ahora un individuo, una sola persona, con una acción de 
tutela puede poner una denuncia.” 
188 Bogotá interview 6. “[La tutela] le ayuda a uno, es una herramienta que hace que los responsables de 
lo que uno está tutelando le respondan por lo que uno está pidiendo.” 
189 Bogotá interview 44. “[La tutela] es lo único que funciona – lo usamos porque es lo que funciona.” 
190 Bogotá interview 13. “[La acción de tutela es] buena, [pero] lo que pasa es que no se cumplen … la 
gente no cumple.” 
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class noted, “Lately, the courts are so full of tutelas … Already [the tutela] lost its 
efficiency.”191 One member of the upper class spoke specifically about the over-use of 
the tutela, stating, “People abuse the tutela a lot and it takes up a lot of time to resolve 
[the tutela claims],” stressing an already overtaxed legal system.192 Finally, some 
respondents simply held negative views on the tutela. As one lower-class respondent 
remarked, “[The idea of the tutela is] to assert our rights, but that does not work … 
that is a lie, it does nothing for you.”193 Similarly, a woman from the middle class 
noted that filing a tutela “seems to me a waste of time and above all fills the courts … 
the perception I have is that it is of no use.”194 Thus, while respondents in Bogotá 
generally agreed that the justice system as a whole leaves much to be desired, 
perspectives on the effectiveness of the tutela procedure were more varied. 
Surprisingly, the ease of filing a tutela procedure does not appear to have 
impacted the decisions of respondents whether or not to make a legal claim. When 
asked to describe the process of filing a tutela claim, why they filed a tutela claim – if 
they had – and if they would file a tutela claim in the future, no respondents mentioned 
that the process was easy, nor did anyone volunteer the idea that one should file the 
tutela in the face of rights violations. In fact, several respondents reported having to 
wait in long lines to file their claims and reported dissatisfaction with the length of 
time that passed between the presentation of the claim and the resolution of their case. 
                                                 
191 Bogotá interview 1. “Últimamente como que las acciones tutela como los juzgados están tan llenos 
de ella… Ya perdió su eficiencia.” 
192 Bogotá interview 33. “La gente abusa mucho y eso quita mucho tiempo también para poder resolver 
las cosas.” 
193 Bogotá interview 29. “[La idea de la tutela es] hacer valer nuestros derechos, pero eso para que, eso 
nunca sirve para nada … eso es mentira, eso no hace nada por uno.” 
194 Bogotá interview 18. “Me parece una pérdida de tiempo y un desgaste y sobre todo llenar más allá 
esos juzgados … la percepción que yo tengo es que no sirve para nada.” 
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These views resonate with those reported in Aguablanca. When interviewees did talk 
about the process of filing a tutela, they spoke of the lines one must wait in and the 
costs one must pay (for example, to the “processor” described above). While the tutela 
process in this view is not necessarily something that is difficult to navigate, it does 
require time and financial resources, rendering it somewhat less accessible for citizens. 
Even among survey respondents – who had all committed to the tutela process at the 
time of the survey – only 32% pointed to the relative ease as the primary reason they 
chose to file their claim. About one-third of respondents envisioned a positive 
outcome resulting from their tutela claim and that nearly one-third offered the view 
that the tutela is the best tool to address the problem at hand. Nearly half of 
respondents, on the other hand, thought a favorable outcome was unlikely or very 
unlikely. Importantly, the best tool is not necessarily a good tool – it may be the only 
tool or the best of a set of sub-par options. This response simply means that relative to 
all other options, the tutela is better. Here, across all three groups, concerns about ease 
and effectiveness of the tutela appeared determinative only for a small portion of 
respondents. 
Overall, neither set of interviewees nor the survey respondents reported 
confidence in the state or the judiciary. Some suggested that they thought the tutela 
would effectively allow them to claim their rights, though others reported skepticism 
about the utility of the tutela. Similarly, some respondents argued that the tutela was 
not difficult to use and pointed to that ease as a reason to file a tutela claim, while 
others argued that the tutela was more difficult to use that they had expected or that 
the ease of use was not a primary determinant in whether or not to file a claim. This 
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discussion should not be taken to mean that no one uses means-ends calculations when 
considering a tutela claim, but it does offer reason to question the utility of this 
outcome-based framework for describing broad patterns of behavior in this case. 
3. Practice-Based Expectation 
 
Finally, the practice-based explanation of this seeming disconnect between 
citizen use of the tutela procedure and their reported beliefs about the state and, more 
specifically, the legal system would suggest that a logic of practice is at play, where 
citizens, regardless of the costs or consequences of doing so, file legal claims, simply 
because that is what one does, or because that is what is understood as appropriate to 
do. In defining practice theory, Iver Neumann (2002: 629) explains that practices are 
“incorporated and material patterns of action that are organized around the common, 
implicit understandings of the actors.” The thought process is not one of careful 
deliberation, of weighing the expected consequences of option against another, but 
instead of common sense.195 Here, filing a tutela could be understood as a practice or 
as an “appropriate” course of action. Evidence in support of this explanation would 
include statements such as “It’s the right thing to do,” or “It’s what we do.”  
One example of this perspective is evident in one in-depth interview with an 
upper-class resident of Bogotá. The interviewee noted that “today, the way to resolve 
problems is through the tutela. Nowadays, it is used for health issues, but you can use 
                                                 
195 Importantly, however, as Schmidt (2014: 819) notes, habits – in a pragmatist theory of practice – are 
not “purely unreflective modes of thought and individual (nonsocial) action.” Schmidt clarifies that 
habits may be considered, in Dewey’s terms, as “standing predilections and aversions.” In this sense, 
habits may play a similar role to the role I describe with respect to beliefs above. For an alternate view 
on the extent to which practices are reflexive or representational in nature, see Pouliot (2014). 
  166 
it for any right that you feel is being violated.”196 This statement could be read as 
support for the idea that filing tutelas is simply what one does, especially in the realm 
of health, thus following the logic of practice. However, given its reference to “the 
way to resolve problems,” it could also be read as following outcomes-based 
reasoning. Further, among all interview and survey respondents, there were no other 
responses that indicated support for the logic of practice explanation.  
Even so, the tutela appears to become taken-for-granted as part of the terrain of 
Colombian life. It is ubiquitous, appearing in news stories, op-eds, and podcasts, as 
well as in colloquial conversation (in verb form, entutelar). It could be, however, that 
the ubiquity of the tutela at the discursive level has not translated evenly or concretely 
into thinking about how individuals claim their rights in real terms. At any rate, 
neither the interviews nor the survey results offer support for the logic of practice 
explanation for mobilization. 
 
So What Explains Mobilization and Why Does It Matter? 
 
All three sources of data offer perspectives on the legal system and rights that 
do not easily harmonize with high levels of use of the legal system to make rights 
claims. When asked why the tutela is used so frequently, judges and lawyers 
repeatedly report that “everyone knows the tutela” and that citizens see the tutela “as 
the solution for everything,” or “today, with the tutela, the judge is in your hands,”197 
yet when asked directly, citizens rarely if ever report these views. More commonly 
                                                 
196 Bogotá interview 20. “Hoy en día la manera de resolver los problemas es a través de la tutela, 
digamos que hoy en día se utiliza todo los temas de salud pero ya tú la puedes poner para cualquier cosa 
algún derecho que tu sientas que se está vulnerando lo puedes poner o algún derecho.” 
197 “Hoy con la acción de tutela, el juez está a mano.”  
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people reported filing tutelas – especially those claiming the right to health – not 
because they have faith that it will work or that it is simply what one does, but because 
that is what one has to do given the reality of limited options. In the words of one 
respondent from the middle class, “Unfortunately, in Colombia, in order to access 
health services, you have to file tutelas,”198 and a woman from Aguablanca noted, 
“Everything [in healthcare] happens through the tutela.”199 Similarly, an upper class 
resident of Bogotá reported: 
The only way to claim that right [to health] so that they listen is through the 
tutela. To me, it is sad that we have come to this, because health should be an 
issue that is mandatory, but as it is not, we have to resort to this, and not 
everyone gets a satisfactory answer [or result].200 
 
In this sense, then, the tutela is understood as the effective entry-point into the 
healthcare system.201 Tutelas may or may not be effectual, but no other options exist, 
except for doing nothing. If the problem is deemed to be important enough, doing 
nothing may not be considered a viable option.202 In other words, the tutela might be 
the only potential solution for anything. Accordingly, even if the judiciary is biased, 
even if the procedure might not work, pursuing any other strategy is likely to be 
                                                 
198 Bogotá interview 9. “Desafortunadamente en Colombia para acceder a algunos servicios de salud 
hay que poner tutelas.” 
199 Aguablanca interview 6. “Todo funciona a medida de tutelas.” 
200 Bogotá interview 46. “La única manera de reclamar ese derecho [a la salud] y que los oigan es a 
través de la tutela. Me parece que pues tristemente hay que llegar a eso porque el tema de la salud 
debería ser un tema que es de carácter obligatorio pero como no es así entonces hay que recurrir y no 
todo el mundo obtiene una respuesta satisfactoria.” 
201 As might be expected, the Constitutional Court has ruled that the tutela cannot be a required part of 
the process of obtaining healthcare (see C-950/07, among other cases). However, this ruling does not 
mean that citizens do not perceive the tutela to play such a role. 
202 What differentiates those who do not act from those who do is an open question and should be the 
subject of future research. Generally speaking, mobilization – both social and legal – occurs at rates 
lower than might be warranted by possible grievances or “justiciable events” (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 
1977; Genn 1999). 
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futile.203 The options are to file a tutela or simply continue to live with the problem; 
there is no other alternative.204 Legal consciousness informs the response set available 
to citizens. Beliefs about law and the state lead citizens to be skeptical of the 
likelihood that the tutela procedure will lead to a positive outcome, but these beliefs 
also lead them to view other options as less favorable. Even those who understand 
themselves to be situated “against the law,” subject to arbitrary decisions on the part of 
judges or other actors, thus, will engage in legal mobilization through the tutela.205 
This finding largely corresponds with Mary Gallagher’s work on “informed 
disenchantment” (2006). Individuals continue to make legal claims, despite less-than-
fully-satisfactory experiences with the courts and despite less-than-positive 
expectations for future interactions with the courts. 
How exactly citizens learn about the tutela might have a significant impact on 
their propensity to use the mechanism to make claims. When asked how they learned 
about the tutela procedure, nearly half of the survey respondents pointed to a lawyer as 
                                                 
203 In some ways, this conclusion meshes with Hendely’s (2012) findings on the use of Russian courts. 
She argues that a combination of need and capacity explain the continued use of courts despite 
professed distrust. In the Colombian case, however, capacity of the claimant appears to be less relevant, 
as a large percentage of lower class individuals file tutelas, rather than use of the courts being the 
domain of wealthy individuals or firms. This may be the result in part of the relatively low time and 
resource costs associated with the tutela procedure. 
204 The key difference between my account and a practice- or habit-based account is that while it may 
be common sense to file a tutela to gain access to healthcare, the justification offered goes beyond that. 
Filing a tutela is not only understood as common sense; it is understood the only option. Filing is not 
simply what one does, but instead it is what one has to do. 
205 This account has focused on the views of (potential) claimants, not on service providers or judges. I 
make no claims as to the accuracy of the views held by those interviewed. Whether these views are 
“true” or “right,” they have an impact on the way citizens interact with the world around them. 
Interestingly, one former lawyer for a large health clinic reports that patients often try to game the 
system, engaging in dangerous behaviors in the clinic – such as submerging recently repaired wounds in 
the toilet to try to contract an infection – that might allow them to gain pensión de invalidez status and 
therefore receive more resources from the state. These patients might fit better the with the law ideal 
type, using the tutela strategically to acquire something wanted, like a state pension. However, this view 
was not expressed by claimants or potential claimants themselves and thus is not part of the main 
analysis. 
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the source of their information. 21% said they learned from civil society or an NGO, 
while 16% said friends or family. 10% recalled learning about the tutela in school. 
One man remembered seeing a program on television that explained what the tutela 
was. Even in the case that a lawyer was the primary source of information, the 
question of why legal cynics would turn to the legal system for redress remains. Some 
individuals reported that in the case of healthcare, their insurance companies directed 
them to file tutelas (after having denied coverage for a needed medication or 
procedure). Overall, then, there appear to be several pathways through which citizens 
learn about the tutela, and the way in which citizens learn about the tutela does not 
appear to be associated with decisions about whether or not to use it. The no other 
alternative explanation is consistent both with these various sources of knowledge 
about the mechanism and with the observed aggregate negative evaluations of the 
legal system, though these pathways should be explored in more detail in future 
research. 
Regardless of relative marginality, class, or claimant/non-claimant status, 
Colombian citizens report strikingly little confidence in judicial institutions, despite 
continued use of legal tools to make rights claims. The case of legal mobilization in 
Colombia has offered little support for the idea that those individuals who find 
themselves situated “against the law” will not engage in legal claims-making. 
Respondents across samples and across socio-economic statuses expressed the view 
that Colombian law is capricious and unfair, yet individuals in all groups filed legal 
claims. Outcomes-based calculations based on the ease and effectiveness of filing 
legal claims may influence the decisions of some individuals, but they do not seem to 
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account for the broad patterns of claims-making identified here. Finally, though the 
use of the tutela has become something of an accepted part of the process of accessing 
healthcare for many Colombians, using the tutela is understood not so much what one 
does (as suggested by the practice-based explanation), but what one has to do, the only 
option one has – and it is understood as an option that may or may not be effective. 
Importantly, the tutela is not, strictly speaking, the only route through which citizens 
can pursue access to their rights. In some cases, individuals or groups could file other 
kinds of legal claims, they could pressure their elected representatives directly, they 
could protest, or take any number of more specific actions. Yet, in this context, the 
tutela is understood to be the action one can take. 
These findings should not be taken to mean that legal consciousness does not 
impact legal mobilization. Rather, they show that legal consciousness affects 
mobilization in complex ways. The beliefs and understandings actors have about their 
rights, the state, and the legal system encourage the use of the tutela, because citizens 
come to understand their rights through the lens of the tutela, viewing the tutela as 
their only possible option for accessing something they want, whether that thing is the 
response to a petition request or access to a specific medication or formal recognition 
by the state.206  
The consequences of this emergent understanding that the tutela is the only 
means through which Colombians can realize their rights (or simply access the goods 
                                                 
206 It might be most accurate to say that while these things are rights in accordance with the way the 
Constitutional Court has interpreted constitutional provisions, those citizens included in this study 
generally did not describe them as rights. Instead, citizens referred to something they wanted or needed 
that could be procured (possibly) through the use of the tutela procedure. 
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and services they want or need) are substantial. Perhaps most important in this case is 
the filtering of social and political demands into the legal sphere. As Susan Silbey 
(2005: 325) notes, “the seemingly individualized, disparate decisions of legal actors 
cumulate to reflect the wider array of social forces more than the facts of specific 
incidents.” Though the judicialization of politics has been a global process, it has 
taken on a unique form and depth in Colombia through the ability – and apparent 
necessity – of citizens to file individual rights claims. Nowhere is this more apparent 
than in the realm of healthcare provision, in large part due to the understanding that 
one must file a tutela claim to even access the healthcare system. Shifts towards 
judicialization change the nature of obligation between citizen and state. Specifically, 
citizens have access to the rights promised to them in the constitution not as the result 
of implemented public policy or their ability to demand accountability from their 
elected officials, but because of their ability to file legal claims.  
Importantly, even with the tutela, the realization of rights is not uniform. In 
fact, class appears to play a significant role. Rodrigo Uprimny and Juanita Duran 
(2014: 41) find that middle and upper class citizens have generally benefitted more 
from the judicial protection of health through the tutela procedure, because they are 
better able to access the legal system than the impoverished and marginalized, despite 
the 1991 constitutional changes meant to improve conditions of access.207 Landau 
(2014) similarly concludes that the most disadvantaged citizens have not benefitted 
from these legal changes to the degree than their wealthier counterparts have. These 
                                                 
207 Notably, even though judicial protections of healthcare seem to be unequal, significant reforms to 
the healthcare system in 1993 resulted in the expansion of coverage from about 25% of the population 
in 1995 to 90% of the population in 2011 (Lamprea 2015: 61).  
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initial studies affirm insights from broader law and society literature on how material 
and social resources influence the ability of citizens to realize their rights (Galanter 
1974). All Colombians may have the right to claim their rights but not everyone can, 
in fact, claim their rights, and not everyone has the right to an implemented solution to 
their rights claim in practice. 
 The long-term significance of the existence of the tutela procedure and the 
persistent lack of confidence in the state remain to be seen. At this point, more than 25 
years after the constitutional reform, the impact of what may have been a good faith 
attempt to expand citizenship by virtue of broader rights guarantees appears to be a 
reiteration of the same old story, that all citizens are equal, but some are more equal; 
that everyone has rights, but some have a better ability to realize their rights. This is 
not to say that the 1991 Constitution and the tutela have had no effect on the lived 
reality of citizens; such a conclusion is undoubtedly false. The claim here is more 
limited, that the implementation of the 1991 Constitution has not resulted in 
substantive citizenship gains for all. Just as the existence of the tutela procedure 
should not be taken to mean that a thick or robust citizenship has been realized, 
continued use of the tutela should not be taken to mean uncritical faith in either the 
tutela itself or the legal system more generally. Instead, the persistent use of the tutela 
indicates the paucity of other options. Citizens use the tutela because there is no other 
alternative. 
 
Conclusion 
 
  173 
This chapter has explored the relationship between legal consciousness and 
legal mobilization among everyday Colombian citizens, drawing on three sources of 
originally collected data. Across the three largest cities in Colombia, regardless of 
class or relative marginality, citizens report a profound lack of faith in the judiciary’s 
ability or willing to provide justice and in the broader state’s ability or willingness to 
protect their rights. Yet, every year in large numbers, citizens turn to the court to make 
rights claims, requesting that judges call on state and private entities to change their 
behavior. In Colombia, as is the case elsewhere, citizens continue to make claims 
through the legal system, participating in the construction of “hegemonic legal 
consciousness” (Silbey 2005: 349), where formal legal institutions maintain functional 
legitimacy “despite repeated evidence of law’s failure to live up to its own ideals” 
(Hull 2016: 553). This disconnect presents an interesting puzzle – if citizens have so 
little trust in the courts, why do they turn to them with such frequency?  
The argument advanced here is that the beliefs that citizens hold about the 
state, the legal system, and their rights – developed through personal experiences and 
on the basis of word of mouth – condition them to view the acción de tutela as the one 
possible way to resolve their problems, especially for – but not limited to – issues 
related to health. Though citizens do not necessarily see the judiciary as an ally or the 
tutela as an easy and effective tool, every other option is less promising; there is no 
other alternative to the tutela. Some individuals are what we might call “true 
believers,” professing full faith in the tutela’s transformative potential in the country, 
while others view the tutela procedure negatively, as a waste of time. Overall, 
however, claimants seem to be largely ambivalent, employing the tutela because it is 
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the best option of a limited choice set. This conclusion runs contrary to declarations 
made by legal elites and media outlets, which tend to report exuberant and even 
overuse of the tutela by everyday citizens. 
This study has introduced empirical evidence of the deep skepticism with 
which Colombian citizens view the state, especially with respect to the state’s ability 
to provide justice and protect constitutional rights. The high frequency of use of the 
legal procedures, especially the tutela, obscures this profound distrust in state 
institutions. Examining legal mobilization in conjunction with legal consciousness 
allows for a fuller understanding of the dynamics at play. Though it may be tempting 
to dismiss some of these perceptions as someone simply misunderstanding the legal 
process – for example, getting caught up in rumors of corruption or not recognizing 
that delays often result from the protection of the rights of both those bringing cases 
before the courts and defendants – these findings should be taken on their own terms. 
This is how Colombian citizens across socioeconomic statuses from three major cities 
report their views on the state, the legal system, and their rights.  
This chapter has examined two aspects of my constructivist account of legal 
mobilization: legal grievance formation and legal opportunity. By adopting a “from 
below” perspective, we can see not only that cases do not come before judges “as if by 
magic” (Epp 1998: 18), but more specifically just how fraught and complicated the 
process of legal claims-making actually is. Chapter 6 takes on this perspective in the 
South African case. 
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CHAPTER 6 
EXPLORING CLAIMS-MAKING PRACTICES  
IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Legal Mobilization “From Below” in South Africa 
While the previous chapter examined the relationship between legal 
consciousness and legal mobilization in Colombia, this chapter turns to the South 
African case to explore legal claims-making in the absence of a mechanism that 
dramatically reduces the difficulty of accessing the formal legal sphere (such as the 
tutela). Gabrielle Kruks-Wisner (2018: 124) defines claims-making as “action – direct 
or mediated – through which citizens pursue access to social welfare goods and 
services, understood as publicly provided resources intended to protect and improve 
well-being and social security.” Contemporary scholarship on legal claims-making, or 
legal mobilization, has been largely divorced from the broader conceptual category of 
claims-making. Yet, the rationale for such a hardline separation is unclear. As George 
Lovell (2012) demonstrates, even those who engage legal language and legal 
strategies enthusiastically hold complex understandings of the potential and limitations 
of the turn to law, and the turn to law does not necessarily or wholly close off the 
advancement of claims in other forums. Further, a broad view of claims-making can 
help to uncover how individuals make claims in expected and unexpected ways, and in 
expected and unexpected forums. In doing so, I focus on the following question: when 
do individuals choose to advance claims to social welfare goods in the formal legal 
system? 
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South Africa represents one of the most complete commitments to social 
constitutionalism (at least on paper). Further, South Africa is a country defined by 
stark inequalities, and many of its citizens lack access to the basic goods and services 
that a dignified life demands. While some indicators, such as access to electricity, 
piped water, and flush toilets, suggest significant improvement over the last twenty 
years, others, such as the percentage of the population living in poverty and the 
housing backlog, indicate stasis at best. South Africa shows both dramatic 
transformation in terms of rights recognitions and the creation of new avenues for 
claims-making as well as enduring poverty and significant barriers to the access of 
social goods and services.  
My examination of claims-making practices in South Africa draws on an 
original 551-person survey. The survey focused on experiences of and responses to a 
set of problems related to housing, water, sanitation, electricity, work, education, and 
health. I refer to this set of problems as “social welfare goods” in this chapter. We 
know relatively little about the micro-foundations of legal claims-making. As such, I 
engage in a theory-building exercise, examining the determinants of both the belief 
that one should turn to the formal legal system when faced with difficulty accessing 
social welfare goods (the normative-evaluation outcome) and actual legal claims-
making in those situations (the behavioral-turn-to-law outcome). More specifically, I 
investigate whether or not these outcomes are associated with knowledge about the 
courts, confidence in judicial institutions, legal system experience, exposure to legal 
resources, and an individual’s perceived status relative to his or her neighbors. In my 
analyses, I find striking differences between the factors that influence when people say 
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they should file a legal claim in response to a rights violation and when they actually 
do so. Interestingly, the way an individual interprets his or her own material 
conditions, especially relative to his or her neighbors influences these outcomes. 
Having experienced fewer life difficulties is associated with the normative-evaluation 
outcome, while having experienced more life difficulties and is associated with the 
behavioral-turn-to-law outcome. Surprisingly, those who view themselves as better off 
than their neighbors turn to law when faced with difficulties accessing social welfare 
goods, though they are not more likely to view the turn to law as normatively 
appropriate. Both neighborhood context and beliefs about the meaning of law and 
rights impact legal claims-making practices in ways that have not yet been adequately 
studied or theorized. 
These findings contribute to our understanding of claims-making and 
mobilization practices. First, they demonstrate that the relationship between normative 
evaluations of when one ought to file a legal claim do not necessarily coincide with 
the actual use of the courts to advance rights claims. In addition, they point to the 
importance of examining a largely under-studied set of factors related to how 
claimants perceive the material conditions of their own lives relative to those of their 
peers. In fact, what drives people to turn to the courts may have as much to do with 
how they understand themselves as with how they understand the courts.  
 
Constitutional Commitments and Access to Social Goods 
From the time of the Freedom Charter (1955) up through the construction of 
the post-apartheid South African state, the African National Congress insisted on the 
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indivisibility of rights, of the need for both access to political freedoms and those 
goods necessary for human flourishing. The 1996 Constitution accordingly recognized 
not only civil and political rights, but also economic, social, and cultural rights, 
making it one of the most progressive constitutions in the world. This constitutional 
framework has been described as fundamentally “transformative” in nature (Klare 
1998; Davis and Klare 2010), with the idea being that the Constitution would set out 
the path leading the country from a social and political order embedded in 
discrimination and exclusion to one founded on justice and dignity. 
The new constitutional framework encouraged changes meant (1) to allow for 
the dismantling of the apartheid state and to replace it with one defined by inclusive, 
participatory institutions, and (2) to encourage claims-making on the basis of 
individual constitutional rights rather than on the basis of group membership. In 
addition to recognizing individual rights, this new framework instated new 
mechanisms through which citizens could advance social claims not only more easily 
than during apartheid but also relative to other young democracies – these mechanisms 
include new Constitutional Court, “Chapter 9 institutions,” such as the Human Rights 
Commission208 and Public Protector,209 as well as local governance bodies that would 
                                                 
208 The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) refers to itself as “the national institution 
established to support constitutional democracy” on its website, https://www.sahrc.org.za/. The 
SAHRC’s mandate includes promoting, monitoring, and assessing human rights. In practice, the 
SAHRC is involved in research, advocacy, and legal services. South Africans are able to file complaints 
with the SAHRC, some of which are taken up in litigation or mediation, and the organization is also 
able to initiate investigations and legal cases of its own volition. 
209 On its website, the Office of the Public Protector bills itself as: “an independent institution 
established in terms of section 181 of the Constitution, with a mandate to support and strengthen 
constitutional democracy,” having “the power to investigate, report on and remedy improper conduct in 
all state affairs,” and as accessible to all South Africans: “Anyone can complain to the Public 
Protector,” http://www.pprotect.org/. 
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be required by law to seek out citizen participation in decision-making processes. 
These changes not only dramatically reconfigured the expressed obligations of the 
state to its citizens, but also opened up new avenues for claims-making. 
Since the end of apartheid, various government initiatives have been developed 
with the aim of improving basic living conditions. First and foremost, the Mandela 
government sought to implement what was called the “Reconstruction and 
Development Program” (RDP) following the transition to democracy. The first policy 
initiative of this program focused on “meeting [the] basic needs” of the general 
population, facilitating access to things like employment, housing and land, water and 
electricity, and healthcare and welfare (Ministry in the Office of the President 1994: 
9). Though this program was ultimately abandoned, each subsequent government has 
continued to promise the expansion access to basic goods and services (and 
government housing is still colloquially referred to as “RDP housing”). As of 2016, 
the Department of Human Settlements reports that more than four million homes and 
housing subsidies have been delivered since 1994, and census figures show that access 
to electricity, piped water, and flush toilets has also increased substantially since the 
mid-1990s (Statistics South Africa 2017). 
Yet, income inequality has increased since the end of apartheid, from a GINI 
score of 59.3 in 1993 to 63.4 in 2011(World Bank 2017). Further, as Figure 1 shows, 
in raw numbers, more people currently live in poverty than did at the end of apartheid, 
with more than 30 million people living in poverty in 2015 compared to about 24 
million in 1996. In terms of percentages, we see only a marginal improvement from 
57% living in poverty in 1996 to 55% in 2015.  
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Figure 6.1. Poverty Statistics Over Time210 
 
What is more, despite the large number of houses built, the Department of Human 
Settlements (2017: 15) reported that “housing backlogs within both the subsidy and 
affordable market segments have almost doubled since 1994 and the number of 
informal settlements have increased.” This housing backlog comes in the midst of 
complaints regarding unreliable demand databases, unspent budgets, and “queue 
jumping.”211  
As is clear from this discussion, despite overt constitutional promises regarding 
the promotion of social welfare, access to the goods and services that provide the basis 
for a dignified life is far from assured. This chapter examines how citizens have 
responded to this mix of promise, need, and frustration. I turn now to a discussion of 
claims-making within the legal sphere and outside it. 
                                                 
210 Data for 1996 and 2001 from HSRC (2004) and for 2006-2015 from Statistics SA (2017). 
211 Queue jumping in this context refers to unfairly moving ahead on the housing waitlists. Despite the 
transition to an alternate system of monitoring and allocation that does not involve a waitlist, the myth 
and language of queue jumping remains common. See overview in Tissington and Munshi (2012). 
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Beliefs about Law, Rights, and the State and Claims-Making 
 
Much of the time, individuals experiencing difficulties are thought to “lump” 
their problems (to do nothing) or to rely on self-help, family members, or friends and 
neighbors rather than to turn to formal institutions (e.g., Levine and Preston 1970; 
Felstiner 1974; Engel 2010). This may be particularly true of minorities or otherwise 
marginalized individuals (Bumiller 1988; Ewick and Silbey 1998; Nielsen 2000). Yet, 
even if mobilization or claims-making is not inevitable, neither is it uncommon. 
Across contexts and categories of difference, and even under the possibility of great 
personal risk (Wood 2003), individuals make claims on the state, demanding goods in 
services in the streets, in courtrooms, and in the offices of political officials. 
Comparative scholarship on claims-making, both within the legal sphere and 
beyond it, indicates that knowledge, experience, and social status are key factors 
influencing when and how individuals raise grievances. This literature points to the 
importance of grievance formation, or the process by which individuals come to 
recognize difficulties in their lives as difficulties that ought not to exist, that are 
changeable, and upon which they can make claims (Simmons 2014, 2016). Yet, the 
existence of grievances is not sufficient to result in claims-making (McCarthy and 
Zald 1977; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988; Genn 1999; Tarrow 2011). As 
Kruks-Wisner (2018: 133) clarifies, “[a] person must… both aspire to make claims on 
the state and have the capacity to do so. Claim[s]-making aspirations reflect 
underlying beliefs about what the state can and should deliver, as well as about if and 
how the state will respond … Claim[s]-making thus rests upon a sense of entitlement 
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and efficacy.” What exactly catalyzes such a sense of entitlement and efficacy in 
different social or political contexts has yet to be identified. 
This chapter examines the correlates of claims-making via formal legal 
institutions. The literature reviewed in this section gives rise to several hypotheses to 
explain the response of individuals to difficulties in their lives. The first hypothesis 
stems from the idea that problems must be recognized as grievances to act on them. 
Though someone without knowledge of his or her rights may still make claims on the 
basis of appeals to something other than rights (e.g., some sense of justice or ethics), 
knowledge of rights may reasonably be assumed to provide one strong rationale for 
claims-making. Level of formal education could also serve as a proxy for this type of 
foundational knowledge. In a study of labor law and legal mobilization in 
contemporary China, Mary Gallagher (2017) finds a statistically significant 
relationship between level of education and propensity to file a legal claim related to 
workers’ rights or other employment issues, but she also finds that legal knowledge 
gleaned through experience can take the place of formal education in spurring 
mobilization. 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who have higher levels of formal education and/or 
who are more knowledgeable about their rights are more likely to make legal 
claims than individuals who do not (Knowledge and Education). 
 
Two additional hypotheses focus on the impact of experience with, exposure 
to, and confidence in institutions on claims-making. There exists a robust literature on 
institutional legitimacy (particularly focused on the U.S. context) that purports that 
confidence in the judiciary translates into use of the legal system and compliance with 
its rulings (e.g., Tyler 1990; Levi 1997; Tyler and Fagan 2008). This literature has 
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found personal experience (Benesh and Howell 2001; Wenzel, Bowler, and Lanoue 
2003; Benesh 2006), perceptions of procedural justice (Tyler 1990; Tyler and Huo 
2002; Huq et al. 2013; Tyler and Jackson 2014; Tyler and Sevier 2014), perceptions 
and experiences of crime and corruption (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Della 
Porta 2000; Pharr 2000; Seligson 2002; Kelleher and Wolack 2007; Booth and 
Seligson 2009; Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009; Fernandez and Kuenzi 2010; Clausen, 
Kraary, and Nyiri 2011; Carreras 2013; Salzman and Ramsey 2013), and knowledge 
of the judiciary (Murphy, Tanenhaus, and Kastner 1973; Casey 1974; Gibson, 
Caldeira, and Baird 1998; Wenzel et al. 2003; Gibson 2007)212 to be the primary 
correlates of judicial legitimacy. While this literature has identified the correlates of 
judicial confidence or legitimacy, the consequences of expressed confidence or lack 
thereof continue to be largely assumed rather than demonstrated. Further, this 
literature remains mostly isolated from discussions of claims-making. 
Even so, this literature does give rise to additional hypotheses regarding 
claims-making. One anticipates that previous direct, personal experience with or more 
general exposure to lawyers, legal clinics, and judges will be positively associated 
with filing legal claims. The other expects the same relationship between general 
confidence in the judiciary and legal claims-making. Individuals who express little to 
no confidence in formal legal institutions are expected to be more likely to lump their 
                                                 
212 To be clear, the claim here is that knowledge leads to confidence (because learning more about the 
institution means learning that it works well) and that confidence translates into positive evaluations, 
compliance, and use. Contrast this with Gallagher’s study, which indicates that knowledge may be 
associated with what she calls “informed disenchantment” (2006, 2017). In her account, negative 
evaluations may still be associated with continued use of the judicial system. See Hendley (1999, 2012), 
Smulovitz (2010), and Taylor (2018) on similar processes in Russia, Argentina, and Colombia, 
respectively. 
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problems or to advance claims outside the legal sphere. More specific beliefs about the 
legal system’s efficacy or utility are also expected to be associated with propensity to 
make legal claims.  
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who have personal experience with or exposure to 
legal institutions, actors, or procedures will be more likely to turn to the courts 
to make legal claims than individuals who do not (Experience/Exposure). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Individuals who express general confidence in the legal system 
will be more likely to make legal claims (Institutional Confidence). 
 
A final hypothesis indicates that social context rather than knowledge, 
institutional experiences, or evaluations drive claims-making. It emphasizes that 
individuals are concerned not only with their own access to goods and services, but 
also with the access that their neighbors have. This variable of context, of neighbor-to-
neighbor relations, is potentially of vital importance to the ways in which individuals 
interpret both what they have and what they need, yet it has often been overlooked in 
scholarship on mobilization and claims-making.213 In a comparative study of the 
United States and South Africa, Gwyneth McClendon (2018) focuses on how relative 
status concerns, particularly as they relate to envy, spite, and esteem, motivate 
behavior. The reference groups against which individuals evaluate their relative status 
may include neighbors, coworkers, co-ethnics or any other group that seems 
reasonably similar to the individual in question. While McClendon does not explicitly 
examine legal claims-making as such, her findings map on nicely with this literature. 
She finds that in at least some South African municipalities, relative status concerns 
help to explain why housing budgets may remain unspent despite significant need for 
                                                 
213 For an exception that explicitly considers the impact of social relations or “weak ties” across 
neighborhoods, see Kruks-Wisner (2018). 
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housing, arguing that it may be politically expedient not to build new formal housing 
units, as individuals who see their status diminishing relative to their peers may protest 
or later punish local officials at the polls.  
The implication here is that individuals who see their neighbors as doing better 
than they are in terms of access to basic goods and services might be more likely to 
make claims to those goods and services than other individuals who are similarly 
situated in terms of lacking access but who view themselves as better off, or at least 
not worse off, than their neighbors. Feelings of jealousy or fairness concerns might 
motivate those who are less well-off but who are exposed to those who are more well-
off to see the problems they personally face (that perhaps their neighbors do not) as 
grievances or as claim-worthy. In other words, witnessing inequality may prompt a 
sense of entitlement (“if someone like me has access to these goods, then I deserve to 
as well”). Alternately, this same group of less well-off individuals may mobilize or 
make claims following the example of their more well-off neighbors who might have 
previously advanced their own claims, out of a sense of efficacy and possibility. 
Regardless of the pathway, this hypothesis focuses on the motivating potential of 
relative status.  
Hypothesis 4: Individuals who perceive themselves to be worse off relative to 
their peers are more likely to make legal claims than those who perceived 
themselves to be better off, regardless of class or income (Relative Status). 
 
In what follows, I detail the survey design and sampling strategy before presenting 
analyses that explore the relationship between claims-making and knowledge about 
the law or rights, experience with the formal legal sphere, exposure to legal resources, 
institutional evaluations, and relative status concerns.  
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Survey Design  
 
In order to investigate individual attitudes on rights, law, and the state, and 
individual claims-making practices, I use data from an original survey that engages a 
novel sampling strategy. A South African survey firm fielded the survey in November 
2017. The questionnaire lasted about 45 minutes and was available in four languages, 
English, Tswana, Xhosa, and Zulu.214 Potential respondents were asked what language 
they were first and second most comfortable using, and if their responses did not 
correspond to one of the four languages of the survey, they were excluded in the 
survey. Though respondents were not selected on the basis of race, the percentage of 
respondents belonging to each of the four major racial categories (“Black,” “White,” 
“Coloured,” and “Asian/Indian”) largely reflect national statistics.215  
The survey targeted 551 respondents, with an effort to specifically sample both 
individuals who had prior experience with the legal system as well as those who did 
not. For this reason, the design deviates slightly from a standard random sampling 
design, wherein all individuals are both randomly selected and have an equal 
probability of being selected. The 2014/2015 wave of the Afrobarometer survey shows 
                                                 
214 The four languages were chosen on the basis of the languages most commonly spoken in the 
“claimant communities” included in the survey. Though Afrikaans is frequently spoken in the Western 
Cape, few Afrikaans speakers do not speak one of the four survey languages. Of those individuals who 
indicated that they were most comfortable with a language other than one of the four survey languages, 
20 were Afrikaans speakers, 11 spoke Tsonga, seven were Sotho speakers, and one spoke Shona. All of 
these respondents noted that they felt “second most comfortable” speaking one of the four survey 
languages, and they then took the survey in that second language. 
215 In the survey Black respondents comprised 80.6% of the total, compared to 80.2% nationally, White 
respondents were slightly overrepresented at 11.2% of the survey, compared to 8.4% nationally, 
Coloured respondents were slightly underrepresented at 6.5% of the survey and 8.8% nationally, and 
Asian/Indian respondents made up 1.6% of those surveyed compared to 2.5% of the national 
population. 
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that only 246 out of 2,388 total respondents in South Africa reported having 
experience with the courts in the previous five years.216 With an N of 551, a random 
sampling strategy and the same rate would result in only 57 respondents with 
experience in the courts.217 Because I specifically wanted to be able to compare 
claimants and non-claimants, I chose to devise an alternative sampling strategy, one 
that I believed would allow for the overrepresentation claimants. 
This alternative strategy relied on two sampling procedures. The first 
procedure focused on the (presumed) oversampling of claimants and involved 
randomly selecting respondents from pre-identified communities (Ratanang, 
Marikana,218 and Thusong) that had been involved in housing rights litigation at the 
High Court level within the previous five years or that are currently involved in 
housing rights litigation.219 The idea was not that 100% of respondents from these 
communities would identify as “claimants” or acknowledge legal system experience 
(certainly there may have been some in- or out-migration since the communities’ legal 
cases ended), but that a larger percentage would than in the general population. A 
South African NGO facilitated contact with the governing bodies representing three 
                                                 
216 Afrobarometer, http://www.afrobarometer.org/. 
217 The South African Social Attitudes Survey of 2014 found that 16% of respondents had been 
involved in some way in a court case in the previous 20 years (Democracy, Governance, and Service 
Delivery Research Programme: 2015), which with a sample size of 551 would have resulted in 88 
“claimants,” higher than the estimate derived from Afrobarometer. 
218 This is not the Marikana of the massacre of striking mine workers perpetrated by state police forces 
in North West province. Instead, this is an informal settlement located in the Philippi area of Cape 
Town in Western Cape. 
219 The choice of housing rights litigation was made for several reasons. First, housing rights litigation 
has emerged as the most common type of social rights litigation in South Africa, comprising about 
60.8% of all social rights litigation in the country and 51.7%. Second, housing rights litigation 
historically has involved communities, a feature that makes identifying and contacting a substantial 
number of “claimants” possible. It is feasible that claimants involved in other forms of litigation differ 
fundamentally from housing rights litigants. Third, an NGO focused on housing rights litigation was 
willing to work with me. 
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communities, all three of which correspond to informal settlements. The communities 
were chosen because of their involvement in litigation and their relationship with the 
NGO. In other words, these communities are likely not representative of the whole 
population of “claimants” in South Africa (though due to the lack of public official 
records regarding litigation, that population is unknown). Again, though the 
communities were named litigants, it was by no means a given that the individual 
respondents living in these communities would identify as litigants. In fact, whether or 
not these individuals understood themselves to be claimants was a question of interest 
in the survey.  
The second sampling procedure involved randomly selecting respondents from 
within the provinces in which the three “claimant communities” are located, Gauteng, 
North West, and Western Cape (shown in Figure 6.2). All respondents, thus, were 
randomly sampled, but they did not have an equal probability of being selected, as 
individuals living in “claimant communities” were more likely to be selected than 
respondents living elsewhere in the provinces.  
Figure 6.2. Map of South Africa 
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Table 6.1 offers a comparison of these three provinces in terms of their 
population, unemployment rate, and GDP/capita. The goal here is neither compare 
provinces, nor to generate a sample representative of South Africa as a whole. Instead, 
I aim to perform an exploratory investigation of the claims-making behavior of South 
Africans from three provinces. 
Table 6.1. Province Comparison 
 Gauteng North West Western Cape 
Population220 12.3 million 3.5 million 5.8 million 
Unemployment221 30.2% 26.2% 21.9% 
GDP/capita222 $9,681 US $6,677 US $8,694 US 
 
Table 6.2 shows self-reported experience with the legal system, including 
those who reported having filed a legal claim to defend their rights and those who 
reported having been involved in a legal case for another reason. Compared to about 
9% of respondents in the general population survey who identified as having legal 
system experience, just under 31% of community members identified themselves as 
such. This finding is interesting in its own right: though every respondent based in 
Ratanang, Marikana, or Thusong may be assumed by outside observers to be a litigant 
or to have experience with the legal system, as the communities in which they live 
were named in legal cases within the last five years, not every resident reported 
understanding him- or herself in that way.223 Still, 92 respondents reported having 
                                                 
220 Statistics South Africa (2015). 
221 South African Market Insights (n.d.). 
222 World Atlas (n.d.). 
223 The NGO foresaw this possibility. It may be that while litigation about a potential eviction appears 
important, unique, or memorable to outside observers, it was not understood that way in these 
communities. Instead, this kind of legal contestation might be understood as the continuation of a 
normal state of affairs, of insecurity. It is also possible that the family member answering the survey 
questions was often, due to chance, not the family member involved in discussions with the NGO or 
community leaders about the litigation and therefore the person surveyed did not understand him- or 
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brought a case to defend their rights or having been involved in a legal case for any 
other reason, a number that allows for statistical analysis.  
Table 6.2. Self-Reported Legal System Experience 
 
Province 
Community  
Sample 
General Population 
Sample  
 
Total 
Gauteng 30/68 (Thusong) 
[44.1%] 
4/103 
[3.9%] 
34/171 
[19.9%] 
North West 27/66 (Ratanang) 
[40.9%] 
24/139 
[17.3%] 
51/205 
[24.9%] 
Western Cape 5/67 (Marikana) 
[7.5%] 
2/108 
[1.9%] 
7/175 
[4.0%] 
 62/201 
[30.9%] 
30/350 
[8.6%] 
92/551 
[16.7%] 
 
 
Beliefs about the Law and Claims-Making Practices 
 
This section details the results of the survey. The survey asked respondents 
about whether or not they had ever faced difficulties in access to the following goods: 
housing, water, sanitation, electricity, work, education, and health. These seven life 
difficulties were selected upon consultation with the housing rights NGO with the goal 
of covering the basic necessities of daily life. Problems accessing any one of the seven 
goods could be understood in the context of the 1996 Constitution, or, stated 
differently, could be understood as rights violations224 (though whether or not such a 
claim would hold up in court is a different question).  
                                                 
herself to be a litigant. Finally, it is possible that in- and out-migration in these areas meant that some of 
the survey respondents were, in fact, not involved in discussions about anti-eviction litigation. 
224 The right to adequate housing is enshrined in Section 26 of the Constitution – and that right has been 
referenced in cases about both sanitation and electricity. Both water and healthcare are covered by 
Section 27 (as is food and social security). Rights associated with access to employment and 
employment conditions fall within Sections 22 and 23. Finally, Section 29 lays out the right to 
education. 
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Between 74% and 79% survey respondents reported having experienced 
difficulties related to housing, water, sanitation, electricity, work, education, and 
health. When asked the primary way in which they responded to those difficulties, 
they pointed to several different responses, from doing nothing or asking friends and 
family for help, to engaging formal channels, such as turning to law (operationalized 
as talking to a lawyer, entering into litigation, or filing a formal complaint with the 
Human Rights Commission) or to public officials, to participating in protests. In 
keeping with previous findings on the frequency with which grievances are “lumped,” 
most respondents noted that they did nothing in the face of each these difficulties. 
Importantly, a not inconsequential number of respondents reported having no 
difficulties related to these goods and services. In what follows, I present analyses of 
two distinct outcomes: (1) when respondents reporting that they should turn to law in 
response to these life difficulties and (2) when they reported actually doing so.  
In Figure 6.3, we see that agreement with the statement, “If my rights are 
violated, I should file a legal claim, because the government has the obligation to 
protect my rights” over-predicts the likelihood of filing a legal claim. Importantly, 
simply because something can be understood as a rights violation does not mean that 
it will be, and agreement that you should do something does not mean that you 
actually will. What this level of agreement does suggest, however, is that a substantial 
proportion of survey respondents envision the legal system as a forum in which rights 
claims can or should be advanced. 
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Figure 6.3. Agreement that One Should File a Legal Claim 
 
 
Table 6.3 shows analyses of the correlates of agreement with this statement in 
contrast to reported behavior. The dependent variable of Model 1 is comprised of the 
four response options to the question, “If my rights are violated, I should file a legal 
claim, because the government has the obligation to protect my rights,” ranging from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree. The dependent variable of Model 2 is a count of 
the times respondents turned to law following problems with the seven life difficulties. 
This variable is coded as “1” if the respondent reported having met with a lawyer, 
litigated, or filed a claim with the Human Rights Commission in response to any one 
of the difficulties, “2” if the respondent had turned to law in response to two 
difficulties, and so on, or “0” if the respondent reported never having met with a 
lawyer, litigated, or filed such a claim. Importantly, this variable represents not the 
actual occurrence of litigation, but the stated willingness or likelihood to turn to the 
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law when faced with a problem. Respondents who reported never having faced 
difficulties accessing any of the social welfare goods were excluded from both models. 
A standard array of demographic variables is included in the models: age, 
gender, income level, and race. Income level refers to self-reported monthly income, 
organized along the official Statistics South Africa (2015) yearly household income 
categories of no income (0 Rand), low income (R1 to R19,200), middle income 
(R19,201 to R307,200), and upper income (R307,200 and above).225 Race is a dummy 
variable indicating whether or not the respondent defined him- or herself as Black. 
The models also include province-level fixed effects. 
Both models incorporate a set of variables meant to account for the impact of 
formal education and knowledge of the law, including education, having read the 
Constitution, and correctly identifying that the Constitution includes a right to 
housing. Education is operationalized as a dummy variable indicating whether or not 
the respondent finished high school and received a matriculation certificate (described 
in the shorthand “matric”). These three measures serve to proxy knowledge of 
constitutional rights. The models also include variables measure exposure or 
experience. In each model, there is a variable corresponds to self-reported litigation 
involvement, having met with representatives of an NGO or legal clinic, and 
belonging to the claimant community. Belonging to a claimant community could serve 
to expose respondents in a more diffuse way to the legal system than being involved in 
litigation personally or directly meeting with an NGO or legal clinic. These variables 
are based on a yes or no question in the survey, and thus are included as dummy 
                                                 
225 In November 2017, when this survey was fielded, 1 USD was worth roughly 14 ZAR. 
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variables. In the normative evaluation model (Model 1), the variable indicating having 
turned to law in response to difficulties accessing any of the social welfare goods is 
included (the dependent variable of Model 2).  
The two models also include another set of variables that reflect different 
views held by individuals about the judicial system. These variables consider 
perceptions of the speed, ease of use, cost of the judicial system, as well as the honesty 
or corruptness of its officials. Assessments of how much respondents trust judges 
specifically, as well as the extent to which respondents believe that “In practice, no 
one in South Africa is above the law” and “the Constitutional Court protects my rights 
and the rights of people like me” are also included. In addition, Model 2 includes a 
variable indicating whether or not the respondent believes one should file a legal claim 
in response to a rights violation (the dependent variable of Model 1). These variables 
are operationalized along a four-point scale.  
A final set of variables corresponds to the impact of the difficulties the 
respondent has faced in his or her life, as well as more generalized beliefs about how 
those difficulties have changed over the course of the respondent’s life and the status 
of the respondent relative to his or her neighbors. The models include two measures of 
difficulty accessing the seven social welfare goods. The first denotes the number of 
issue areas (from zero to seven) in which the respondent reported having faced 
problems. The second indicates the frequency with which the respondent reported 
facing a difficulty operationalized along a four-point scale, averaged across the seven 
issue areas. Finally, the models include two variables representing the perceived 
relative quality of life of the respondent. Each respondent was asked to assess his or 
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her personal quality of life as well as the general quality of life enjoyed by those in his 
or her neighborhood. The difference between these two assessments provides the basis 
of the relative quality of life measures. The measures included here are two dummy 
variables, one combining all positive assessments (where both neutral and negative 
assessments are coded as “0”), and one combining all negative assessments.  
Table 6.3. Assessing the Correlates of Legal Claims-Making 
    (1) Should File a Claim (2) Turn to Law   
Education    -0.03    0.12 
     (0.09)    (0.18) 
Read Constitution   -0.10    -0.06 
     (0.10)    (0.17) 
Know Right to Housing  0.29***   -0.29* 
     (0.11)    (0.16)   
Reported Legal System Experience 0.03    0.11 
     (0.13)    (0.20) 
Reported Turn to Law  0.04    --- 
     (0.03)    --- 
Exposure to Legal Clinics  0.03    0.12 
     (0.15)    (0.28) 
Claimant Community   -0.11    0.51*** 
     (0.09)    (0.18)          
Judicial System: Speed  0.05    -0.24*** 
     (0.06)    (0.09) 
Judicial System: Ease   -0.09    0.16 
     (0.06)    (0.11) 
Judicial System: Cost   0.07    -0.04 
     (0.05)    (0.07) 
Judicial System: Honesty  0.01    0.18** 
     (0.06)    (0.09) 
Trust Judges    0.01    -0.05 
     (0.05)    (0.07) 
Should File a Legal Claim  ---    0.11 
     ---    (0.10) 
No One Above the Law  0.24***   0.10 
     (0.05)    (0.08) 
Con Court Protects Rights  0.29***   0.12 
     (0.06)    (0.10)   
Difficulties (Number)   -0.12***   0.22*** 
     (0.04)    (0.08) 
Difficulties (Frequency)  0.22**    -0.28 
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     (0.11)    (0.21) 
Relative Quality of Life (+)  0.12    0.66*** 
     (0.09)    (0.18) 
Relative Quality of Life (-)  0.16    -0.04 
     (0.11)    (0.17)   
Age     0.01    0.01 
     (0.00)     (0.01) 
Female    -0.03    -0.37** 
      (0.08)    (0.15) 
Income Level    -0.04    0.20* 
     (0.09)    (0.12) 
Black     0.10    -0.04 
     (0.13)    (0.20)   
Constant    1.01***   -0.87 
     (0.37)    (0.67)   
N     325    325 
* p < 0.05, Results reported with robust standard errors. 
 
Neither having graduated from high school nor having read the Constitution is 
associated with agreement that one should file a legal claim or with turning to law in 
practice. However, correctly recognizing that the Constitution contains a provision 
related to the right to housing is statistically significant and positively associated with 
agreement that one should file a legal claim, yielding some support for the notion that 
knowledge of rights might be thought of as an important predictor of legal claims-
making. On the other hand, correctly identifying that the South African Constitution 
includes a provision related to housing is associated with this behavioral outcome, but 
in the opposite direction of Model 1. Unlike with the normative evaluation, knowledge 
of rights here is associated with a lower likelihood of turning to law in practice. 
Disaggregating between the seven social welfare goods suggests differential 
relationships, at least in the bivariate context, between this kind of rights knowledge 
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and claims-making practices, something worth investigating further in future 
research.226 Overall, though, these analyses yield little support for Hypothesis 1. 
 None of the four variables meant to proxy experience with or exposure to the 
formal legal system appear to be related to how respondents evaluate whether or not 
they should file a legal claim in the event of a rights violation. Turning now to the 
relationship between these variables and the turn to law in practice, we see that neither 
litigation experience or exposure to legal clinics is significantly associated with the 
filing of legal claims. Belonging to the claimant community sample, however, is 
statistically significant and positively associated with reportedly turning to law in 
response to difficulty accessing social welfare goods. In other words, if the respondent 
was from Marikana, Ratanang, or Thusong, all else equal, he or she was more likely to 
report turning to law.227 Several pathways to this adoption of legal claims-making 
exist. For one, the respondent may not recognize him- or herself as a prior litigant or 
may not have personally interacted with legal clinics, but knowledge about the legal 
process or even a generalized propensity toward litigiousness may have traveled more 
diffusely through neighborhood or community ties. Additionally, respondents from the 
claimant communities may have been more likely to have met with a lawyer than 
respondents from the general population. Because the dependent variable here 
comprises having initiated a legal case or a formal complaint with the Human Rights 
Commission and having simply met with a lawyer, so it is very possible that a 
respondent could identify as not having legal system experience as such but could 
                                                 
226 Full results of these bivariate analyses are available upon request. 
227 This finding was expected, but not necessarily guaranteed considering the sampling strategy, which 
sought to over-sample individuals with legal system experience. 
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have turned to law (by meeting with a lawyer) in response to difficulty accessing the 
social welfare goods.228 Overall, however, there is little support for Hypothesis 2.  
The variables meant to assess evaluations of how the judicial system functions 
as a whole – its speed, ease of use, cost, honesty, or trust in judges – are not 
significantly associated with whether or not respondents think that a claim should be 
filed. In contrast to the normative evaluation model, assessments of the speed of 
navigating the judicial system and the honesty of judicial system employees are 
significantly associated with the reported propensity to turn to law to advance claims. 
Interestingly, those who believe the judicial system moves quickly are less likely to 
report turning to law. This finding could indicate that a subset of the population views 
the courts as handling cases too rapidly or too flippantly, though what actually 
underpins this finding merits additional study. Those who view judicial system 
employees as honest (rather than corrupt) are more likely to report turning to law after 
a difficulty accessing social welfare goods, indicating some support for the 
institutional confidence hypothesis. Assessments of the cost and ease of engaging the 
judicial system employees are not, however, associated with the turn to law in 
practice. Interestingly, the abstract evaluation of the relationship between law and 
South African citizens (the statement “no one is above the law”) and the more specific 
evaluation of the Constitutional Court (the statement that the “Court protects rights”) 
are both statistically significant and positively associated with agreement that one 
should file a legal claim. Yet, neither variable is associated with turning to law in 
                                                 
228 In fact, 60 respondents reported having legal system experience without ever responding to 
difficulties accessing the seven social welfare goods by turning to law, and 87 respondents reported 
turning to law without identifying as having legal system experience.  
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practice. Overall, then, there is mixed support for the institutional confidence 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 3). Here, the mechanics of how the judicial system functions 
appear to be less important than how the respondent interprets the apex court (which 
he or she is unlikely to have had any direct personal engagement with) and how the 
respondent interprets the status of law in the country.  
The number of social welfare goods that the respondent faced difficulty in 
accessing is statistically significant and negatively correlated with agreement that one 
should file a legal claim. The opposite relationship characterizes the turn to law in 
practice. The number of issue areas in which the respondent reported having faced 
difficulties is statistically significant and positively associated with the stated 
propensity to turn to law. Here, it could be that those facing difficulty accessing a 
larger quantity of social welfare goods were more likely to have filed a legal claim in 
the past and had a negative experience with that claim, rendering them less likely to 
positively evaluate the appropriateness of filing a legal claim. 
In contrast, the frequency of difficulty accessing social welfare goods is 
statistically significant and positively associated with agreement that one should file a 
legal claim, suggesting that if a problem persists, individuals might be more likely to 
view filing a legal claim positively. The frequency of difficulty accessing social 
welfare goods is not associated with turning to law in practice, however. Again, there 
is a disconnect between the factors that are associated with the belief that one should 
file a legal claim and the factors that impact self-reported behavior. Future research 
should more closely examine these relationships between the quantity and frequency 
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of difficulties accessing social welfare goods and both the belief that one should file a 
legal claim and the filing of legal claims in practice. 
Evaluations of relative status, whether positive or negative, are not associated 
with the belief that one should file a legal claim following a rights violation. By 
contrast, Model 2 indicates the importance of status for turning to law in practice, but 
not necessarily in the direction expected by Hypothesis 4. Once again the results 
corresponding to reported behavior differ from expressed beliefs about the 
appropriateness of a filing a claim. In Model 2, negative assessments of relative 
quality of life are not statistically significant, while positive assessments of relative 
quality of life are statistically significant and positively associated with the turn to law. 
In other words, individuals who view themselves as better off than their neighbors 
appear to be more likely to file a legal claim than individuals who view themselves as 
worse off or doing about the same as their neighbors, the opposite of what was 
expected by Hypothesis 4. This finding meshes with arguments about the cost and 
difficulty of accessing the legal system, suggesting that those with more resources are 
better able to access the legal system and benefit from legal claims-making. Here, the 
implication is that these resources may be “real” (where an individual actually does 
have a higher level of income than his or her peers) or perceived (where an individual 
understands him- or herself as having access to more resources than peers, regardless 
of actual differences in resources). To use Kruks-Wisner’s (2018) term, this 
comparison to neighbors may prompt in individuals a sense of efficacy, an ideational 
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shift (“yes, I am the kind of person who can file legal claims”) that effectively lowers 
barriers to accessing the courts.229  
Finally, turning to the demographic control variables, neither age nor race is 
associated with agreement that one should file a legal claim or with the turn to law in 
practice. A survey with a larger sample size might be better able to parse potential 
differences across racial categories, examining for instance differences in reported 
claims-making across self-identified Black respondents and self-identified Coloured 
respondents, comparisons that were not possible in this survey. Gender and income 
level are both statistically significant related to turning to law in practice, but not the 
belief that one should file a legal claim. Women were less likely to report turning to 
law in practice than men, and those with higher levels of income were more likely to 
do so than those with lower levels of income. These gendered dynamics should be 
examined in future studies. The finding with respect to income is consistent with the 
idea those with more resources are better able to navigate the legal system and take 
advantage of opportunities to make legal claims (Galanter 1974).  
Interestingly, about 70% of those respondents who reported turning to the law 
in response to a difficulty accessing at least one of the social welfare goods reported 
agreement with the statement, “If my rights are violated, I should file a legal claim, 
because the government has the obligation to protect my rights.” However, analyses 
                                                 
229 Alternately, it could be that individuals who made claims in the legal sphere benefitted materially 
from those claims and are now better off than their peers (or see themselves as better off), even if they 
were not at the time when they made the claim in question. One limitation of the survey design is that I 
am not able to assess the temporal sequencing of claims-making and (changes in) the other included 
variables. Cultural expectations about who benefits from the law may also drive this finding, if the 
relatively better off assume that the law might work for them, while the relatively less well-off assume 
that the legal system exists to protect elite interests. 
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reveal that the relationship between agreement with this statement and the self-
reported propensity to turn to law following difficulty accessing at least one of the 
seven social welfare goods is not statistically significant in the multivariate regressions 
shown here and even in a bivariate regression.230 This finding could be interpreted as 
partial indirect evidence that survey respondents did not understand difficulty 
accessing the seven social welfare goods to be violations of their rights.231 Still, there 
is no necessary reason to expect respondents to take a conservative or limited view of 
constitutional rights provisions – everyday “rights talk” often reflects a more 
expansive understanding of rights than is indicated by jurisprudence or legal thought 
(Lovell 2011).  
In sum, these results indicate a divergence in the correlates of evaluations of 
the appropriateness of filing legal claims and the correlates of self-reported turning to 
law in practice. Overall, we see little support for the notion that education or 
knowledge of rights robustly predicts either normative or self-reported legal claims-
making (Hypothesis 1). The same holds for experience or exposure to the judicial 
system (Hypothesis 2), though Model 2 indicates that community- or neighborhood-
level exposure might influence claims-making in practice. Abstract evaluations of the 
status of law, namely that no one is above the law in South Africa, and specific views 
on the Constitutional Court appear to influence normative views on legal claims-
making, while evaluations of the judicial system’s ease, speed, cost, and corruptness 
                                                 
230 Full results of this bivariate analysis are available upon request. 
231 On the other hand, it could be that respondents, following their own experience in the legal system, 
became disillusioned with the courts and thus did not agree that one should file legal claims after rights 
violations. 
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do not (Hypothesis 3). For self-reported claims-making, however, these abstract and 
specific evaluations do not appear to be influential. Instead, evaluations of the honesty 
or corruptness of judicial officials hold more weight. Finally, with respect to relative 
status, there is evidence that the ways in which respondents understand the problems 
in their lives relative to the problems facing their neighbors influence legal claims-
making in practice, though not in the way expected by Hypothesis 4. Instead, those 
who view themselves as better off than their peers are the ones who actually file legal 
claims. 
 
Normative and Actual Claims-Making: What’s at Stake? 
 
So what should we make of this apparent disconnect between the determinants 
of normative and actual claims-making? First, it could simply be that the survey 
respondents did not view the life difficulties as rights violations, meaning that they 
thought about these two sets of questions differently. If this is the case, there may not 
be a disjuncture between normative claims-making and claims-making in practice, but 
there is a disconnect between constitutional rights recognitions and citizens’ 
understandings of the substance of those rights. That citizens could have interpreted 
these problems through the lens of constitutional rights but did not would be an 
interesting puzzle in its own right. If this is the case, the challenge is informational. 
Assuming the goal is to ensure that rights recognitions on paper are met with rights 
protections in practice, rights education campaigns could serve to remedy this 
disconnect. 
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Alternatively, though, it could be that respondents did think of these life 
difficulties as rights violations and therefore on average also thought that 
they should advance legal claims but did not actually do so as frequently might be 
expected for some reason – whether that reason has to do with the cost of making legal 
claims, the difficulty of doing so, apathy, or something else. There may also be a 
deeper thought process behind this choice of when it is appropriate to engage the 
formal legal sphere. For example, Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey (1998) found that 
for a subsection of their interviewees, that they viewed the legal system as legitimate 
and important was the reason they chose not to take everyday problems to the 
courts.232 The courts were understood to be too important for measly, everyday 
situations; instead, the formal legal system was understood as the set of institutions 
you turn to only when others might be in danger or when a problem has become 
sufficiently serious. Considering the role that the South African Constitutional Court 
took on in response to the scandals of the Zuma presidency (ensuring a modicum of 
government oversight, accountability, and transparency), this seems highly plausible 
in the South African case as well. If this is the case, the challenge is not simply 
differences in beliefs about the meaning of rights, but has to do instead with 
competing understandings of the purpose of the courts. 
Why does this matter? There are certain bedrock assumptions about the ways 
in which legal systems work and their relation to the rest of the state. These 
assumptions connect the legal system’s legitimacy to the willingness of disputing 
                                                 
232 Ewick and Silbey (1998: 28) classified these respondents as falling within the “before the law” ideal 
type, meaning that this group tended to view the law as objective, removed from their daily lives, and 
“majestic, operating by known and fixed rules in carefully delimited spheres.” 
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parties to turn to the formal legal sphere and to accept decisions handed down by the 
courts (e.g., Shapiro 1981; Tyler 1990). However, as evidenced in this chapter, these 
connections may not be present in all contexts. Beliefs about the substance of rights 
(or what constitutes a rights violation) and beliefs about the purpose of the courts can 
instead play an outsized role in when potential disputants turn to the courts. Further, 
assessments of the legitimacy of the courts can, at least under certain circumstances, 
actually suppress claims-making in the formal legal system. In these situations, the 
gulf between normative and actual claims-making may widen and in fact leave 
citizens with fewer perceived ways to confront the challenges in their lives. 
One concern might be that where citizens see fewer institutionalized venues in 
which they feel they can or should make claims, they might be more likely to turn to 
extra-institutional means. In fact, service delivery protests have become a common 
feature of South African life, particularly since the mid-2000s (Alexander 2010; Zuern 
2011). Interestingly, however, evaluations of the judiciary (as measured by the 
variables included in Models 1 and 2 above) are not associated with having protested 
as a response to difficulty accessing any of the seven social welfare goods. The same 
is true of evaluations of the president, the ANC, and the local government. If the lack 
of institutional options for claims-making drove a turn to extra-institutional modes of 
claims-making (such as protesting), then we would expect to find negative 
relationships. The number and frequency of difficulty accessing social welfare goods 
and relative status concerns likewise are not significantly associated with having 
protested. There is, on the other hand, a statistically significant negative relationship 
between education and protest, with those having completed matric being less likely to 
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have protested. Having read the constitution is positively associated with the protest 
outcome, although there is a negative association with correctly noting that the 
constitution recognizes the right to housing. It might be that some knowledge of rights 
primes a willingness to protest, but a greater degree of knowledge of the constitution 
indicates skepticism about the utility of protesting. Membership in a claimant 
community and identifying as Black are both positively associated with having 
protested in response to issues related to accessing the seven social welfare goods.233  
These findings complement prior studies focused on service delivery protests, 
which found that individuals simultaneously engaged in institutionalized forms of 
political participation, like voting, and extra-institutional forms, like protesting 
(Booysen 2007). In other words, there is not necessarily an antagonistic relationship 
between claims-making through formal institutions, whether by voting or filing legal 
claims, and claims-making outside of those institutions. Even so, the challenge posed 
by the perception of limited opportunities for claims-making remains. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has detailed an exploratory investigation into the claims-making 
practices of present-day South Africans. An original 551-person survey fielded in 
2017 asked South Africans in three provinces about their views on the legal system 
and the state more generally, as well as if they had ever had problems with respect to 
health, housing, education, work, sanitation, electricity, or water and how they 
responded to those problems (i.e., what kinds of claims – if any – they made in what 
                                                 
233 The full results of this analysis are available upon request. 
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kinds of forums). Clear differences emerged in the comparison between agreement 
with the statement that one should file a legal claim in response to a rights violation 
and actual – or more accurately, self-reported – turning to law when faced with a life 
difficulty. Agreement that no one is above the law and that the Constitutional Court 
protects rights is associated with the belief that one should file legal claims, but neither 
of these variables was associated with actually turning to the law after experiencing of 
the seven life difficulties. These divergent findings suggest that respondents may not 
have understood the social welfare goods as potential legal grievances or as rights 
violations in the first place. In other words, although respondents apparently have high 
confidence in their ability to file legal claims and in the appropriateness of the legal 
system adjudicating rights claims, they may not view everyday challenges in their own 
lives as rising to the level of rights violations. Another possibility is that something 
else is inhibiting the filing of legal claims, perhaps including both structural and 
ideational barriers. The analyses presented in this chapter demonstrate the importance 
of neighborhood context and relative status for understanding the ways in which 
citizens interact with the law and with the state. How individuals view themselves, the 
access they personally have to goods and services, as well as how they might deal with 
challenges in accessing those goods and services depends on social context. Where 
individuals see others having differential access and differential options for redress 
can motivate certain types of claims-making, while making other kinds of claims-
making seem less possible or desirable.  
As was the case in Colombia (explored in Chapter 5), belief in the legitimacy, 
effectiveness, and/or appropriateness of the legal system as a site of rights claims-
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making does not appear to drive actual patterns in legal claims-making. High levels of 
claims-making can coexist with negative evaluations of the formal legal sphere, and 
low levels of claims-making can occur despite positive perceptions of the courts. 
Instead, the drivers of legal mobilization are much more complicated. The perceived 
array of options available to prospective claimants influences the choice to turn to the 
law, as is particularly evident in the Colombian case. Other social-contextual factors, 
such as perceptions of relative status also impact the extent to which citizens advance 
legal claims to social rights, as is clear from the South African case. Thus, the “from 
below” perspective of how potential claimants understand the law, the state, and their 
rights has illuminated the complex way in which citizens engage the state through the 
formal legal system. Chapter 7 will turn to “from above” perspective and examine the 
role of judges and other legal elites in the legal mobilization process, and Chapter 8 
will tie the “from below” and “from above” perspectives together, demonstrating the 
interconnection between and co-constitutive nature of these experiences with the law. 
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CHAPTER 7 
JUDICIAL AGENCY AND THE ADJUDICATION OF SOCIAL RIGHTS  
 
 
Traditionally, the judiciary has been characterized as “the least dangerous 
branch” (Bickel 1962), a non-representative part of the government best suited to 
address property rights, contract disputes, or other issues falling within the realm of 
civil and political, but not social, citizenship (Marshall 1950). In this model, 
legislatures represent the concerns and needs of citizens, and, as such, scholarship on 
the state provision of welfare has tended to focus on parties and labor movements. Of 
late, however, citizens around the world have begun to mobilize the law to make 
social claims on the state, demanding access to the goods and services that provide the 
foundation for full social citizenship, including health, housing, education, and social 
security. Previous chapters have probed the ways in which citizens of both Colombia 
and South Africa understand rights, the role of the courts, and their own needs. This 
chapter turns to how judges interpret the legal order in which they find themselves and 
links these understandings to the ways in which judges approach the task of 
adjudicating social rights claims. 
In this chapter, I explore the development and modification of new legal 
institutions “from above” and further elaborate the constructivist account of legal 
mobilization, specifically by focusing on the impact of judicial agency on legal system 
change in the realm of social rights. What explains the differential interpretation of 
constitutionally recognized social rights across countries? Why were judges willing to 
offer both individual and structural remedies beyond the scope of the written text of 
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the constitution in Colombia and more hesitant to do so in South Africa, where they 
instead focused on the constitutionality of policy, rather than outcome?  
In answering these questions, I introduce the concept of judicial agency and 
demonstrate how contingent choices made by constitutional court judges in Colombia 
and South Africa influenced the opportunity for legal mobilization for social rights. 
Judicial agency refers to actions undertaken by judges as they fulfill their judicial 
functions – they decide cases, and in doing so, they interpret law that is often 
ambiguous. Further, they must make decisions in their non-neutral social 
environments, and these decisions have political consequences. In short, judges ought 
to be conceptualized as situated political actors. Judges make choices about which 
cases to hear and how to decide the cases they do hear, and these choices have 
potentially long-lasting and unforeseen consequences.  
By looking to role conceptions, attitudes, and strategic incentives, existing 
scholarship on judicial decision-making seeks to explain the kinds of choices judges 
make.234 Importantly, though, with each decision a judge takes, he or she could have 
chosen otherwise. If a judge (1) holds progressive attitudes about rights, (2) envisions 
his or her role as one that protects the rights of citizens, and/or (3) sees an opportunity 
to expand the power of the courts, he or she may issue a rights-protective decision in a 
given case. Still, even within this choice to issue a rights-protective decision, the judge 
has leeway in how to delimit the decision and what legal foundation to rely on, among 
other things. Thus, contingency and judicial agency play a larger role in the judicial 
process than often acknowledged. 
                                                 
234 See Chapter 2 for a more detailed overview of theories of judicial behavior. 
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In the Colombian and South African cases, Constitutional Court justices 
created opportunities for mobilization for social rights by changing understandings 
about and uses of pre-existing institutional arrangements, through the contingent 
exercise of judicial agency. This exercise of judicial agency was particularly 
influential in the moments following constitutional transition, where understandings of 
rights, state obligation, and the role of judges were unsettled. Contingent choices made 
by judges during this period would have outsized effects on the justiciability of social 
rights and the institutionalization of social constitutionalism.  
These judges “layered” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 15; Streek and Thelen 
2005) new rules about the protection of social rights on existing rules regarding 
fundamental rights, expanding the purview of each court in the process, but they did 
so in profoundly different ways across the two countries. While Colombian judges 
relied on the notions of the interconnectedness of rights (developing a doctrine called 
conexidad) and the essential content of rights (developing a doctrine called mínimo 
vital), South African judges turned to a robust understanding of human dignity, which 
posited that the lack of recognition of the dignity of one person also harmed the 
dignity of others (while largely avoiding the push to define the essential content of 
rights). Judges were able to utilize the popular media to spread the message that each 
Constitutional Court would respond positively to rights claims, which encouraged 
citizens to turn to the courts with social claims. These contingent choices spurred the 
massive, yet unforeseen expansion of the tutela procedure in Colombia and 
precipitated policy-oriented judicial decision-making and the centrality of what is 
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known as “meaningful engagement” in South African constitutional rights 
litigation.235 
To advance this argument, I draw on semi-structured elite interviews and an 
analysis of Constitutional Court documents. I conducted interviews with 90 
Colombian “legal elites” – or judges, lawyers, law professors, activists, and public 
officials – in the major cities of Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali, as well as in two small 
towns in the western part of the country. These interviews took place between July 
2016 and May 2017. I also conducted interviews with 88 South African legal elites in 
Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, and Cape Town between July 2017 and May 2018. 
Participants were selected by virtue of their expertise on constitutional law, rights 
activism, or social service provision in each country. The interviews took place in the 
respondent’s office, home, or a public setting, like a coffee shop, and lasted up to two 
hours. The interviews followed a semi-structured interview guide, and they were 
transcribed in the language in which they were conducted.236  
A second source of data – Constitutional Court records – supplements these 
interviews. The Colombian Constitutional Court has the power to review the decisions 
of every tutela procedure in the country. After a multi-stage process, Constitutional 
Court justices select about 1% of the tutelas filed across the country each year for 
review. Each revision decision is published on the Constitutional Court’s website and 
                                                 
235 While this chapter focuses on changes within the Constitutional Court in each country, Chapter 4 
details the political contestation that occurred as actors outside these courts reacted to these expansions 
in the significance of constitutional law and constitutional claims-making.  
236 All 88 South African interviews were conducted in English. 69 of the 90 Colombian interviews were 
conducted in Spanish, the rest in English. 
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is publically available. All South African Constitutional Court decisions are published 
online on the Court’s website, and lower court decisions are often available on the 
Southern African Legal Information Institute website as well. Importantly, justices at 
the two Constitutional Courts have resolved to take on drastically different workloads. 
While the Colombian Court decides nearly 1,000 cases each year (including both 
tutela and constitutionality claims), the South African Court hears only about 30 cases 
per year.237 
Explaining Legal Mobilization in the Aftermath of Institutional Change  
This chapter examines the role of judicial behavior in influencing the contours 
of legal mobilization for social rights following the adoption of social 
constitutionalism. As described in Chapter 2, the constructivist account of legal 
mobilization is compatible with major theories of judicial behavior. Where it diverges 
is its overt focus on beliefs and agency. Many accounts of judicial behavior in 
Colombia and South Africa privilege ideological considerations (e.g., Nunes 2010; 
Fowkes 2016), though some also refer to strategic concerns as well (e.g., Rodríguez-
Raga 2011; Roux 2013). However, both strategic incentives and ideological incentives 
are indeterminate – judges always have choices, and while either strategic incentives 
or ideological preferences may make certain choices unimaginable, alone they cannot 
explain why judges choose one of a set of closely related choices.  
                                                 
237 Chapter 8 further details these differences in caseload. 
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In what follows, I introduce the concept of “judicial agency” to capture the 
contingent nature of judicial decision-making.238 This concept of judicial agency best 
explains what led to changes in legal categories and institutions that then allowed for 
legal mobilization for social rights to occur in both Colombia and South Africa during 
the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. I also demonstrate how early ideological orientations and 
decisions had long-term effects in each Constitutional Court. In both cases, two 
mechanisms for ideational change were present. First, in the early 1990s, progressive 
judges – including judges who had not been part of the traditional ranks of the 
judiciary – gained access to the Constitutional Court, and once there, they began to 
issue progressive decisions on issues related to constitutional rights. Second, this 
progressive orientation became embedded in each Court, encouraging ideational 
conversion on the part of later judges, who were did not necessarily share these 
progressive legal visions prior to joining the Court.239 In this way, exercises of judicial 
agency and long-lasting effects. 
In Colombia, progressively-minded judges created opportunities for legal 
mobilization by changing understandings about and uses of particular pre-existing 
judicial institutions. Rodrigo Nunes (2010b) identifies the origins of these progressive 
decisions as primarily ideological in nature rather than as responses to strategic 
considerations. Even so, the progressive orientation of the early Constitutional Court 
became so ingrained that even conservative judges appear to have put up relatively 
                                                 
238 This approach is similar to Landau’s focus “on the choices made by justices to carve out their own 
political space” (2014: iv). 
239 The argument here is not that these progressive orientations are immutable – in fact, in recent years 
in each country, observers have variously lamented shifts away from rights protections, toward 
mediocrity, or toward conservatism. 
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little resistance upon assuming their position as Constitutional Court justices. As 
Néstor Osuna, a former justice in the Consejo Superior de la Judicatura240 and alternate 
Constitutional Court justice explained, “There is a tradition in the [Constitutional] 
Court of progressivism from day one. Judges of the conservative tradition who came 
to the Court became moderates at least.”241 This progressivism was manifest in rights-
protective stances, particularly in stances that allowed for the justiciability of social 
rights through the tutela procedure and generated a larger role for the Constitutional 
Court in the broader judicial system than previously envisioned.242 I build on Nunes’s 
argument, showing that in addition to the progressive ideological orientation of early 
justices, which became embedded in the institution of the Court, we must also 
consider the agentic and contingent elements of judicial decision-making in order to 
explain legal mobilization for social rights in Colombia. In the Colombian case, 
judicial agency resulted in changes in the political and legal opportunity structures, as 
judges reinterpreted the bounds of formal features of the legal system.  
 Similarly, South African Constitutional Court justices also shaped the terrain 
of opportunity for legal mobilization through judicial decisions that influenced shared 
                                                 
240 The Supreme Judicial Council oversees the administration of the judiciary. 
241 Interview 1600808_0009. A former auxiliary justice in the Sala de Seguimiento de Salud of the 
Constitutional Court, confirmed this view (interview 1600818_0012). Although in Colombia, the term 
“magistrate” is used rather than “justice,” I use justice here to refer to both Colombian and South 
African judges for consistency. 
242 Interestingly, neither the Colombian nor the South African Constitutional Court was formally the 
head of the judiciary at the time these new constitutions were written. The Colombian system featured 
four high courts, but the tutela contra sentencias (described in Chapter 4) meant that the Constitutional 
Court could review the decisions of the other high courts. The South African system initially divided 
matters into the categories of constitutional and non-constitutional, with the Supreme Court of Appeal 
being the highest court for non-constitutional matters. The 17th Amendment to the Constitution 
expanded the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court in 2013. Since then, it could hear all matters of 
“general public importance,” effectively rendering the constitutional/non-constitutional divide 
meaningless. 
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understandings of the purpose of the courts and meaning of constitutional rights 
guarantees. In contrast to the typical member of the legal profession in South Africa at 
the time (and a sizeable group of lawyers throughout the 1990s and 2000s), the 
justices of the first Constitutional Court bench viewed social rights as potentially and 
appropriately justiciable.243 In fact, rather than simply dismissing these issues as 
falling outside the purview of the judiciary, these Constitutional Court justices rooted 
decisions recognizing the justiciability of social rights in a particular conception of 
human dignity and sought to orient these decisions toward evaluations of state policy. 
These choices in early decisions altered the bounds of the Court’s work and had long-
lasting impacts on the type and scope of future judicial decisions. 
In both Colombia and South Africa, judges layered new rules about the 
protection of social rights on existing rules regarding constitutional rights, expanding 
the purview of each Constitutional Court in the process. These new rules reflected the 
implications of contingent choices made by judges. Further, these judges were able to 
spread their understandings about the role of the Court in protecting constitutional 
rights to potential rights claimants. In each case, to greater or lesser degrees of 
success, the media connected the new Constitutional Court to the broader citizenry, 
filtering information about operation of the Court to citizens. Through news reports 
and other media content, largely created by legal elites, citizens came to learn about 
the Court and view it as a potentially effective site of claims-making. In sum, judicial 
agency and contingent choice, specifically the layering of new rules on old ones and 
                                                 
243 Interviews with one career judge (2017.10.18_14.54_01) and several advocates (e.g., 170725_0120, 
170811_0128, 170828_0143 and 170929_0168) confirm this point. 
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the utilization of the media as a broker to inform citizens about the Constitutional 
Court, explains the institutional change underpinning the emergence of legal 
mobilization for social rights in Colombia and South Africa. 
 
On Agency and Activism 
Before examining legal mobilization for social rights in Colombia and South 
Africa, a discussion on terminology is necessary. In this chapter, I argue that judicial 
agency best explains changes in the ability and likelihood of citizens to mobilize for 
social rights in the legal sphere. Judicial agency should be differentiated from judicial 
activism.244 Judicial activism refers to behavior defined as inappropriate or beyond the 
proper judicial role in pursuit of a political agenda. The term suffers from two related 
limitations. First, what is considered judicial activism is often, in common usage, the 
product of the analyst’s own political preferences rather than an assessment of the 
judicial role in context. Even in legal-academic terms, then, what exactly counts as 
judicial activism is open to interpretation. Keenan Kmiec (2004) notes four acts that 
fall within the concept of judicial activism: overturning or striking down constitutional 
actions undertaken by other branches, ignoring precedent, engaging in judicial 
lawmaking, and moving from accepted methods of judicial interpretation to 
unaccepted ones. A blatant example of any of these four types could certainly be 
identified, but what about when the appropriate precedent is up for debate or when 
existing precedent is inconsistent with the values underpinning the constitutional 
                                                 
244 Judicial receptivity – theorized as part of the legal opportunity structure (Hilson 2002) – also differs 
slightly from judicial agency. Receptivity implies that the litigants bring forward specific arguments 
that judges then adopt. Judicial agency leaves open the origins of the particular arguments that judges 
promote in their decisions. 
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order, for example?245 Or what if reasonable observers disagree about the scope of 
acceptable methods of judicial interpretation? For one observer, the decision may reek 
of judicial activism, while for another, the decision may be an example of meticulous 
legal reasoning. Second, the term requires a judgment about the intentions of judges, 
an inference about whether or not the judge in question deliberately seeks to ignore 
precedent or commit any of the other acts noted above that comprise judicial activism. 
The ability to conclusively ascertain the motivations or intentions of judges is by no 
means guaranteed.246  
The term “judicial agency” avoids these limitations, withholding judgment 
without evidence. Judicial agency refers to the fact that judges are political actors, 
even if they are not politicized actors. Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin (1998: 8), 
while carefully distinguishing between types of judicial action, including 
interpretation and policy making, note that “all judicial action is political.” Judges do 
not simply apply general legal provisions to specific cases in a vacuum, disconnected 
from political and social life; instead, they make decisions that have normative and 
distributional consequences – in fact, they are empowered to do exactly that. These 
                                                 
245 Further, in a system characterized by judicial discretion (often considered a fundamental feature of 
judicial independence), judges need not always follow precedent. 
246 Interestingly, in the case of Colombia, specifically, the 1991 Constitution in defining the state as an 
estado social de derecho (social state under the rule of law) pointed to a vision of the state that 
embraces an active role for judges in the promotion and protection of the rights of citizens. As argued 
by Justice Ciro Angarita Barón in the tutela case T-406/92, this vision of the state imposes a positive 
obligation on the judiciary, one that includes a lawmaking function: “El juez, en el Estado social de 
derecho también es un portador de la visión institucional del interés general. El juez, al poner en 
relación la Constitución – sus principios y sus normas – con la ley y con los hechos hace uso de una 
discrecionalidad interpretativa que necesariamente delimita el sentido político de los textos 
constitucionales. En este sentido la legislación y la decisión judicial son ambas procesos de creación 
de derecho.” The decision later notes how this vision of the judicial role supplements the separation of 
powers, by checking the legislature, rather than subverting it. See the full decision here: 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1992/T-406-92.htm.  
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decisions are based on understandings of what the law means, on views of their duties 
as judges, and on beliefs of how the state ought to interact with citizens. To be clear, 
the claim here is not that judges exercise politicized functions, serving the interests of 
specific politicians, political parties, or private interests – though at times certain 
judges might. Rather, the claim is that judges are actors in the political sphere. They 
make choices, they interpret the law in this way or that way, and the choices they 
make have important political implications. Judicial agency, thus, is a rather expansive 
concept, covering a wide range of potential acts. This expansiveness is not a 
conceptual weakness, but a strength – judicial agency is descriptively accurate, 
recognizing that judges take many different kinds of actions and make many different 
kinds of choices (in comparison to judicial discretion, for instance, which refers only 
to decisions about whether or not to follow precedent in a given case). 
In contrast to early models of judicial decision-making, this perspective that 
acknowledges the political context in which judges find themselves and their political 
function has become more or less commonplace in contemporary scholarship. Even 
so, the majority of scholarship that examines legal mobilization or legal claims-
making takes the judiciary and judicial receptivity as relatively static factors. The 
adoption of this political perspective has important, yet often overlooked implications 
for understanding rights adjudication. The most pressing of these implications is that 
judicial decision-making should not be viewed in isolation, as if it were divorced from 
ongoing social or political trends. Judges make choices about how to think about and 
decide cases, choices that may be influenced by political, institutional, and social 
context. This approach further requires carefully attention to the long-term effects of 
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decisions, not just on jurisprudence or on the power of the judiciary vis-à-vis other 
political actors, but also on everyday lived experience. The rest of this chapter 
demonstrates the utility of this approach to situated judicial agency, with explicit 
reference to the emergence of legal mobilization for social rights in Colombia and 
South Africa, respectively. Chapter 8 further explores the impact of social context on 
judicial receptivity and legal mobilization. 
 
Early Colombian Constitutional Court Decisions and Judicial Agency 
Before turning to early Colombian Constitutional Court decisions, it is 
important to note who exactly comprised the early Court and consider the initial 
design of the tutela procedure. During the first year of the Court’s operation (a period 
typically described as the “transitional court”), there were seven justices. Three had 
served on the Supreme Court (José Gregorio Hernández, Fabio Morón, and Jaime 
Sanín), one on the Council of State (Simón Rodríguez), and three came from academic 
backgrounds (Ciro Angarita, Eduardo Cifuentes, and Alejandro Martínez). The three 
justices with academic backgrounds had also been associated with a commitment to 
human rights and a more expansive view about the appropriate role of the judiciary.247 
Cifuentes, Martínez, Hernández, and Morón were selected to continue to serve on the 
court for a full eight-year term following this transitional period. 
According to the 1991 Constitution, tutelas could not be used to make claims 
about social rights violations; instead, they were meant to serve as a mechanism 
through which citizens could make claims about civil and political rights violations. In 
                                                 
247 For more detail on these early justices, see Nunes (2010b). 
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other words, the institutional design allowed no opportunity for legal mobilization on 
issues related to social rights, despite substantial opportunity for claims-making in the 
realm of civil and political rights. Moreover, the drafters of the Constitution did not 
imagine that the tutela would apply to social rights. For instance, Martha Zamora, who 
served as the Secretary of the Justice Commission at the 1991 constituent assembly, 
suggested that the constitutional designers “never imagined that it would be as 
important for a society like ours to have the tutela. If we turned the film back, I think 
they imagined it as something very important but not as important as it came to be.”248 
Similarly, Néstor Osuna held that: 
No person at that time had the ability to predict the dimensions that it would 
have. What we wanted was to have was a cheap and simple tool for citizens for 
simple problems. We did not think that new rights were going to be created. 
We were [just] looking for a simple tool available to citizens.249 
 
Juan Carlos Esguerra, the member of the constituent assembly who actually proposed 
to call this mechanism the “tutela,” concurred, noting, “It was not meant to grow that 
much.”250 Still, there was a push to ensure that the tutela would be included to serve as 
mechanism to “give rights teeth,” in the words of Rodolfo Arango,251 an auxiliary 
justice during the early 1990s, or as former justice Eduardo Cifuentes put it, “the idea 
[was] that it is not enough to consecrate a bill of rights, but that these rights must be 
surrounded by guarantees through instruments that would make them effective [or 
claimable].”252 
                                                 
248 Interview 160930_. 
249 Interview 1600808_0009 
250 Interview 160923_0035. Many other interviewees confirmed these points. 
251 Interview 1600825_0016. 
252 Interview160726_0006. 
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In the following years, the use of the tutela did expand, and quite quickly. 
Decisions on several tutelas filed in 1992 set the stage for the development of the 
justiciability of social rights in Colombia. Early that year, Pastora Emilia Upegui 
Noreña filed a tutela (T-002/92), claiming a violation of the right to education.253 Both 
the lower courts and the Constitutional Court rejected this tutela claim. However, in 
rejecting the claim, the Court asserted that the categorization of rights in the 
Constitution should be an auxiliary rather than determining factor in the decision 
about whether or not to hear tutela cases.254 It also suggested that education could, in 
other concrete cases, be considered a fundamental right. A few months later, in 
deciding a tutela regarding health, the Court noted, “today, with the new constitution, 
rights are what judges say they are through tutela decisions.”255 Together, these 
decisions helped to stake out a larger role for judges in determining the status of 
constitutional rights. Esguerra suggests that these decisions should be interpreted as an 
                                                 
253 Briefly, after the claimant had failed mathematics three times, the Universidad Tecnológica de 
Pereira refused to allow her to re-enroll in the industrial engineering program.  
254 “El hecho de limitar los derechos fundamentales a aquellos que se encuentran en la Constitución 
Política bajo el 
título de los derechos fundamentales y excluir cualquier  otro que ocupe un lugar distinto, no debe ser 
considerado como criterio determinante sino auxiliar, pues él desvirtúa el sentido garantizador que a 
los mecanismos de 
protección y aplicación de los derechos humanos otorgó el constituyente de 1991.” See the full decision 
here: http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1992/T-002-92.htm. Further, the decision noted 
that judges ought to examine constitutional rights with respect to one another rather than in isolation:  
255 The complete paragraph is worth quoting here: “Existe una nueva estrategia para el logro de la 
efectividad de los derechos fundamentales. La coherencia y la sabiduría de la interpretación y, sobre 
todo, la eficacia de los derechos fundamentales en la Constitución de 1991, están asegurados por la 
Corte Constitucional. Esta nueva relación entre derechos fundamentales y jueces significa un 
cambio fundamental en relación con la Constitución anterior; dicho cambio puede ser definido como 
una nueva estrategia encaminada al logro de la eficacia de los derechos, que consiste en otorgarle de 
manera prioritaria al juez, y no ya a la administración o al legislador, la responsabilidad de la eficacia 
de los derechos fundamentales. En el sistema anterior la eficacia de los derechos fundamentales 
terminaba reduciéndose a su fuerza simbólica. Hoy, con la nueva Constitución, los derechos son 
aquello que los jueces dicen a través de las sentencias de tutela.” See the full decision here: 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1992/T-406-92.htm.  
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attempt by the Constitutional Court justices make social rights “real” or meaningful in 
everyday life.256 Cifuentes similarly notes: 
Everything is the discretion of the judge…. It would be the Constitution [that] 
obviously introduces the figure and gives possibilities for the constitutional 
judge to expand it, but the expansion of the tutela, the guidelines of the 
guardianship were not drawn by the Constitution but in my opinion developed 
[by judges].257 
 
Here, as Cifuentes sees it, judges – exercising judicial agency – determined not only 
that the tutela procedure would expand, but also how it would expand. Importantly, 
the justices who wrote these decisions were two of the three academics appointed to 
the Court, Justices Martínez (T-002/92) and Angarita (T-406/92). 
This expansion of the tutela procedure continued, as the Constitutional Court 
justices began to establish principles for analyzing concrete cases. First, the Court 
declared that the fundamental status of rights would be evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis in response to the unique facts presented by an individual tutela, per the decision 
T-406/92.258 In this case, a resident of the Campestre neighborhood of Cartagena filed 
a claim asserting that an ongoing public works project violated his rights to sanitation, 
health, and a healthy environment. The court of first instance rejected the claim on the 
grounds that these rights are not fundamental rights recognized by the Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court revoked this decision, granted the tutela, and noted that all 
future cases with similar fact patterns should be decided in the same manner. The 
Court sustained this approach in its decision on a case filed by SAS Televisión Ltda, a 
                                                 
256 Interview 160923_0035. 
257 Interview160726_0006. 
258 “Es importante tener en cuenta que la eficacia de las normas constitucionales no se puede 
determinar en abstracto; ella varía según las circunstancias propias de los hechos.” Ibid. 
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cable television provider (T-451/92).259 The company claimed that the denial of a final 
operating license (it had been granted a provisional license) violated the right to work, 
to private property, and to culture. The Third Superior Court of Ibagué rejected the 
claim, and the Constitutional Court upheld that decision.  
Within this case-by-case analysis, judges developed two doctrines:  the 
conexidad (connection) doctrine and the mínimo vital (vital minimum) doctrine. 
Neither doctrine necessarily flows from a particular ideology, though both allowed for 
the expansion of progressive rights protections. The connection doctrine refers to the 
possibility of understanding a non-fundamental right as fundamental, and therefore 
justiciable, insofar as its violation also results in the violation of a fundamental right. 
The doctrine derives from decisions made in 1992, starting with T-406/92, which 
indicated that the right to health could be understood, in certain circumstances, as 
being essentially connected to the right to life. Later that year, Víctor Narváez Paredes 
filed a tutela (T-506/92) and claimed the confiscation of his car by the national police 
not only went beyond the appropriate function of the police, but it also violated his 
right to property. The Court denied the tutela, citing doubts about who was the true 
owner of the car and noting that the authorities appeared to have acted appropriately. 
Even in denying this property rights claim, the Court nevertheless affirmed the case-
by-case approach and the possibility of connecting fundamental rights with non-
fundamental ones. In this, the Court – or more accurately, the three academic justices, 
                                                 
259 Refering back to T-406, the decision holds, “…el carácter fundamental de un derecho no se puede 
determinar sino en cada caso concreto, atendiendo tanto la voluntad expresa del constituyente como la 
conexidad o relación que en dicho caso tenga el derecho eventualmente vulnerado con otros derechos 
indubitablemente fundamentales y/o con los principios y valores que informan toda la Constitución.” 
See the full decision here: http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1992/T-451-92.htm.  
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Ciro Angarita, Eduardo Cifuentes, and Alejandro Martínez, who wrote these decisions 
– recognized the ability to make tutela claims related to social or cultural rights in 
some instances.260  
The second doctrine of justiciability, called mínimo vital, emerged in the 
decision T-426/92 (written by Cifuentes), which notes that although the Constitution 
does not include a right to subsistence, such a right is implied or can be deduced from 
the existence of other, included rights.261 Subsequent decisions, such as T-005/95 
(again written by Cifuentes), which focused on the rights to health and social security, 
more fully articulated what was to become the vital minimum doctrine, noting that 
although health was not a fundamental right, access to medical services were 
necessary to a life with dignity in the particular case.262 The standard implied by this 
doctrine requires that “the petitioner show both that the failure to receive treatment 
was severe enough to threaten his rights to life, dignity, or personal integrity, and that 
the petitioner lacked the resources to pay for this treatment or to attain it under some 
other plan” (Landau 2012: 421). In this conception, otherwise progressively realizable 
                                                 
260 “La posibilidad de considerar el derecho a la propiedad como derecho fundamental depende de las 
circunstancias específicas de su ejercicio. De aquí se concluye que tal  carácter no puede ser definido 
en abstracto, sino en cada caso concreto. Sólo en el evento en que ocurra una violación del derecho a 
la propiedad que conlleve para su titular un desconocimiento evidente de los principios y valores 
constitucionales que consagran el derecho a la vida a la dignidad y a la igualdad, la propiedad 
adquiere naturaleza de derecho fundamental y, en consecuencia, procede la acción de tutela.” See the 
full decision here: http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1992/T-506-92.htm.  
261 “Aunque la Constitución no consagra un derecho a la subsistencia éste puede deducirse de los 
derechos a la vida, a la salud, al trabajo y a la asistencia o a la seguridad social.” See the full decision 
here: http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1992/T-426-92.htm.  
262 “El derecho a la salud no es en principio un derecho fundamental de aplicación inmediata. Sin 
embargo, la Corte ha estimado que este puede ser protegido por medio de la acción de tutela en casos 
especiales en los cuales se presente conexidad palmaria con un derecho fundamental... En estas 
circunstancias, la efectividad de su derecho al servicio médico se encuentra en conexidad evidente con 
su derecho al mínimo vital indispensable para la subsistencia en condiciones dignas.” See the full 
decision here: http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1995/T-005-95.htm.  
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rights (those that are regarded as not immediately applicable) become justiciable, as 
they are necessary for a minimal standard of living. Ultimately, judges decided to 
recognize the vital minimum as a right in itself. 
Throughout this period, certain Constitutional Court justices actively expanded 
rights protections, often through the purview of the tutela procedure,263 viewing the 
constitutional parameters as artificial limitations on the legal tool that resulted not 
from societal preferences but political maneuvers and compromises. Cifuentes recalls: 
The challenge was to change the judicial culture … to demonstrate that the 
Constitution was a performative constitution … The Constitution had to be 
binding on all public powers and private powers, so that constitutional 
guarantees could effectively address general conditions of citizenship and 
equality. The constitutional judge should not only be a counselor to the state… 
The second challenge of the Court was for rights to mean more power for the 
weak… and for that reason the extension of borders of economic, social and 
cultural and fundamental rights was guided by the Court directly.264 
 
Importantly, judges were able to suggest and implement alternate understandings of 
the proper scope of the tutela procedure and the nature of rights, in part due to their 
independence and in part due to the continued (and expanding) filing of tutelas by 
aggrieved citizens. Decisions made by judges in the years immediately following the 
creation of the new constitution allowed citizens to file tutelas that made claims to a 
wide variety of social rights. In other words, these expansions did not apply singularly 
to any one right. 
Further, as Rodolfo Arango, an auxiliary justice during the first years of the 
Court, remembers, “from the beginning of the Court we had a very, very aggressive 
                                                 
263 Interestingly, many of these extensions were suggested in tutela decisions that actually rejected the 
original applicant’s claims. 
264 Interview160726_0006. 
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strategy of delivering the decisions and explaining them very pedagogically, directly 
to the media… every week on the front page of the newspaper [you read] a surprising 
decision, one that protected someone’s rights.” Arango also notes that the tutela 
procedure “allowed [for] a growing awareness that people had rights and that they 
could defend them through the judges.”265 In addition to these outreach efforts by the 
Constitutional Court itself, the government of President César Gaviria also promoted 
the work of the Court and particularly the tutela. Manuel José Cepeda – then a legal 
advisor to President Gaviria and later a justice of the Constitutional Court – recalls:  
We created a program called La tutela factor humano. La tutela factor humano 
was like a soap opera … It was a representation of a case. There was someone 
who intervened and said what happened [in the case] … someone who says, 
‘And then this happened in the procedure, and then the judge decided [this 
way]’ … It was in primetime and it was viewed by the people.266 
 
As such, Constitutional Court judges did not decide cases in a vacuum, separated from 
the people. Instead, both the Court and the government sought to bring the Court 
closer to citizens, so they would be aware of the work of the Court. 
These early developments should not be taken to mean that all tutelas filed 
result in positive outcomes. Moreover, a successful decision does not necessarily 
result in compliance or the delivery of a remedy. A pilot study on compliance with 
tutela decisions across issue areas found “alarmingly low” compliance rates, even for 
the issue areas with the best rates (Gauri and Staton 2013).267 Still, even with 
                                                 
265 Interview 1600825_0016. 
266 Interview 170223_0060. 
267 Among legal professionals there does not appear to be a consensus about whether or not 
Constitutional Court orders are, in fact, complied with (Juan Carlos Henao, a former Constitutional 
Court justice, interview 161108_0054; Hernán Olano, a former oficial mayor of the Constitutional 
Court, interview 160920_0028; Pablo Rueda, former auxiliary justice, interview 161104_0052). 
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alarmingly low rates of compliance, the courts might be the most responsive 
democratic political institution accessible to Colombian citizens. Rodrigo Uprimny 
and Mauricio García-Villegas (2006: 71) point to a “crisis in representation” in the 
Colombian state as well as the general weakness of the social movements and 
opposition parties as partial explanations for the emergence of an activist 
Constitutional Court. The exercise of judicial agency thus led to the creation of 
opportunity for legal mobilization through the tutela procedure. Specifically, the 
iterative and path-dependent nature of the legal process (the continued processing of 
tutelas and the drafting of doctrine and precedent) allowed Constitutional Court judges 
to expand rights recognitions. A massive, yet unforeseen increase in the usage of the 
tutela to claim constitutional rights, including social rights, followed. 
Notably, though the early Constitutional Court decisions could have applied to 
all social rights, different rights evolved along different trajectories. Specifically, 
health tutelas increased more dramatically through the 1990s and early 2000s than 
tutelas invoking other social rights. This subsequent development can be explained, in 
part, by a rise in grievances related to the new healthcare system. Between 1995 and 
2011, the percentage of the Colombian population included in the healthcare system 
expanded from 25% to 90%, increasing further to 95% by 2016 (Lamprea 2015: 61; 
Lamprea and García 2016). This expansion resulted in substantially increased levels of 
coverage, but that coverage did not necessarily translate into real access to healthcare 
services for newly covered individuals, which, in turn, resulted in an increased 
quantity of grievances. Importantly, however, without these early decisions that 
opened the space for legal mobilization on social rights, the tutela procedure could not 
  231 
have been used to make claims related to the right to health. Further, these early 
decisions helped propel the necessary shift in understanding health problems as 
something as unfortunate to something legally objectionable. Chapter 8 further 
describes this process. 
What is more, the early Constitutional Court decisions appear to have set in 
motion specific patterns of decisions. These patterns reflect what Paul Pierson (2000) 
describes as increasing returns and lock-in effects. Seemingly small changes in 
institutional rules can compound over time, leading to substantial consequences. 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 (below) depict trends over time in tutela decisions by the Court, 
from the transitional court (1992) to the first court (1993-2000), second court (2001-
2008), and third court (2009-2015268). Figure 7.1 shows the percentage of reviewed 
tutelas in which the Court chose to concede the rights claim and the percentage of 
reviewed tutelas in which the Court confirmed the lower court’s decision. Figure 7.2 
restricts the sample to social rights claims. The percentage of social rights claims 
reviewed increases over time, as does the percentage of claims conceded in both 
samples, while the percentage of decisions confirmed decreases over time. Subsequent 
courts continued to follow the transitional court’s commitment to protecting social 
rights, conceding these claims directly and overturning lower court decisions that 
denied these rights claims. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 are based on a random sample of tutela 
revision decisions taken from the Constitutional Court’s website. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
268 This sample was taken before the end of the third term in 2016.   
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Figure 7.1. Tutela Decisions by   Figure 7.2. Social Rights Tutela  
the Con. Court (%)    Decisions by the Con. Court (%) 
     
 
Contingent choices made by new Colombian Constitutional Court justices – in 
other words, the exercise of judicial agency – kicked off processes that resulted in 
unexpected changes to the institutional and ideational environment, which the 
influenced opportunities for social rights claims-making. Progressive attitudes about 
the role of the judiciary or the purpose of the law are indeterminate:  two judges who 
share the belief, for example, that social rights are justiciable may disagree about the 
basis on which social rights cases should be decided. More specifically, nothing about 
a progressive orientation necessarily indicates that judges would turn to an analysis of 
the interconnectedness of certain rights or on a “vital minimum” standard of living to 
adjudicate social rights. In fact, looking to South Africa, we see that judges made 
different decisions in the wake of constitutional transition about how to best expand 
social rights protections. Rather than considering which enumerated rights should be 
considered “fundamental” or considering the specific connection between a social 
right and a fundamental right, South African judges instead situated decisions about 
the justiciability of social rights with respect to an understanding of human dignity and 
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the conditions necessary for a dignified life. This focus on human dignity led not only 
decisions granting recourse for violations of social rights, but it also shaped the ways 
in which judges adjudicated different kinds of rights claims. 
 
Judicial Agency in South Africa and the Expansion of Housing Rights 
 The creation of the South African Constitutional Court was followed by the 
appointment of a mixture of justices who had been part of the traditional legal 
establishment and justices who had not. According to the Interim Constitution of 
1993, the first bench had to include four sitting members of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal – Laurie Ackermann, Richard Goldstone,269 Tholie Madala, and Ismail 
Mohamed were chosen in this capacity. President Mandela selected advocate and 
founder of the Legal Resource Centre, Arthur Chaskalson, to serve as the first Judge 
President of the Court. From a list of ten potential justices nominated by the Judicial 
Services Commission, President Mandela selected John Didcott (a judge on the Natal 
Division of the Supreme Court), Johann Kriegler (a judge on the Transvaal Division of 
the Supreme Court), Pius Langa (an advocate), Yvonne Mokgoro (an academic, who 
had served as a prosecutor in the Mmabatho Magistrate’s Court years prior), Kate 
O’Regan (an academic), and Albie Sachs (an activist and academic). These 
appointments made for a diverse bench in terms of experience. Further, as Penelope 
Andrews (2006: 567) notes, “In 1994, South Africa’s judiciary was overwhelmingly 
white, male, drawn from the ranks of the middle and upper classes, and Afrikaans 
speaking … [T]here were two black judges and one female judge amongst the two 
                                                 
269 Justice Goldstone was finished his term as Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia, so Sydney Kentridge served as an Acting Justice between 1995 and 1996. 
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hundred or so judges that made up the judiciary.” The appointment of two women 
(Mokgoro and O’Regan), and four people of color (Langa, Madala, Mohamed, and 
Mokgoro) represented a significant shift in terms of descriptive representation. The 
choice of these eleven justices also meant that the Constitutional Court would be a site 
in which judges thought differently about rights protections and the possibilities of 
constitutional law than they did in other courts across the country, as was the case in 
Colombia. 
In contrast to Colombia, however, social rights in the South African 
Constitution are expressly limited by the international standard of progressive 
realization, meaning that the state is obligated to take concrete steps (“reasonable 
legislative and other measures”) to ensure improved access to social goods and 
services, but not to immediately provide those goods and services to all citizens. This 
limitation comes from the South African constitutional drafters’ focus on “universally-
accepted rights” and international human rights law.270 Further, while the Section 38 
of the South African Constitution officially lowered standing requirements, allowing 
easier access to the courts than ever before, the litigation process in South Africa 
remained both costly and time-consuming. There is nothing similar to the tutela 
procedure in South Africa. Instead, cases concerning constitutional rights questions 
tend to be heard first in the High Courts and then may be appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Appeal and eventually to the Constitutional Court, a process that can take 
                                                 
270 The progressive realization standard explicitly appears in the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. 
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several years and requires the involvement of two different kinds of lawyers (attorneys 
and advocates). 
The South African Constitutional Court has heard an average of just under 
three social rights cases each year (with a maximum of six social rights cases in a 
given year) between 1996 and 2016, and of these cases, the majority have dealt with 
the right to housing. In fact, as of 2016, the Court had decided 31 housing rights cases, 
compared to 15 education rights cases, five social security cases, seven health cases, 
and two cases involving water. Overall, social rights cases make up about 9% of the 
Court’s work. 
Underpinning the early Court’s work and many early discussions of South 
African constitutional law is a robust conception of human dignity.271 As Edwin 
Cameron (now a Constitutional Court justice) wrote in 2014 (95-96):  
[T]here is sound reason why dignity, for all its indeterminacy, has taken so 
central a place in the formative jurisprudence of the Court. It is to be found in 
South Africa’s past of racial indignity – where racial subordination was both 
premised on and enacted shamefulness and disgrace. Apartheid laws deprived 
black South Africans of their citizenship, gave them education that was inferior 
to whites’, segregated and confined them on land both urban and rural, and 
relegated them to poorer jobs and economic roles. But those laws represented, 
and did, more. They derived from the view that black South Africans were 
subordinate and inferior humans, and treated them accordingly. They 
enunciated and practiced the condition of ‘non-whiteness’ as legally shameful. 
 
Accordingly, the Court has emphasized the importance of dignity regardless of rights 
issue in question. In the Court’s first case, one involving the constitutionality of the 
death penalty, S v Makwanyane and Another (1995), Judge President Chaskalson 
concluded: 
                                                 
271 See Liebenberg (2005), Barnard-Naudé, Cornell, and Du Bois (2009), Chaskalson (2011), and 
Cornell (2014), among many others. 
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The rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights, and 
the source of all other personal rights in Chapter Three. By committing 
ourselves to a society founded on the recognition of human rights we are 
required to value these two rights above all others. And this must be 
demonstrated by the State in everything that it does …272 
 
Each justice in this case wrote a concurring decision. Seven of the nine relied on a 
discussion of the right to dignity, and four explicitly discussed ubuntu instead of or in 
addition to dignity. The central status of dignity in the thinking of the first bench of the 
Constitutional Court is clear.  
As another example, Justice Sachs wrote, “It will be noted that the motif which 
links and unites equality and privacy, and which, indeed, runs right through the 
protections offered by the Bill of Rights, is dignity” in the case National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others (1998, 
emphasis in original).273 Interestingly, civil society actors, namely the Centre for 
Applied Legal Studies (CALS), challenged this approach, encouraging the Court to 
view the right to equality as distinct from dignity, rather than as fundamentally 
interconnected. CALS argued that a focus on equality as such would allow for the 
Court to take more robust action in promoting substantive equality instead of primarily 
responding to overt discrimination after the fact.274 Justice Sachs further noted in this 
decision that, “it [is] plain that dignity is not only a value fundamental to our 
Constitution, it is a justiciable and enforceable right that must be respected and 
protected” (emphasis in original). In these cases, as well as other early cases dealing 
                                                 
272 See the full decision here: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1995/3.html.  
273 See the full decision here: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1998/15.html.  
274 See Section 120 of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of 
Justice and Others (1998) for Justice Sachs’s summary of CALS’s argument (ibid.). 
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with issues as varied as presidential powers, criminal law, regulations, and freedom of 
speech,275 the Court, largely regardless of the justice writing the main opinion, 
highlighted the significance of dignity in the constitutional law of the new South 
Africa. 
Turning to the Court’s analysis of social rights, we see a continuation of this 
pattern. The first social rights case276 to come before the Court, Soobramoney v 
Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) (1997), involved a claim regarding the right to 
health, advanced by a man suffering from kidney failure who was seeking access to a 
dialysis machine at a state-run medical facility. In deciding the case, Judge President 
Chaskalson wrote: 
There is a high level of unemployment, inadequate social security, and many 
do not have access to clean water or to adequate health services. These 
conditions already existed when the Constitution was adopted and a 
commitment to address them, and to transform our society into one in which 
there will be human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new 
constitutional order. For as long as these conditions continue to exist that 
aspiration will have a hollow ring.277 
 
He noted the “constitutional commitment” to address these conditions was expressed 
in Sections 26 and 27, which detail the rights to have access to adequate housing, 
healthcare, food, water, and social security and social assistance. Ultimately, the Court 
decided against Mr. Soobramoney, with Judge President Chaskalson concluding, “The 
State has to manage its limited resources … There will be times when this requires it 
                                                 
275 See, for example, Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 
(1996), President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo (1997), Prinsloo v Van der Linde 
and Another (1997), and Harksen v Lane NO and Others (1997), among others. 
276 In 1996, the Court heard a case related education, Gauteng Provincial Legislature in re: Gauteng 
School Education Bill of 1995, but did not actually reference the Section 29 constitutional right to 
education. 
277 See the full decision here: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1997/17.html.  
  238 
to adopt a holistic approach to the larger needs of society rather than to focus on the 
specific needs of particular individuals within society.” In a concurring decision, 
Justice Sachs held that an acknowledgement of the dignity and equality of all citizens 
required the rationing of healthcare services.278 Overall, this case challenged the Court 
to navigate a commitment to the realization of social rights and human dignity and a 
concern with balancing individual needs and collective consequences.279 
The next substantive social rights case, Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others, came before the Court in 2000.280 This 
case involved the attempted eviction of 900 people living in a squatter settlement near 
the city of Cape Town. At the start of the decision, Justice Zak Yacoob wrote, “The 
case brings home the harsh reality that the Constitution’s promise of dignity and 
equality for all remains for many a distant dream.”281 Here again we see the centrality 
of dignity in South African constitutional rights jurisprudence. Justice Yacoob later 
noted that “[s]ocio-economic rights are expressly included in the Bill of Rights; they 
cannot be said to exist on paper only.” This move can be interpreted as an attempt to 
indicate that social rights are meaningful in South Africa, despite the Soobramoney 
                                                 
278 Specifically, he wrote, “In all the open and democratic societies based upon dignity, freedom and 
equality with which I am familiar, the rationing of access to life-prolonging resources is regarded as 
integral to, rather than incompatible with, a human rights approach to health care.” 
279 The public reacted with outrage to this decision, as Mr. Soobramoney died shortly after the decision 
was handed down. Chapter 8 discusses this case in more detail. 
280 Technically, the Court released two decisions on an education-related cases earlier. The first, a case 
known as Premier, Province of Mpumalanga and Another v Executive Committee of the Association of 
Governing Bodies of State Aided Schools: Eastern Transvaal (1998), involved the right to education 
insofar as it dealt with schools, but the case was decided on the basis of administrative law. The second 
case, Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education (2000), centered on whether or not 
corporal punishment should be allowed in private religious schools. The analysis did not rely on the 
right to education as such (though it did engage with the right to maintain independent educational 
institutions), but instead on the balance between religious freedom, privacy, culture, dignity, equality, 
security of the person, and the rights of children.  
281 See the full decision here: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/19.html.  
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decision. Yet, how exactly rights would exist beyond their inscription on paper would 
be defined by judicial decisions. The Soobramoney decision made clear that they 
would not exist, at least in the judicial sphere, at the level of the individual claimant. 
The Grootboom decision further clarified a focus on the “reasonableness” of policy 
decisions, drawing on the phrase “reasonable legislative and other measures” included 
in Constitution (reasonableness was not quite defined, though the decision did indicate 
that clear respect for human dignity would be integral to an assessment of 
reasonableness).282 Ultimately, the Court found that the state’s housing policy was 
unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional because it neglected to provide for those 
in desperate need, and the decision mandated that the government develop an 
emergency housing policy. The justices of the Constitutional Court could have 
decided these cases differently, and many analysts and observers have suggested that 
they should have. 
Social rights cases continued to make it to the Constitutional Court, numbering 
two or three per year through the early 2000s. Between 2000 and 2002, the Court 
considered three additional education-related cases, declining to hear one, deciding 
one on the basis of the Minister of Education’s powers (while explicitly refraining 
from addressing any constitutional rights questions), and relying on an analysis of just 
                                                 
282 “It is fundamental to an evaluation of the reasonableness of state action that account be taken of the 
inherent dignity of human beings. The Constitution will be worth infinitely less than its paper if the 
reasonableness of state action concerned with housing is determined without regard to the fundamental 
constitutional value of human dignity. Section 26, read in the context of the Bill of Rights as a whole, 
must mean that the respondents have a right to reasonable action by the state in all circumstances and 
with particular regard to human dignity. In short, I emphasize that human beings are required to be 
treated as human beings” (Section 83). 
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administrative action in the third.283 In 2001, another housing-related case came before 
the Court, though the case hinged on whether or not the state could build a temporary 
transit camp on a specific piece of public land rather than on an interpretation of the 
meaning of the right to housing as such.284 
 The next case that resulted in a substantive development to social rights 
jurisprudence was Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and 
Others (2002).285 The Treatment Action Campaign case involved the rollout of a state-
led program meant to combat mother-to-child transmission of HIV through a 
medication by the name of nevirapine. Initially, the state wanted to make the 
medication available only at certain medical facilities (two per province), arguing that 
it had concerns about the safety and cost of nevirapine, though then-President Mbeki’s 
AIDS denialism likely also played some role in this approach. The Treatment Action 
Campaign attempted to hone an argument focused on policy reasonableness 
(Heywood 2009), and the Court’s decision in this case once again affirmed the 
commitment to evaluating the reasonableness of policy designs. Unlike previous 
cases, this decision does not rely on an explicit assessment of dignity in its evaluation 
of policy reasonableness. Still, the case served as an important move for the Court in 
challenging a prominent national policy and in considering the right to health care as 
justiciable in practice like the rights to housing and education. 
                                                 
283 Permanent Secretary of the Department of Education of the Government of the Eastern Cape 
Province and Another v Ed-U-College (2000), Minister of Education v Harris (2001), and Bel Porto 
School Governing Body and Others v Premier of the Western Cape Province and Another (2002), 
respectively. 
284 Minister of Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and Others 
(2001). 
285 See the full decision here: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/15.html.  
  241 
The Soobramoney, Grootboom, and Treatment Action Campaign cases are 
typically recognized as setting out the parameters of social rights jurisprudence in 
South Africa. Together, they point to an approach that combined focuses on policy 
choices – specifically the “reasonableness” of those choices – and a respect for human 
dignity. Whether a policy was reasonable and whether it afforded sufficient 
protections to the dignity of South Africans would be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
South African judges made clear an aversion to firmly defining the substance or 
content of rights – contrasting with the declaration of the Colombian Constitutional 
Court in T-406/92 that “today, with the new constitution, rights are what judges say 
they are through tutela decisions” and contrary to the preferences of prominent civil 
society organizations and human rights lawyers, which favored the minimum core 
approach to outlining the content of social rights establishing in international law. 
Instead, South African judges focused on policies, processes, and societal rather than 
individual effects, and, as one former clerk and current advocate noted, “the way our 
Court interpreted its role made it very clear that it was secondary to the role of the 
elected representatives … I think it created a very restrained role for itself.”286 
The key here is that judges could have decided differently, even considering 
their commitment to a transformative constitutional order. For instance, as noted 
above, the Court has rejected the “minimum core” approach to rights adjudication. In a 
unified decision in the Treatment Action Campaign case that reaffirmed the approach 
set out in Grootboom, the Court held that: 
                                                 
286 Interview 170803_0123. James Fowkes – another former clerk – reiterated this view in an interview 
(170905_0153) and in his 2016 book. 
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[E]vidence in a particular case may show that there is a minimum core of a 
particular service that should be taken into account in determining whether 
measures adopted by the state are reasonable, the socio-economic rights of the 
Constitution should not be construed as entitling everyone to demand that the 
minimum core be provided to them.287  
 
This remains a point of contention among the human rights legal community – 
whether or not the minimum core is officially dead and whether or not the Court 
should have rejected the minimum core approach at all.288 Further, many jurists and 
legal experts around the world – disagreeing with the South African Court – have 
determined that the concept offers a useful legal tool for understanding and 
adjudicating rights claims. As another example, the Court has also chosen to limit 
direct access to the Court, preferring to allow lower courts to hear cases first, though 
the appeals process can draw cases out for years, potentially limiting the impact of 
rights decisions for individual claimants (Dugard 2006, 2015). The justices offered 
reasons for these choices, but other progressive judges may very well have made 
different choices, despite a shared commitment to a progressive vision of 
constitutional law. In short, the justices of the Court exercised judicial agency as they 
developed South African constitutional law. 
One further addition to the jurisprudence worth discussing in detail comes by 
through the creation of the concept of “meaningful engagement.”289 The emergence of 
the idea of meaningful engagement clearly demonstrates the importance of 
                                                 
287 Section 34. 
288 Various interviews with former clerks, as well as current activists and legal professionals. 
289 There is something called “consulta previa” in Colombia, which is conceptually similar to 
“meaningful engagement” in South Africa, though the application of consulta previa has been much 
more limited – namely to indigenous communities and the social/environmental impacts of mega-
projects.  
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contingency in judicial decision-making. Meaningful engagement essentially refers to 
an obligation to attempt mediation or some kind of formalized, direct face-to-face 
interaction between relevant parties outside the courtroom before a case is decided. 
This doctrine fully emerged in the Constitutional Court’s decision on the Occupiers of 
51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg and Others (2008) case, though it has roots in a case four years earlier, 
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (2004).  
The Port Elizabeth Municipality case involved the potential eviction of 68 
people, including 23 children, living in 29 shacks that had been built on privately-
owned land. In writing for the Court, Justice Sachs highlighted the promise of 
“respectful face-to-face engagement or mediation through a third party” and noted: 
[T]hose seeking eviction should be encouraged not to rely on concepts of 
faceless and anonymous squatters automatically to be expelled as obnoxious 
social nuisances. Such a stereotypical approach has no place in the society 
envisaged by the Constitution; justice and equity require that everyone is to be 
treated as an individual bearer of rights entitled to respect for his or her 
dignity.290 
 
Justice Sachs did not use the phrase “meaningful engagement” in his written decision, 
but he did hold that the eviction would not meet the “just and equitable” standard – a 
standard set forth in the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation 
of Land Act of 1998 – for a number of reasons, one of which had to do with the 
complete lack of any attempt to “listen to and consider the problems of this particular 
group of occupiers.”  
                                                 
290 See the full decision here: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2004/7.html.  
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The Olivia Road case involved the potential eviction of more than 400 
occupiers of unused or abandoned buildings in downtown Johannesburg. The Court 
issued an interim order which stated in part: 
The City of Johannesburg and the applicants are required to engage with each 
other meaningfully and as soon as it is possible for them to do so, in an effort 
to resolve the differences and difficulties aired in this application in the light of 
the values of the Constitution, the constitutional and statutory duties of the 
municipality and the rights and duties of the citizens concerned.291 
 
This interim order, written by Justice Sachs, and the subsequent decision in the case, 
written by Justice Yacoob, detailed the concept of meaningful engagement.292 Justice 
Yacoob’s decision once again noted the connection between a recognition of and 
respect for dignity and reasonable policy, but the case is best known for the 
meaningful engagement doctrine. Here, I will quote at length from an interview with 
former justice Albie Sachs: 
I introduced the notion [of meaningful engagement] … The eviction must be 
just and equitable, and there are some cases where there’s no right answer. The 
answer in favor of some might go against others, so you give it your best shot 
to balance out the competing interest, and I said since mediation hadn’t been 
tried, meaningful engagement involving mediation hadn’t been tried, it would 
not be just or equitable to order their eviction. 
 
That now has become part of the court doctrine. Where you have competing 
interest, the court doesn’t give a ruling that defines who technically is in the 
right or in the wrong … It gets the parties to engage meaningfully with each 
other and report back to the court. 
 
                                                 
291 See the full decision here: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2008/1.html.  
292 Justice Yacoob articulated that “[e]ngagement is a two-way process in which the City and those 
about to become homeless would talk to each other meaningfully in order to achieve certain objectives. 
There is no closed list of the objectives of engagement. Some of the objectives of engagement in the 
context of a city wishing to evict people who might be rendered homeless consequent upon the eviction 
would be to determine (a) what the consequences of the eviction might be; (b) whether the city could 
help in alleviating those dire consequences; (c)whether it was possible to render the buildings 
concerned relatively safe and conducive to health for an interim period; (d) whether the city had any 
obligations to the occupiers in the prevailing circumstances; and (e) when and how the city could or 
would fulfil these obligations” (Section 14). 
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It serves quite a profound democratic justice element. It gives the voice, direct 
voice, to the poor. The poor are not just an anonymous mass out there to be 
protected by the judiciary. The poor become participants in deciding on their 
own fate. They become families. They become people with names, with the 
history, with biographies, with particular interests and so it’s part of the human 
dignity aspect that’s found in our Constitution. 
 
At the same time, it compels the authorities to humanize the processes … to 
take account of the impact of the measures on the poor. And it’s the process, I 
think, [that] has been very educative for many bureaucrats, and it humanizes 
what otherwise could be a very cold abstract form of judicial intervention. And 
it reconfigures the role of the judiciary to manage the process rather than 
simply to define rights.293 
 
Meaningful engagement thus is based on the way in which early justices understood 
the concept of dignity and how that ought to play out in contemporary South African 
life. It also sets out a specific, broad role for the Court, beyond hearing and deciding 
discrete cases as they are presented in the courtroom, there is a concern for shaping the 
relations between different sets of actors in the “real world.”294 
This turn to meaningful engagement was prompted not by civil society or 
arguments put forward by litigants, but by the Constitutional Court justices 
themselves. As an advocate who was working at the Court as a clerk at the time noted, 
“my recollection is that this whole idea of meaningful engagement wasn’t raised by 
the parties, wasn’t the basis on which the case was argued. It was raised by the judges 
                                                 
293 Interview 171003_0170.  
294 Interestingly, in a prior case, Minister of Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental 
Association and Others (2001), Judge President Chaskalson seems to suggest that mediation prior to the 
determination of where to build a transit camp to house flood victims was unnecessary and undesirable: 
“If all persons with an interest in the choice of the location of the transit camp would have had to be 
heard before the choice was made, the process would almost certainly have been contentious and drawn 
out. The decision, however, was one that had to be made expeditiously because the urgent needs of the 
flood victims called for prompt action on the part of the government” (Section 105). This is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the later developed concept of meaningful engagement, as it could be 
argued that the Kalaymi Ridge case involved extraordinary circumstances (the flood) and that the 
location of a transit camp is a substantively different issue than whether or not/how an eviction will 
proceed. See the full decision here: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2001/19.html.  
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at the hearing, and then kind of pushed by them.”295 Another former clerk suggested 
that meaningful engagement derives from the transition experience of negotiated 
settlement, stating, “It’s basically the Court taking what happened in CODESA and 
putting it into law.”296 Thus, the elaboration of the concept of meaningful engagement 
is an example of the exercise of judicial agency. 
Interestingly, Heidi Barnes, one of the advocates representing the applicants 
against the City in the Olivia Road case, recalled that the initial meaningful 
engagement decision “was quite frustrating for us at that time” though she also noted 
that “in the end, meaningful engagement has become quite a powerful and useful tool 
in litigating in this area.” In addition, the emphasis on meaningful engagement 
outlived Justice Sachs and the other justices comprising the first Constitutional Court 
bench, and future judges applied the concept to new types of cases, including both 
education- and water-related cases in addition to housing rights cases. Not only did 
Constitutional Court justices adopt the language of meaningful engagement, but so did 
High Court judges, who, considering the historical composition of the judiciary, might 
be less likely to favor progressive or expansive interpretations of constitutional law.297 
The trajectory of meaningful engagement reflects again the patterns of critical 
                                                 
295 Interview 2018.03.01_14.36_01. 
296 Interview 2018.03.29.15.51_01. 
297 These cases include: Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School & Others v Essay N.O. 
and Others (2011 – Constitutional Court, education); Rand Leases Properties v Occupiers of 
Vogelstruisfontein and Others ('Rand Leases') (2011, 2013, 2014 – High Court, housing); Federation 
for Sustainable Environment and Others v Minister of Water Affairs and Others (2012 – High Court, 
water); Schubart Park Residents' Association and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 
and Another (2012 – Constitutional Court, housing); Head of Department, Department of Education, 
Free State Province v Welkom High School and Another; Head of Department, Department of 
Education, Free State Province v Harmony High School and Another (2013 – Constitutional Court, 
education); Ngomane and Others v Govan Mbeki Municipality (2016 – Constitutional Court, housing); 
Daniels v Scribante and Another (2017 – Constitutional Court, housing). 
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junctures, path dependence, and increasing returns described by Paul Pierson (2000). 
Here also we see evidence that “large consequences may result from relatively small 
or contingent events [and that] particular courses of action, once introduced, can be 
almost impossible to reverse” (Pierson 2000: 251). 
As was the case with Colombia, justices considered publicizing decisions as 
part of their work, not just handing those decisions down. Integral to these outreach 
efforts were the formation of a media committee and the introduction of television 
cameras into the courtroom. In an interview, former Justice Goldstone recalled: 
We had seminars with senior journalists. We had annual meetings with the 
editors of the main newspapers and a lot of things came together from that. 
One of them was issuing a press summary together with judgments. The 
summary was drafted by the judge who wrote the lead opinion. That was very 
useful for the journalists … because, you know, sometimes it was a 150-page 
judgment.298 
 
These press summaries allowed journalists to more easily engage with potentially 
complicated legal decisions and translate what the Court was doing to the public. 
Further, because the South African Broadcasting Company carried almost live court 
proceedings, citizens – at least those with access to television – could see the Court in 
action and learn about its work for themselves.299 Constitutional literacy remains a 
challenge in South Africa,300 but in this way, the Court attempted to close the gap 
between citizens and constitutional law. 
Through the early years of the South African Constitutional Court, justices 
made contingent choices related to how to consider social rights, which led to changes 
                                                 
298 Interview 170718_0115.  
299 There was a slight delay so that in the event that any confidential information was shared, the Chief 
Justice could halt the broadcast. 
300 Various interviews with activists and lawyers. 
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to the institutional and ideational environment, in turn influencing opportunities for 
social rights claims-making. These choices also resulted in the expansion of the 
workload and the content of the work of the Court over time. Unlike in Colombia, 
however, the South African story does not hinge on a particular legal tool. In fact, 
although the 1996 Constitution did lower standing requirements through Section 38, 
and although Section 167 allows for claims to be brought directly to the Constitutional 
Court (in other words, allowing the Court to serve as a court of first instance), the 
South African Court hears only a small fraction of the claims the Colombia Court 
decides each year (up to 55 rather than well over one thousand, respectively). Even so, 
the Court’s decisions on social rights have had significant impacts on South African 
social policy and the ability of South Africans to make claims to their constitutional 
rights. 
 
Conclusion 
In sum, the ways in which judges interpreted constitutional provisions for 
fundamental rights structured opportunities for legal mobilization in both Colombia 
and South Africa. These contingent choices, these exercises of judicial agency had 
long-lasting impacts on the shape of legal procedures and social rights jurisprudence, 
as a result of the dynamic of path dependence. Initially in Colombia, individuals 
experimented with the new tutela procedure by making rights claims across issue 
areas. Judges used early tutela decisions as opportunities to clarify and expand the 
purview of existing legal categories. Here, judges engaged in layering, through the 
addition of new institutional rules to pre-existing rules. In this case, new legal 
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doctrines (conexidad and mínimo vital) regarding the ability to claim rights with the 
acción de tutela were layered on the old standard of determining the fundamentality of 
a right (its location in the constitutional text). Judges and allies in the executive branch 
also sought to spread information about the work of the Court through the popular 
media. Through news and television reports, citizens were able to learn about the 
rights-protecting stance of the Court and the existence of the tutela procedure. Legal 
mobilization increased dramatically in the subsequent years, as citizens continued to 
use the tutela procedure more and more frequently to make social rights claims. 
Judicial agency – on the one hand through the expansion of existing legal categories 
and mechanisms through tutela decisions and on the other through efforts to inform 
citizens about the Court through the media – helps to explain the emergence and 
contours of legal mobilization for social rights in Colombia.  
Similarly, in South Africa, citizens, NGOs, and social movements 
experimented with the new constitutional framework, bringing different kinds of 
claims and legal arguments before the Constitutional Court. Justices responded by 
engaging in judicial agency – making choices about which cases to hear, the basis 
upon which to decide those cases, and how to publicize their work. These choices led 
to the development of a jurisprudence based on human dignity and policy evaluations. 
Upon the foundation of the progressive realization of social rights outlined in the 1996 
Constitution, Constitutional Court justices layered new rules, such as the requirement 
for meaningful engagement prior to eviction proceedings and the privileging of policy 
evaluations over individual rights claims. These new rules took on greater importance 
over time, with lower court judges adopting them and with judges across jurisdictions 
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applying them to a wide range of cases – for instance, requiring meaningful 
engagement between parties in cases not dealing specifically with evictions or housing 
rights. These choices and rules impacted opportunities for legal mobilization for social 
rights over time, stymying individual claims-making and encouraging housing rights 
cases. By publicizing the work of the Court through television broadcasts and media 
summaries, judges ensured a greater possibility of citizen knowledge of and 
engagement with the Court.  
This chapter builds on previous studies that point to the fact that some of the 
time, though not always, judiciaries serve as vocal advocates in favor of rights 
protection or other progressive goals, willing to challenge the policies and beliefs of 
other state actors in defense of a disadvantaged minority (Gargarella et al. 2006; Gauri 
and Brinks 2008; Brinks and Gauri 2014).301 Chapter 8 investigates the relationship 
between judicial receptivity and variation in legal mobilization, drawing out the 
influence of societal actors on this relationship in both Colombia and South Africa. In 
doing so, it connects the “from above” perspective detailed in this chapter with the 
“from below” perspective explored in Chapters 5 and 6, tying together the 
constructivist account of legal mobilization. 
  
                                                 
301 For an overview of US-focused accounts regarding the role of judicial attitudes in legal struggles, 
see e.g. Segal and Spaeth (2002). 
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CHAPTER 8 
LEGAL MOBILIZATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
Citizens have advanced claims to social rights in very different ways across 
countries (Gauri and Brinks, 2008). Leveraging comparisons within and across 
cases, this chapter investigates legal mobilization for social rights in Colombia and 
South Africa. Even though the constitutions of Colombia and South Africa protect a 
similar set of rights, these protections have translated into very different patterns of 
claims-making in the formal legal sphere. In Colombia, legal claims to the right to 
health have become ubiquitous, particularly through the tutela procedure,302 yet 
relatively few housing rights claims have emerged. Legal claims to the right to health 
in South Africa, on the other hand, have been rather limited, focusing on HIV/AIDS 
related issues, whereas claims to the right to housing predominate. Why is that the 
case? What explains in legal mobilization across countries and issue areas? 
To better understand patterns in legal mobilization, I argue that a holistic 
approach is necessary, one that assesses both legal claims-making and judicial 
behavior together – in other words, an approach that views legal mobilization “from 
above” and “from below” is necessary. In this chapter, I show that patterns in legal 
mobilization derive from a highly contingent and recursive process of grievance 
construction and a reinterpretation of the meaning and scope of fundamental 
constitutional rights. In doing so, I draw on the constructivist account of legal 
                                                 
302 The acción de tutela is a legal procedure that allows individuals to make immediate claims to 
constitutional rights before any judge in the country and does not require the service of a lawyer. 
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mobilization develop in Chapter 2. The model offers an explanation for the shift 
between the initial period of experimental claims-making with unpredictable outcomes 
that came in the wake of the creation of new constitutions when understandings about 
rights, the law, and state obligations held by both potential claimants and judges were 
unsettled and later, established patterns of claims-making and judicial decision-
making. This shift involves the social construction of some issues and not others as 
“legally grievable,” as well as the development of judicial receptivity to some but not 
all kinds of claims. Thus, this model helps to clarify “the process of mobilizing the 
law” (Arrington 2018: 24). Further, the constructivist account recognizes the agency 
of judges, claimants, and counter-claimants as they contest the meaning of rights. 
Neither judges nor claimants are passive actors; instead, both play vital roles in 
producing the feedback loops that reinforce cycles of legal mobilization.  
 
Legal Opportunity, Support Structures, and Claims-Making 
 
The concept of “opportunity” features prominently in contemporary analyses 
of both social and legal mobilization. Within the political process model, developed to 
explain social movement and protest activity (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), 
scholars refined the notion of the “political opportunity structure,” which refers to 
“consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political 
environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by 
affecting their expectations for success or failure” (Tarrow 2011: 163). Importantly, 
however, opportunity alone is not enough to cause mobilization. As Doug McAdam 
and Sidney Tarrow (2018: 4) note, the original political process model held that “[i]t is 
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the confluence of political opportunities, indigenous organizational capacity, and the 
emergence of an oppositional consciousness (or ‘cognitive liberation’) that shape the 
rise of a movement and its prospects for success.” Building from this framework, 
studies refining the concepts of political opportunity, organizational capacity, and, to a 
lesser extent, the cognitive or ideational elements of mobilization have proliferated. 
Chris Hilson (2002) adapted the concept of political opportunity to focus 
specifically on the conditions under which social actors are able to mobilize law to 
make demands (see also Andersen 2005; Vanhala 2012). Legal opportunity 
encompasses both institutional and contingent factors. Lisa Vanhala (2018b: 112) 
notes that “at least three factors matter across jurisdictions and across policy areas: 
legal stock, standing rules, and rules on costs.” Legal stock refers to the existing body 
of law and delimits the kinds of legal arguments that can be advanced, while standing 
rules determine who can bring claims before the courts, and rules on cost set out the 
amount of financial risk litigants undertake when initiating a court case. In addition to 
these factors that limit both access to the courts and the types of claims that can 
formally (or reasonably) be made, scholars have also highlighted the importance of 
judicial receptivity and a “support structure” of social and material resources available 
to claimants (Galanter 1974; Epp 1998; Andersen 2005). The classic support structure 
model (Epp 1998) demonstrates how societal actors facilitate litigation, easing 
constraints on would-be claimants by providing financial support, technical 
knowledge, and other such resources.  
Like political opportunities, legal opportunities are not static in nature and can 
be created, or at least altered, by would-be mobilizers in a political process that 
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involves contestation over ideas, actors, and institutions. This has to do with the nature 
of court-society relations. As Julio Ríos-Figueroa (2016: 20), “the dialogue between 
the court, the public, and the political actors runs both ways, because the court 
sometimes sets the public debate going, but other times it starts from what the 
majority, a minority, or a specific political actor raises as a critical issue.” Studies of 
diverse topics such as environmentalism in England and Scotland (Vanhala 2018b), 
human rights movements across Latin America (González-Ocantos 2016), and 
mobilization against political violence (M. Gallagher 2017) demonstrate how actors 
can modify the conditions of legal opportunity through educational campaigns and the 
formation of multi-dimensional support structures that simultaneously agitate for 
change and facilitate ties with the state.303 
Yet, it is not rules and resources as such that meaningfully and directly impact 
the possibility of legal mobilization, but the perceptions of potential claimants 
(Andersen 2005). The beliefs that potential claimants have about institutional purpose 
or orientation, institutional rules, as well as their own resources and external support 
impact when opportunities are recognized and acted upon. In other words, theories of 
legal opportunity implicitly rest on assumptions about the beliefs of the actors 
involved. Opportunities must be understood as such to be acted on. As McAdam 
(1982: 48) wrote in his seminal study of the “black insurgency” in the United States, 
“Mediating between opportunity and action are people and the subjective meanings 
                                                 
303 For an overview of the ways in which courts are “activated,” see Hilbink and Ingram (forthcoming). 
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they attach to their situation.” Legal opportunity is thus subjective, flexible, and 
contingent.  
Building on these works, I develop the constructivist account of legal 
mobilization, which explains both the emergence and endurance of legal claims-
making regarding social rights. The account also clarifies the importance of 
societal actors – from pharmaceutical and insurance companies to advocacy 
networks, NGOs, and community organizations –  for legal mobilization. In moving 
from the period immediately following the adoption of new constitutional frameworks, 
which set out new opportunities for legal mobilization, to subsequent periods, during 
which patterns of claims-making and judicial decision-making are more firmly 
established, societal actors impact the judicialization of grievances and judicial 
receptivity.  
In this model, societal actors play an integral role in legal mobilization, not 
only materially supporting claimants in their efforts to seek redress, but also actively 
contributing to the social construction of grievances by helping to frame certain issues 
as “legally grievable.”304 In other words, societal actors encourage potential claimants 
to view a specific problem through the lens of the law and to make claims in the 
formal legal system rather than doing nothing or advancing a claim in some other 
setting. Many investigations of mobilization either assume that grievances are based 
on “underlying activity” (following Casper and Posner 1974) or are simply ever-
present (following McCarthy and Zald 1977), or they fail to articulate a stance on 
                                                 
304 The social construction of legal grievances goes beyond “rights consciousness” as it is less about 
knowledge of rights than about the development of a sense of entitlement to certain goods or services as 
well as the understanding that claims to those goods or services can/should be advanced in legal forums. 
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where grievances come from and how actors recognize something as a grievance. My 
constructivist approach, in contrast, acknowledges that grievances, and especially 
legal grievances, develop through social interaction rather than appear unmediated as 
the result of material conditions (Simmons 2016). As activists, lawyers, judges, and 
government officials participate in the framing of an issue as legal in nature (whether 
by advancing such a frame, accepting it, or failing to actively contest it), this legal 
frame may spread and come to be incorporated diffusely into everyday understandings 
of the issue in question (McCann 1994; Pedriana 2006; Paris 2009; Vanhala 2016, 
2018a; Schoenfeld 2018).  
There is also a more direct process by which NGOs, legal aid services, and 
other actors reach out to individuals who have a particular problem and explicitly 
argue that the problem is a legal one, encouraging potential claimants in their 
networks to understand that problem and problems like it in legal terms. This kind of 
action is most clear in strategic litigation campaigns, but it is potentially much broader 
than that. In fact, as will be demonstrated in greater detail below, in the case of health 
rights claims in Colombia, insurance companies that were targeted in legal claims 
ultimately came to encourage continued claims-making in this direct fashion, as the 
legal cases counterintuitively offered these companies the possibility of financial gain 
rather than sanction. Another variant of the direct process involves NGOs and legal 
aid services convincing potential claimants to actually pursue litigation, vouching that 
there is viable argument and reasonable chance of winning. Through this process, 
whether in a diffuse or direct form, potential claimants come to view issues that 
previously they were willing (or resigned) to ignore or to deal with in other ways as 
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legal issues, as legally grievable. The material reality of people’s lives does not 
change, but their understandings of that reality does.305 
Societal actors impact not only claimants and the process by which grievances 
are socially constructed, but also judicial receptivity to particular claims through the 
mechanism of public exposure to problems. Two key holdings of my constructivist 
account of legal mobilization are that judicial receptivity is not static and that it does 
not fall solely within the domain of judges. Existing studies have identified two 
mechanisms through which societal actors can influence judicial receptivity to 
particular claims: changes in argumentation about specific points of legal 
interpretation and changes in personnel. With respect to argumentation about legal 
interpretation, Ezequiel González-Ocantos (2016) and Amanda Hollis-Brusky (2015), 
in studies of transitional justice in Latin America and the Federalist Society in the 
United States, respectively, show how civil society organizations can play a 
pedagogical role, introducing and supporting new arguments about rights or 
interpretation to sympathetic judges. They further demonstrate how societal actors 
may focus on personnel changes, advocating for the replacement of opposed judges 
and for the nomination of favored judges.  
I identify an additional mechanism: public exposure to problems. This 
mechanism involves a joint public and legal process, where an issue becomes visible 
to judges in their lived experience outside the courtroom as well as legible to judges as 
legal in nature. Judges come to see that a problem is legal in nature and that it is not 
being dealt with well in the context of the legal system. They then become more open 
                                                 
305 See Lake, Muthaka, and Walker (2016) for a related argument. 
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to new legal approaches to the issue. In other words, through this process, a problem is 
made “real” to the law.  
The exposure mechanism differs from the argumentation mechanism in that 
the contention is not that judges become swayed by new legal arguments, but that the 
persistence or increase of claims related to a specific grievance cumulatively inform 
judges about an issue, causing them to become comfortable with the scope of the issue 
and more aware of the issue’s salience, and to identify with claimants.306 This can 
spark a consideration or reconsideration about the correct legal response to that issue – 
and therefore those claims. Though Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin (1998: 160) 
examine judicial policy-making rather than legal mobilization, they identify a similar 
process at play in their analysis of the judicial response to reprehensible prison 
conditions in the United States, suggesting that “these conditions had existed for a 
century, of course; what changed suddenly, in 1965, was the judiciary’s perceptions of 
them.” Here, continued claims-making (and thus continued exposure) ultimately 
resulted in a change in judicial receptivity. 
Breaking this process down, an initial confluence of exposure in daily life (i.e., 
life outside the legal system) and exposure within legal system plays an important role 
in the development of judicial receptivity, inspiring judges to connect an issue that 
they have perhaps seen on television or in their everyday lives with the format, scope, 
and tools of law. Repeated exposure to similar cases within the formal legal system 
has several concrete effects. As Julio Ríos Figueroa (2016: 29) outlines, “where there 
                                                 
306 For arguments that focus on how judges’ awareness of and responsiveness to an issue may shift over 
time, see Feeley and Rubin (1998), Hilbink (2014), Petrova (2016), and Ríos-Figueroa (2016). 
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is a “continuous flow of cases [judges] will not only get more and more varied 
information, but will also be more able to express their jurisprudential preferences 
under more favorable circumstances.” By contrast, if there are only a handful of cases 
on a particular topic over a longer period of time, judges may have less flexibility in 
their decision-making, as they are bound by the facts of the cases before them, and 
they may be forced to decide cases in unfavorable political environments. The mere 
existence of many potential cases does not necessarily mean that judges will seek to 
resolve those cases at all or in novel ways. This is where repeated exposure to the 
issue in daily life and assessments of how that issue come into play. When judges 
view the issue as oppositional to contemporary socio-legal values, such as country-
specific understandings of what constitutes justice or dignity,307 this exposure results 
in judicial receptivity.308 In short, the combination of different kinds of exposure can 
lead judges to come to understand an issue as appropriately resolved in the formal 
legal sphere and therefore increase their receptivity to that issue. 
Where sustained legal claims-making related to a particular issue, following 
the identification of the issue as legally grievable, prompts judicial receptivity by 
exposing judges to that issue, a positive feedback loop forms. Receptivity then inspires 
further claims-making, especially if judges signal to potential claimants the kinds of 
arguments or claims they are most likely to evaluate favorably by staging pedagogical 
                                                 
307 I use the combined form “socio-legal” intentionally here, acknowledging that social and legal values 
will not always align – take, for example, the South African Constitutional Court’s decision against the 
death penalty despite widespread public support for it. 
308 This assessment of contemporary socio-legal values is an interpretive move, reflecting one choice 
among many that judges in each country could have made. In this way, contingency again becomes 
central. 
  261 
interventions or offering “cues” (Baird 2007), spreading information to potential 
claimants about the kinds of arguments or claims likely to be accepted.  
 
Patterns in Legal Mobilization for Social Rights in Colombia and South Africa 
 
In order to identify and assess patterns in legal mobilization, I draw on 178 
interviews, as well as an analysis of constitutional rights claims. Over the course of 
nearly two years of fieldwork in Colombia and South Africa, I conducted semi-
structured interviews with current and former Constitutional Court justices (8) and 
clerks (82), other lawyers and judicial system actors (51), members of NGOs (50), and 
academics (37).309 I also compiled databases of social rights cases (those that 
explicitly referred to the right to education, health, housing, social security, and/or 
water) in both countries. Colombian case information comes from national-level 
summary statistics about tutelas published by the Defensoría del Pueblo and a random 
sample of tutelas reviewed by the Colombian Constitutional Court between 1992 and 
2016 that I collected from the Court’s website. Information about the South African 
cases (1996-2016) come from the South African Constitutional Court’s website and 
the Southern African Legal Information Institute (SAFLII), as well as NGO reports 
and case law books. 
While both the Colombian Constitutional Court (CCC) and the South African 
Constitutional Court (SACC) have been lauded as among the most progressive, rights-
protective courts in the world, they have taken on significantly different workloads. 
On average, the CCC hears 243 constitutional abstract review cases, or “c-cases,” in 
                                                 
309 Many interviewees fit in multiple categories.  
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addition to reviewing 709 tutelas, or “t-cases,” each year. Because t-cases comprise a 
much larger portion of the CCC’s work and because a much larger portion of t-cases 
than c-cases involve social rights claims, I focus on t-cases.310 Since the early 2000s, 
social rights claims have made up somewhere between about 47% and 65% of all 
tutelas each year in Colombia.311 In contrast, the SACC has heard about 30 cases per 
year, though that number is increasing. In South Africa, social rights cases reflect 
between zero and nearly 20% of all SACC cases each year. 
Beyond these differences in total volume of cases, we also see differences in 
the types of social rights claims advanced in each country. In Colombia, health rights 
tutelas have emerged as the most common type of social rights claim – and at times, 
these claims have even eclipsed all other types of tutela claims. For example, in 2008, 
Colombians filed just under 345,000 tutela claims, of which about 143,000 involved 
the right to health. The next most common claim involved the right to receive a 
response to a petition request, at about 113,000. Figure 8.1 shows the nationwide 
variation in social rights tutela claims between 2003 and 2014. While health claims 
remain the most common, other types of social rights claims have increased in 
frequency.312 In South Africa, housing rights claims are by far the most common of 
the 204 social rights cases across the High Court, Supreme Court of Appeal, and 
Constitutional Court levels, as demonstrated in Figure 8.2. Though the number of 
                                                 
310 In a random sample of 349 c-cases – originally coded by the Congreso Visible project – only 41 
involved social rights (of which about 75% related to social security/pensions). 
311 Social rights cases amounted to 50% of my sample of tutelas reviewed by the Transitional Court 
(1992), 58% for the First Court (1993-2000), 71% for the Second Court (2001-2008), and 72% for the 
Third Court (2009-2016). 
312 The Defensoría del Pueblo only distinguished between health, education, and “other” social rights 
cases until 2010, when social security cases were included.  
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claims differs from year to year, no other type of claim rivals housing. These trends 
hold when examining the 60 social rights cases at the SACC level independently. 
Figure 8.1. Social Rights Tutelas, 2003-2014 
  
Figure 8.2. Social Rights Cases in South Africa, 1996-2016 
  
 
There is substantial variation in the form that legal mobilization for social 
rights takes in each country. In fact, by examining differences in the modal type of 
claimant, as well as the degree of centralization and mediation of claims-making, we 
can view the Colombian and South African cases as representing two distinct forms of 
legal mobilization. In Colombia, the tutela encourages individual claimants to make 
relatively unmediated, decentralized claims. My sample of tutelas reviewed by the 
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CCC shows that nearly 85% were individual claims. The tutela procedure does not 
require that a claimant advance a formal legal argument, merely that he or she suggest 
that his or her rights had been violated. In theory, the tutela can be presented directly 
to a judge without any mediation, though in practice, potential claimants may seek 
advice or assistance from legal clinics or NGOs, government human rights offices 
such as the Defensoría del Pueblo or the Personería, or private individuals sometimes 
referred to as processors (“tramitadores”).  
In South Africa, on the other hand, the applicant named in a social rights claim 
is generally a collective actor, such as a social movement or NGO, or all residents of a 
particular parcel of land, or unrelated applicants who all are affected by the same 
problem. Further, constitutional rights claims tend to be both heavily mediated and 
heavily centralized, with some combination of NGOs, legal clinics, movement 
organizations, and/or lawyers offering pro bono legal services being involved. This 
type of claims-making is encouraged by institutional rules that require the use of two 
types of lawyers over the course of a lengthy, costly litigation campaign. As such, a 
traditional support structure (Epp 1998) becomes an almost necessary feature of legal 
mobilization for social rights in South Africa.  
 
Explaining these Patterns: Manufacturing Opportunity within Constraints 
 
So why does claims-making congregate around the right to health in Colombia 
and the right to housing in South Africa? The subsequent sections of this chapter take 
up this question, demonstrating the importance of the social construction of legal 
grievances and judicial receptivity through public exposure to problems. They also 
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highlight how the way legal professionals came to understand which rights were 
judicially enforceable coincided with the way the general population came to 
understand which of their rights were most claimable in the formal legal sphere. 
1. Litigating the Rights to Health and Housing in Colombia 
The formal rules regulating the tutela procedure help mitigate the need for a 
traditional support structure (Wilson 2009). As a result, the form of legal mobilization 
that has emerged with the tutela is primarily individual in nature, features 
decentralized claims-making, and is largely unmediated. Even so, as this section will 
detail through a comparative examination of legal mobilization related to health rights 
and housing rights, societal actors help to shape legal claims-making. In the case of 
health claims, actors not usually associated with the legal system, such as insurance 
and pharmaceutical companies, have helped to cement the understanding that access to 
healthcare is a fundamentally legal issue among claimants. Through the influx of legal 
claims related to the right to health, judges were exposed to the extent of the 
healthcare system’s inefficiencies and inequities, and they began to reinterpret the 
meaning of the right to health, expanding rights protections in the process and 
encouraging further claims-making through a positive feedback loop. Housing-related 
claims did not emerge with frequency, and societal actors related to the provision and 
regulation of housing did not see value in offloading service-provision onto the legal 
system, while those related to the provision and regulation of health did. In other 
words, problems with access to healthcare became understood as legal grievances, 
while problems with access to adequate housing did not.  
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By examining patterns of tutela claims rather than taking an individual case as 
the unit of analysis, I reveal two key incentive structures in the realm of health rights 
claims. On the one hand, individual citizens found practical incentives to file tutela 
claims, and on the other, insurance and pharmaceutical companies313 found monetary 
incentives to encourage the use of the tutela procedure. These incentive structures 
spurred changes in beliefs about how law could and should be used in the realm of 
healthcare. Two primary incentives motivated individual citizens. First, the massive 
yet uneven expansion of the healthcare system generated many potential grievances, 
as citizens gained access in theory (if not delivery in practice) to more and more 
services and developed a greater sense of entitlement to those services. Second, 
individual citizens came to understand the filing of tutelas as what one must do to 
receive healthcare services, and the relatively low cost of the tutela procedure allowed 
many citizens to file claims.  
The main monetary incentive motivating insurance companies came about 
because under certain circumstances the state would help to pay for medicines and 
procedures out of an established fund called the Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantía, 
relieving the insurance company of that duty, after the filing of a tutela. The idea 
behind this fund was to ensure that individuals would not be inhibited from accessing 
the medicines or procedures they needed simply because of a gap in coverage, yet the 
system was particularly susceptible to fraud and manipulation by actors in the health 
sphere who could deny coverage or access to a medical service that should have been 
covered and suggest that the patient file a tutela (Hussmann and Rivillas 2014; 
                                                 
313 By “insurance companies,” I mean empresas promotoras de salud. 
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Lamprea 2015).314 While some insurance companies have better reputations than 
others on these matters (and some seem to perform better than their reputations would 
suggest), the general understanding is that the healthcare sphere is characterized by 
mismanagement, understaffing, fraud, and corruption.315 It is unclear exactly how 
frequently this kind of fraudulent activity occurs (though news reports suggest it has 
not necessarily been uncommon316), but it is less important for my account that this 
behavior was, in fact, pervasive than that it is viewed as pervasive and that the 
behavior of insurance companies was interpreted as encouraging the use of the tutela 
in the realm of health.  
Relatedly, Everaldo Lamprea (2015) has documented the existence of financial 
ties between pharmaceutical companies and patients’ organizations engaged in the 
filing of tutela claims with the hopes of expanding the scope of covered medications. 
These kinds of connections can be interpreted as a manipulation of the tutela process, 
but they also reflect the convergence of interests between patients who need specific 
medications and companies that would like to increase access to and the purchasing of 
those same drugs. Regardless of the interpretation here, as with insurance companies, 
we see a pathway through which pharmaceutical companies encourage the use of the 
tutela with respect to the right to health. 
The Minister of Health from 2012 to 2018, Alejandro Gaviria, summarized the 
factors that influenced the increased use of the tutela for health rights claims as 
follows: 
                                                 
314 Interviews 160804_0008, 160819_0013.  
315 El Espectador (2012a). 
316 See, e.g., El Espectador (2012b) and El Tiempo (2012). 
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People started to see in the tutela a way to expand the benefits plan one by one. 
For patients very sick with cancer, the basic plan did not include the 
medication they needed, so they would go before a judge … I believe that this 
is the first dimension. And the basic plan was never updated [early on]. The 
tutela was a way to update [the plan] and [get it to] include [the medicines you 
needed]. I believe that there is a second point that has to do with collective 
learning. Society and, above all, lawyers learned that this was the way to do 
things. And then there were agents among the pharmaceutical industry who 
began to see in the tutela a way to incorporate the latest innovations into the 
health system and [in the process] capture public resources.317 
 
As a result, the tutela and the healthcare system came to be inextricably linked. 
Further, as noted in Chapter 5, citizens commonly report that “Unfortunately, in 
Colombia, in order to access health services, you have to file tutelas,” and “Everything 
happens through the tutela.” In response to this perception the Constitutional Court 
ruled that the tutela cannot be a required part of the process of obtaining healthcare in 
2007 (C-950/07). The fact that the Court felt the need to issue such a declaration 
indicates the prevalence of the view that the tutela was a necessary part of accessing 
healthcare. Because of the way the healthcare system became judicialized, problems 
related to access to health became understood as legal grievances.  
The argument is not that in every case these insurance and pharmaceutical 
companies explicitly call on individuals to file tutela claims (though sometimes that 
does happen), but that a generalized linkage of healthcare and the tutela has emerged, 
that the combination of incentives for insurance and pharmaceutical companies and 
incentives for individuals reinforce the understanding of health as a legal issue. These 
incentives are particularly influential considering the dominant form of legal 
mobilization in Colombia – one that is individual, decentralized, and unmediated. The 
                                                 
317 Interview 161102_0048. 
  269 
understanding that one must file a legal claim in order to have access to health services 
would be less likely to prompt litigation in a setting where litigation is costly and 
time-consuming. 
An analysis of housing rights claims demonstrates that the expansion of rights 
claims present in the realm of health was not inevitable. The official data on tutela 
claims nationwide does not include disaggregated information on claims to the right to 
housing. Instead, housing appears in the “other socioeconomic rights” category. That 
the Defensoría del Pueblo does not tabulate housing rights claims is evidence of their 
relative infrequency. In order to examine housing rights claims more closely, I turn to 
my random sample of tutela claims scraped from the Constitutional Court’s website. 
This sample indicates that between 1992 and 2016, only 3.4% of all reviewed tutelas 
claimed the right to housing, of which the Court accepted 60.5% (compared to 25.1% 
pertaining to the right to health, of which the Court accepted 72.8%).318 The first of 
these housing rights tutelas, T-423/92, dealt with “invasores,” or squatters, who 
remained on rented property even after their lease had ended. Despite acknowledging 
the country’s significant housing deficit, the three-judge panel rejected the claim, 
arguing that the right to housing, like all constitutional rights, had to be sought though 
legal means, that the right to housing was not a fundamental right (and therefore fell 
outside the competence of the tutela), and that, at any rate, “the termination of a lease 
cannot be considered as a violation of the right to housing.”319 The Court also rejected 
                                                 
318 The 60.5% statistic is somewhat misleading, as most of these tutelas were accepted on the basis of a 
right other than housing.  
319 There was also a similarly decided c-case: C-157/97.  
  270 
the only other housing rights tutela it reviewed in 1992 (T-598/92), again pointing to 
the non-fundamental status of the right to housing.  
The most well-known legal claims related to the right to housing is a set of 
cases involving the system of home financing (Unidad de Poder Adquisitivo 
Constante or UPAC). Interviewees, including those currently working at the 
Constitutional Court, consistently referred to the UPAC cases when asked about the 
right to housing and often failed to identify any other housing rights cases. Initially, 
citizens organized, marched, and brought tutela claims in the wake the UPAC crisis 
(Uprimny 2007). Nevertheless, as Pablo Rueda (2010: 46) notes, these tutelas were not 
decided in favor of the claimants, with the CCC finding “that an eventual breach of the 
right to housing was not enough to award protection through [the] mínimo vital” 
standard.320 In 1999, the Court decided an abstract review case related to UPAC (C-
747/99). The Court declared the UPAC system unconstitutional and held that the 
central bank, not the market, should determine interest rates. Interestingly, however, 
two justices noted a hesitance to issue such a decision, stating:  
The reluctance or incompetence of the relevant organs of state – which should 
not be tolerated by the people, who can appeal at all times to the instruments of 
democratic participation – cannot be offered as an excuse for the Court to 
intervene in the determination or elimination of a public policy, outside of its 
original function of the review of constitutionality.321 
 
While the other justices did not share this disinclination, their decisions in tutela 
claims suggest that they, too, saw the tutela as an inappropriate tool to raise claims 
related to UPAC specifically and housing more generally. Some commentators have 
                                                 
320 Following this decision, business groups and government officials criticized the Court for infringing 
on the functioning of the market. 
321 Justices Eduardo Cifuentes and Vladimiro Naranjo make this argument in their dissent (para. 14).  
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suggested that these cases had a demobilizing impact on further claims-making related 
to housing rights.322 Further, not only did judges indicate that they would not respond 
favorably to tutela claims related to UPAC, but financial organizations did not 
promote the filing of these claims (in contrast to pharmaceutical and insurance 
companies in the realm of health). 
Still, it is not immediately clear why other kinds of housing claims did not 
follow a path similar to that of health claims. According to UN-Habitat (2013: 148-
49), in 1990, 31.2% of urban-dwelling Colombians lived in “slum areas,” a percentage 
that dropped to 14.3% by 2009 (compared to a change from 46.2% to 23.0% in South 
Africa). The key here is not that the percentages have declined, but that there is 
evidence of a population that could have made claims on the basis of housing 
inadequacy and could have connected those claims about housing to dignity (which 
incidentally mirrors the types of arguments put forward in South Africa about the right 
to adequate housing).323 Whether or not judges would accept these arguments is 
another story, but it is striking that these kinds of claims have been largely absent in 
the Colombian context.324 
Judicial decision-making related to social rights tutelas has changed over time, 
with judges first rejecting these claims outright, before accepting claims on the basis 
of the conexidad doctrine (where a violation of one right signifies a violation to 
                                                 
322 Interview 161104_0052 
323 Policy regarding evictions likely plays some role here. As Holland (2017) shows, many local 
politicians in Bogotá prefer forbearance to enforcement of laws against squatting. Interestingly, 
Holland’s account further demonstrates how housing has not been judicialized in the way health has 
been in Colombia. While the bureaucrats Holland interviewed expressed concern about the precarious 
lives of those living in informal housing, they did not speak of the “right to housing” as such. 
324 There is evidence, however, that citizens occasionally filed tutela claims to this effect (c.f. Holland, 
2017). 
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another, fundamental right, because the two rights are connected in the concrete case) 
or the mínimo vital doctrine (where a violation of one right indicates that the absolute 
minimum conditions necessary for a dignified life are not met), and finally declaring 
the right to health to be fundamental in itself (and therefore directly claimable with the 
tutela). The expansion of justiciability did not occur as quickly or as fully with other 
social rights as it did with health rights, though these early decisions did not explicitly 
privilege health. While lines of argumentation and interpretation changed, this process 
appears to be primarily one driven by CCC justices. It is certainly true that societal 
actors pushed for protections to the right to health, but judges appeared to rely instead 
on general lines of argument about the status of non-fundamental rights, rather than on 
specific arguments related to health developed by civil society and disseminated to 
judges through workshops, amicus briefs, and legal commentary. These changing 
standards that judges looked to in adjudicating social rights claims reflect socio-legal 
values, specifically interpretations of the meaning of justice, dignity, and a dignified 
life in the Colombian context.  
Eduardo Cifuentes, a justice in the Constitutional Court from its inception to 
2000, notes that one of the two major challenges facing “the Court was for rights to 
mean more power for the weak … and for that reason, the extension of borders of 
economic, social and cultural and fundamental rights was guided by the Court 
directly.”325 Further, as Rodolfo Arango, an auxiliary justice during the first years of 
the Court, recalls, it was the Court itself that played a pedagogical role, disseminating 
information to potential claimants: 
                                                 
325 Interview 160726_0006. 
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From the beginning of the Court, we had a very, very aggressive strategy of 
delivering the decisions and explaining them very pedagogically, directly to 
the media … every week on the front page of the newspaper [you read] a 
surprising decision, one that protected someone’s rights. We did that 
intentionally. Journalists were always visiting the Court, visiting our offices, 
asking what decisions would come out that week that they could write about in 
the newspaper.326  
 
The idea here was to promote a closer connection between everyday citizens and the 
courts, not necessarily to encourage specific rights claims. Thus, it is not immediately 
clear, if these general arguments about the importance of social rights motivated 
Constitutional Court judges and if judges reached out to the public generally rather 
than by inviting specific kinds of cases, why there are such stark differences in legal 
mobilization around the rights to health and housing.  
The exposure mechanism helps to explain the differential expansion of rights 
protections. One auxiliary justice put it this way, “It’s a bit like the citizens were 
knocking on the door to see what the judges were saying. We were very receptive and 
we opened the door completely … They knocked on the door with many cases of 
many issues and we as judges opened it [to health claims].” When pressed as to why 
the Court would have “opened the door” to health claims more readily than other 
social rights claims, she referred to the state of crisis of the healthcare system, to the 
“painfulness” of the situation, and the fact that “we suffer physical pain equally, we 
suffer the pain of seeing a sick relative equally, and we are also equally victims of the 
health system.”327 Another auxiliary justice summarized that the “tutela for social 
rights [emerged] out of pure necessity of the people, and [they] found that the 
                                                 
326 Interview 160825_0016. 
327 Interview 160826_0017. 
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Constitutional Court was receptive to the needs of the people.”328 As judges continued 
to be exposed to health claims, they became more comfortable with them and even 
identified with claimants, and they became more aware of the extent of the problems 
with the healthcare system, and more convinced that these types of claims could or 
should be resolved by the Court.  
Judges became convinced that these types of claims could or should be 
resolved by the Court not simply because of the continued filing of health claims 
(though my sample of tutelas reviewed by the CCC shows that between 1992 and 
2016, nearly 25% involved health claims), but also because the issue of access to 
healthcare comported with judges’ understanding of contemporary Colombia socio-
legal values. In other words, judges viewed access to healthcare as central to a 
dignified life (as evidenced by their willingness to accept health rights tutela claims 
with the mínimo vital and conexidad standards). While my interviewees referred to 
objective factors, such as having sick relatives, the process of recognizing problems 
and identifying with claimants is contingent and subjective; these judges just as easily 
could have referenced not health-related issues, but housing-related issues as what tied 
Colombians together, for example, holding instead that “at a minimum, we all need a 
roof over our heads.” However, they not did share this interpretation of housing and 
relatively few housing rights claims came before the Court (only 3.4% of reviewed 
tutelas involved housing rights claims). Thus, judges were less receptive to housing 
claims than they were to health claims. 
2. Litigating the Rights to Housing and Health in South Africa 
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Turning now to South Africa, the dominant form of legal mobilization features 
collective claimants who advance centralized, formalized, and heavily mediated 
claims. This form of legal mobilization results from the institutional rules governing 
how one can advance a claim in the South African legal system (i.e., by conforming to 
technical standards of legal argumentation), and this form renders proactive legal 
mobilization in the absence of a support structure highly unlikely. The basic support 
structure for social rights claims in South Africa can be divided in two: on the one 
hand, an organization or movement specific to the issue at hand (e.g., Treatment 
Action Campaign for HIV-related issues or Abahlali baseMjondolo for evictions and 
shack-dwellers’ rights), and on the other, the emergent post-apartheid human rights 
legal elite and the NGOs they created. A problem may begin with an individual, but by 
the time that individual engages the legal system, several other applicants (including 
organizations) will have been joined to the complaint, and two sets of legal 
professionals (attorneys and advocates) will have become involved in the expression 
of the legal claim. This is true regardless of the issue area, though legal mobilization 
related to the right to housing has far surpassed mobilization related to the right to 
health. 
Of the 15 health rights cases I identified across the High, Supreme, and 
Constitutional Court levels since 1996, seven focused on claims related to HIV/AIDS, 
three of which related to access to anti-retroviral medication while in prison. The other 
cases are difficult to group and dealt with issues ranging from access to dialysis to the 
legal regime governing surrogacy to the constitutionality of the National Health Act. 
The two earliest health cases emerged in 1997. One, Van Biljon and others v Minister 
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of Correctional Services and others (1997), ended at the Cape High Court with a court 
order protecting the constitutional right of prisoners living with HIV to receive 
“adequate medical treatment,” including prescribed ARVs at state expense.  
The other, Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) (1997), became 
the first social rights case heard by the Constitutional Court. The applicant, Mr. 
Soobramoney, sought to claim an individual right to access healthcare services in light 
of his renal failure he and his inability to obtain dialysis from private medical facilities 
due to the cost. Of course, rights claims are not made unopposed. In this case, the state 
pointed to its limited resources in the health sphere as a reason why the Court should 
not second-guess its health policy and why it should reject Mr. Soobramoney’s claim. 
Ultimately, the Court accepted the state’s argument and clarified that individual claims 
to the right to health would not supersede broader health policy. In concrete terms, this 
meant that the Court refused to direct a state-run medical facility to provide Mr. 
Soobramoney with dialysis treatments, considering the resource limitations faced by 
the state and the nature of Mr. Soobramoney’s illness. The decision was both highly 
public and highly contentious. In fact, one former clerk who worked at the Court at the 
time of the decision recalled, “You know, it was emotionally charged. Clerks got 
phone calls to say ‘you killed Soobramoney’ … One of my good friends got sort of 
repeated phone calls from somebody. And, you know that they read the judgment and 
I think he died two hours later.”329 This decision indicated that one cannot claim the 
right to health in cases like these, and when combined with the already difficult 
                                                 
329 Interview 170801_0121. Mr. Soobramoney actually died two days later, but the idea stands. 
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process of bringing claims before the Court, it made claims-making related to the 
individual right to health even less likely. 
The next health rights case, Treatment Action Campaign (2002), to come 
before the SACC found much more success. Much has been written about this case, 
but, in short, the Court found that the state had acted unreasonably in limiting the 
distribution of a drug shown to inhibit mother-to-child transmission of HIV. The 
decision required that the state roll out a full program to distribute the drug, rather than 
simply pilot the program at a few medical facilities. 
Although the courts in South Africa were willing, at least at times, to accept 
claims to the right to health, health did not become judicialized in the way it did in 
Colombia. Notably, relatively few health claims have been advanced, especially 
outside the realm of HIV/AIDs, despite a flagging public healthcare system, which has 
been characterized as being “in a state of crisis, with much of the public health care 
infrastructure run down and dysfunctional as a result of underfunding, 
mismanagement, and neglect” (Mayosi and Benatar 2014: 1346). One might think that 
the taboo status of HIV/AIDS might have inhibited claims-making in South Africa, at 
least early on in the 1990s. However, even if HIV/AIDS contestation was initially less 
likely because the issue is associated with taboo subjects (Gauri and Lieberman 2006), 
that does not explain the dearth of overall health claims. What we see, in fact, is that 
HIV/AIDS claims surpass other kinds of health claims, such as those related to access 
to medications or procedures, which have been quite common in the Colombian 
context. Further, we might have expected, given the South African government’s 
reticence to develop policy to confront the AIDS epidemic, to see even greater levels 
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of legal claims-making. While there are seven health rights cases pertaining to 
HIV/AIDS (and only eight other health rights cases), neither HIV/AIDS specifically 
nor health more generally became judicialized in the way that housing did. 
The Constitutional Court has been receptive to housing rights claims, 
particularly those claims related to evictions, beginning with the first housing rights 
case to come before it, Grootboom (2000). In Grootboom, the Court found the state’s 
housing policy to be unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, as it neglected to 
provide for those “in desperate need.” The Court handed down this decision over the 
objections of the state that it had limited funds to address the housing crisis and that 
the Court should not second-guess its housing policy decisions – the same objections 
that the Court had been receptive to in the Soobramoney case, which it had heard just a 
few years earlier. The Grootboom decision set off a chain of cases related to the right 
to housing in the context of evictions. One former clerk described the development of 
the right to housing as follows: 
Under apartheid, it was illegal to be a squatter, and you could be kicked out 
and you could be thrown in jail … [Now] you [can] evict someone, but only 
with a court order, and only if it’s equitable … Built into the right is if eviction 
is going to lead to homelessness, the state must provide you with temporary 
alternative accommodation. And over the past 20 years, that has been 
expanded. It’s not just if you’re flood victim the state must provide this 
accommodation, it’s also if the state evicts you. Then the next step is when the 
state evicts you from private land. Then the next step, if a private owner evicts 
you, also you have this right. And now we’re getting to the content of what that 
alternative accommodation looks like … So we’re seeing – and what’s so 
lovely and unexpected – is the Court has started writing case law on this, kind 
of like a handbook for litigators … The jurisprudence has developed to such a 
level that the courts are now writing, “Judges, when they decide this issue, 
have to do X, Y, Z.”330  
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Thus, there has been a steady expansion of the understanding of the scope of the right 
to housing, built step-by-step, from emergency or crisis protections to everyday 
protections. One lawyer explained, “in housing, the area where there’s been the 
greatest success is that evictions have been made very much more difficult through the 
Constitution and through very skilled and energetic lawyers who had pushed the 
boundaries of the Constitution beyond what anyone imagined at the time it was 
written.”331 Social movements organized by shack-dwellers, such as Abahlali 
baseMjondolo, have adopted rights-based language in contesting evictions, and even 
have posters that detail the steps necessary for evictions to proceed lawfully posted in 
their offices. As such, the issue of housing – or at least evictions – appears to have 
been thoroughly judicialized in the South African context, with housing understood 
through the lens of law (unlike in Colombia). In fact, most respondents seemed to take 
it almost as natural that there would be so many housing rights cases, stating, for 
instance, “I think that the starting point, that people need a home, need a roof over 
their heads, is a really significant one.”332 That one needs a home is true everywhere, 
but legal mobilization for the right to housing does not occur everywhere there are 
housing gaps. 
But why were judges so receptive to these legal claims about evictions, in 
contrast to other social rights claims, even though the legacy of apartheid-era social 
exclusion transcended the issue of housing? James Fowkes (2016: 2), a former clerk at 
the Constitutional Court, notes, “Somehow, the Court is seen as being on both sides of 
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[a] dichotomy, with the very same judges apparently contextual, progressive guardians 
of social justice at one moment and closed-minded, heartless formalists the next.” He 
attributes these oppositional assessments to the early Constitutional Court’s preference 
for a “constitution-building” approach, which views the executive as a partner in 
rights-protection rather than as an adversary, and which encourages deference to the 
other branches of government where possible. Interviews with former Constitutional 
Court judges and other former clerks affirm this understanding of the Court.333 The 
Court was not necessarily inclined in general to take interventionist decisions, or to 
demand that the state handle the housing question in any specific way, though one 
lawyer concluded that “one of the reasons the Grootboom case had the outcome [it 
did] was that some of the judges were so relieved to see a socio-economic rights case 
which they could support … [When we were arguing the case,] we kept on saying, ‘Of 
course this is not Soobramoney. Oh no, it’s not Soobramoney.’”334 Again, though, the 
question of why judges would have understood the Grootboom case as “supportable” 
in contrast to the Soobramoney case remains. Both cases entailed positive obligations 
on the state – whether providing access to dialysis machines or temporary alternative 
accommodation.  
As was the case with health rights in Colombia, non-state actors pushed for 
protections, and they were more intimately involved in these litigation efforts than 
were their Colombian counterparts, but we do not necessarily see South African 
judges taking up the arguments preferred by civil society activists. In the Grootboom 
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case, one lawyer remembers, “The judges got really agitated about [the] ‘who first’ 
[question] and said, ‘Well, how can we just reward people because they’ve got clever 
lawyers?’”335 While the Court did end up deciding in favor of Ms. Grootboom, it 
continued to show skepticism regarding the expansive social rights protections called 
for by lawyers and NGOs. This skepticism comes through most clearly in the repeated 
rejection of the minimum core approach to social rights.336 Lawyers repeatedly 
advanced arguments in favor of a minimum core in oral arguments and in amicus 
briefs, but the Constitutional Court judges remained steadfastly opposed to applying 
such an approach.337 
As James Fowkes (2016: 132) holds, “New legal protections can become 
settled and entrenched, and their judicial enforcement can become easier and more 
routine, but this is not inevitable.” The Court’s willingness to decide in favor of Ms. 
Grootboom did not imply that it would necessarily continue to expand housing rights 
protections. The Court hypothetically could have decided in subsequent cases that the 
right to housing would only imply justiciable positive obligations in the context of 
emergencies or could have limited the applicability of housing in some other way. 
After the fact, judicial decisions may seem as if they were inevitable, but this 
perception is not an accurate one.  
One way in which legal protections become entrenched is through the 
continued exposure of judges to particular kinds of legal claims and the problems they 
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336 “Minimum core” refers to the idea in international law that there is minimum level of provision of 
socio-economic rights that governments must provide, regardless of available resources.   
337 Interviews 170814_0130, 170829_0144, 170904_0152, 170908_0156, 171005_0172.  
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implicate, especially when judges interpret these claims as consonant with 
contemporary socio-legal values. Again, the exposure mechanism refers to the process 
by which continued experience with claims related to a specific grievance 
cumulatively inform judges about an issue, causing them to become comfortable with 
the issue and/or to identify with claimants. The process results in an increased 
receptivity of judges to claims pertaining to that issue area. We see this clearly in the 
realm of housing in South Africa, where judges clearly connected the specific issue of 
access to housing with the general value of human dignity. One former clerk noted: 
Housing cases are numerous at this point in the jurisprudence, in the High 
Court and the [Constitutional] Court, and I think that maybe it’s just getting 
judges and courts comfortable in that terrain so that the more of a particular 
kind of case they see, the more comfortable they become with the numbers and 
statistics and so on … Especially in the [Johannesburg] courts they’ve seen it 
again and again and again so they’re becoming more comfortable. I don’t 
know … [but] that’s something that I suspect.338 
 
This view is consistent with hands-on interventions undertaken by the Court in 
housing cases such as Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha 
Homes and Others (2009), which specified “the exact time and manner and 
conditions” of the eviction, including precise directives about the alternative 
accommodation to be provided to those subject to eviction.339 The existence of a 
robust support structure around housing issues and the fact that eviction orders must 
be granted by judges meant that judges would continue to be exposed to housing rights 
cases. Another former clerk pointed to this support structure and the history of land 
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and housing issues in South Africa as being particularly influential on judicial 
receptivity of these kinds of claims:  
There’s a long history of land and housing litigation as kind of an anti-
apartheid move … A lot of the liberal and progressive judges who went on to 
High Courts and the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court 
identified with these cases as sort of, as sites of progressive fighting. I think 
[that] is one reason. There’s been incredibly organized and coordinated 
litigation and planning around housing rights specifically … There’s this kind 
of feedback happening between an issue that is obviously quite dire on the 
ground … [and] good organization among clients, lawyers, and receptiveness 
on the part of judges.340 
 
Yet another former clerk noted that the problem of inadequate housing was visible in 
such a way that judges were exposed to it, that “even judges can see them for 
themselves.”341 The notion that judges can see and identify with the problem of 
housing echoes the idea that in Colombia judges could imagine themselves as 
claimants in a health rights case. Importantly, both are subjective interpretations 
described as if they were instead objective facts. 
Still, exposure is not enough on its own to precipitate judicial receptivity. 
Judges must also have the sense that the kind of rights violation in question is 
incompatible with contemporary socio-legal values – in this case, the value of human 
dignity appears crucial. In early health rights cases, including Soobramoney and 
Treatment Action Campaign, South African judges suggested that while human 
dignity remained central to the post-apartheid South African legal order, the link 
between a difficulty with access to healthcare might not be an infringement on dignity 
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(in Soobramoney) or simply did not consider dignity as a fundamental part of the legal 
analysis (in Treatment Action Campaign). 
In contrast, in early housing rights decisions, human dignity featured 
prominently. For example, in Grootboom, Justice Zak Yacoob wrote, “The case brings 
home the harsh reality that the Constitution’s promise of dignity and equality for all 
remains for many a distant dream.” Here, dignity and access to adequate housing are 
understood as necessarily connected, and this understanding combined with exposure 
spurred judicial receptivity to housing claims. This receptivity involved not only 
hearing housing rights cases, but also issuing interventionist decisions, rather than 
leaving the issue to be resolved by the executive or legislature (even if those same 
judges otherwise embrace a philosophy of judicial deference). These decisions, 
particularly as they detailed what one lawyer quoted above described as “a handbook 
for litigators,” served as cues for potential claimants and incentivized further legal 
claims-making related to the right to housing, forming a positive feedback loop. This 
constellation of factors – judicial receptivity, societal support, and the judicialized 
understanding of housing – has not yet emerged with respect to other social rights 
issues. 
Interestingly, the ways Colombian lawyers talk about the right to health and 
the ways South African lawyers talk about the right to housing are remarkably similar. 
As one lawyer and former clerk in Colombia put it, “among the socioeconomic rights, 
the only one that is actually enforceable in a way that you can actually identify the 
right with a treatment, a drug, something tangible, is the right to health. The only 
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one.”342 Now consider a South African lawyer and former clerk’s view: “I think 
housing just created a particularly unique gap because it’s such a negative effect. It’s 
leave that person alone, [that] was the starting point, not give them healthcare, not give 
them special healthcare, not feed them, not educate them, just simply leave them 
where they are. You know, that’s the difference.”343 Both of these assessments make 
complete sense in their national contexts, but what seems inevitable, commonsense, or 
natural in one country loses that quality when placed in comparative perspective. The 
social right that is understood to be most enforceable, or most appropriate for judges to 
enforce, in South Africa is housing, while in Colombia, it is health. These 
understandings held by legal professionals coincide with the understandings of the 
general population about which of their rights are most claimable. 
 
Conclusion  
 
I have examined differential legal mobilization for social rights in Colombia 
and South Africa, advancing two arguments about how societal actors influence legal 
mobilization in ways unacknowledged or underspecified in existing accounts. First, I 
argue that societal actors not only support claimants in their efforts to seek redress by 
providing financial and technical resources, but they also actively participate in the 
social construction of grievances. Societal actors help to construct broad 
understandings of existing problems as both objectionable and claimable in the legal 
sphere. In other words, they encourage citizens to view specific realities through the 
lens of the law. Second, I identify a new mechanism through which societal actors 
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influence judicial receptivity to particular claims: public exposure to problems, which 
refers to how the persistence or increase of particular kinds of claims inform judges 
about an issue, encouraging them to become (more) comfortable with the scope of the 
problem and/or to identify with claimants. Over time, this continued exposure to 
claims triggers a consideration or reconsideration of the correct legal response to the 
underlying issue, particularly when judges view the issue as comporting with 
contemporary socio-legal values – in the cases analyzed here, when they interpret the 
issue as central to a dignified life. Together, these processes result in a positive 
feedback loop, with sustained legal claims-making prompting judicial receptivity, and 
judicial receptivity (and subsequent pedagogical interventions by judges) inspiring 
additional claims-making. 
The cross-national, cross-sector comparisons explored here help to establish 
how different kinds of societal actors may play similar roles in influencing legal 
mobilization across contexts. In Colombia, health came to be understood through a 
legal lens as incentives of potential claimants combined with incentives of actors 
involved in the provision of healthcare services encourage the use of the tutela. Judges 
– influenced by exposure to these health rights claims – became more receptive to 
those claims, further incentivizing the continued use of the tutela in the realm of 
health. Housing rights claims did not follow a similar path. In contrast, housing rights 
claims have been most common in South Africa. Societal actors helped to construct a 
widespread understanding that housing was a legal issue, instead of simply a personal 
or social one. Further, the exposure of judges to the problem of housing, through both 
continued legal claims and personal experience, encouraged judges to be more 
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receptive to claims to the right to housing relative to other social rights claims. The 
argument here is not that judges in South Africa are unaware of deep problems in the 
healthcare sector, or that judges in Colombia are unaware of housing issues, but that 
this awareness sits at an academic level and is less influential for decision-making, 
while housing in South Africa takes on a more visceral quality and is understood as 
inexorably connected to human dignity. The same applies to health in Colombia, 
because of the way judges have been exposed to these issues.  
Again, the material existence of a problem does not imply that it will 
necessarily be recognized as a grievance. Further, the recognition of a grievance does 
not indicate by itself how or where or by whom that grievance will be expressed. 
There is no one-to-one-to-one translation of problems into grievances into claims. 
Hypothetically, health rights claims could have become most common in South Africa 
and housing rights claims in Colombia, or both types of claims could have emerged as 
equally common in both countries. Patterns of legal claims-making express not only 
underlying material conditions, but also the social construction of legal grievances. 
The beliefs that actors have about the problems in their lives, specifically about which 
problems are legally grievable or claimable, have social roots. Likewise, judicial 
decision-making emerges not from wholly abstract reasoning, but is influenced by 
social context, including through public exposure to problems and a re-interpretation 
of what constitutes the real world.  
A holistic examination of legal mobilization reveals the recursive, 
interconnected nature of grievances, legal opportunity, and judicial behavior. 
Attention to this interplay is key for understanding the contestation about and 
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expansion of access to social goods throughout much of the world. The consequences 
of this kind of expansion of access to social welfare goods are largely unknown. 
Ultimately, constitutional rights offer equal access to all citizens on paper, yet real 
access is determined by the ability of citizens to make claims to these goods, either as 
individuals or as part of a group. In other words, legal recognitions offer an indirect 
route to social incorporation and to social policy change, one that might reify rather 
than offer redress for preexisting disadvantage. Chapter 9 follows with a discussion of 
the implications of this study of legal mobilization for social rights. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
 
The title of this dissertation comes from a poem by Stephen Crane (1899) that 
evocatively captures one of the challenges of rights-based activism. The poem reads: 
 
A man said to the universe: 
“Sir, I exist!” 
“However,” replied the universe, 
“The fact has not created in me 
A sense of obligation.” 
 
 
Making a claim – as difficult as that can often be – is nowhere near enough. As 
Jeremy Bentham (1843) cautioned in his critique of natural rights, hunger is not bread. 
Existing does not necessarily impel recognition. Yet, this seemingly impossible 
situation has been met time and again with obstinate contestation, with people who 
refuse to accept this lack of recognition, with people who imagine better futures and 
work toward those futures tirelessly. 
In this study, I explored efforts to ensure that rights are not simply parchment 
promises, in other words, efforts to create a sense of obligation regarding the social 
needs of citizens in the Colombia and South Africa. Chapters 3 and 4 described the 
historical processes that led to the adoption of social constitutionalist commitments in 
the early- to mid-1990s. Chapters 5 and 6 then turned to mobilization “from below,” 
or decisions made by citizens about when and how to advance legal claims, and 
Chapters 7 and 8 followed with a discussion of mobilization “from above,” or 
decisions made by judges about how to interpret their role and respond to these claims. 
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Together, these empirical chapters comprise my constructivist account of legal 
mobilization. This chapter concludes the dissertation by offering a discussion of the 
consequences of legal mobilization for social rights and the broader lessons that can be 
taken from this study of the experiments with social constitutionalism and legal 
mobilization in Colombia and South Africa. 
 
Evaluating Legal Mobilization for Social Rights  
 
Although this project focused on the emergence and character of legal 
mobilization for social rights in Colombia and South Africa rather than its 
consequences, the subsequent sections attempt to draw some initial conclusions about 
the various impacts of the turn to law in these two countries. César Rodríguez-
Garavito (2011: 1679) advocates for the assessment of the effects of judicial decisions 
along two axes: direct/indirect and material/symbolic. I take his typology as a starting 
point, but expand it to consider not only judicial decisions but the broader process of 
legal mobilization, which includes both legal claims-making and judicial decision-
making. Material consequences of legal mobilization for social rights include whether 
or not individual claimants have personal access to social goods, as well as whether or 
not social policy changes directly as a consequence of a legal order or indirectly as the 
court shapes legislative debate and public opinion. Symbolic consequences of legal 
mobilization for social rights include shifts in understandings of what kinds of 
grievances are legal in nature, of the judicial role, and the extent to which law 
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constrains powerful actors.344 I begin with a discussion of material and symbolic 
impacts on claimants I then turn to the effects of legal mobilization on the state, 
specifically considering both the relationship between legal mobilization and public 
policy and the challenges and opportunities that legal mobilization presents for state 
actors.  
1. The Consequences of Legal Mobilization for Individual Claimants 
Scholars have long-noted how law can enable and constrain those who wish to 
contest existing power relations at the same time. As E.P. Thompson (1975: 264) 
explains in his study of the Black Act: 
On the one hand, it is true that the law did mediate existent class relations to 
the advantage of the rulers; not only is this so, but as the century advanced, the 
law became a superb instrument by which these rulers were able to impose 
new definitions of property to their even greater advantage, as in the extinction 
by law of indefinite agrarian use-rights and in the furtherance of enclosure. On 
the other hand, the law mediated these class relations through legal forms, 
which imposed, again and again, inhibitions upon the actions of the rulers. 
 
Thus, while elite control of the drafting of legal rights and regulations and over the 
operation of legal institutions may result in the perversion of the supposedly even-
handed law, this codification, this formalization, and this claim to fairness and justice 
at times can empower non-elites and constrain those in power. On the other hand, 
“rights talk” may offer new opportunities to claimants or to movements in their myriad 
quests to improve the conditions of their lives, but, at the same time, the very 
invocation of rights may legitimate an illegitimate state or further embed a hegemonic 
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(2015), and Keck and Strother (2016) on various ways to evaluate the impacts of judicial decisions or 
the turn to law more broadly. 
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discourse, reifying existing power relations (e.g., Glendon 1991; Nonet and Selznick 
2001; Silbey 2005). 
These questions about elite machinations and counter-hegemonic possibilities 
can overshadow fundamental questions about lived experience. All too often 
discussions of law and social change (or politics writ large) are divorced from the 
ways in which people experience opportunities, constraints, advances, and setbacks. 
Yet, as Robert Cover (1986: 1601) rightly proclaimed, “legal interpretation takes place 
in a field of pain and death.” Far from simply being parchment promises, social rights 
recognitions bring into relief Cover’s notion – legal interpretation regarding the scope, 
meaning, and content of social rights has had life and death consequences for 
Colombian and South African citizens.  
For example, the Treatment Action Campaign decision gave thousands upon 
thousands of South African babies the opportunity to begin their lives without having 
contracted HIV during birth. In the words Gilbert Marcus, one of the lawyers involved 
in the case, “Now, let me tell you that was an agonizing decision, because every day 
that went by, babies were dying. It’s as blunt and as ugly as that.”345 Prior to the 
judgment, President Mbeki and members of his administration had publically 
indicated suspicion regarding the connection between HIV and AIDS and had proven 
hesitant to roll out measures to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS. Yet, following the 
Treatment Action Campaign decision (and continued mobilization by the Campaign), 
cases of mother-to-child transmission dropped from 70,000 per year to less than 8,000 
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Research Council (2015: 108). 
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per year by 2013 (Motsoaledi 2014: 10). On the other hand, while the decision in the 
Soobramoney case did not cause Mr. Soobramoney’s death, neither did the decision 
mandate access to the medical services Mr. Soobramoney direly needed. Here, I am 
not contesting the soundness of the legal reasoning underlying these decisions; 
instead, I mean to highlight the serious consequences of legal mobilization, something 
that is easily overlooked in the study of the politics of law and courts.346 
In addition to impacting who lives and who dies, legal mobilization also 
influences how citizens are able to live. For example, despite what Varun Gauri and 
Jeffrey Staton (2013) describe as “alarming low” rates of compliance with tutela 
orders, thousands upon thousands of Colombians have been able to access medicines 
following the filing of tutela claims that they otherwise would not have. As another 
example, shack dwellers in KwaZulu-Natal were able to retain their homes as the 
Constitutional Court struck down the “Slums Act,”347 the implementation of which 
would have rendered them homeless, and, in all likelihood would have also resulted in 
the wholesale destruction of their possessions. Although these consequences may be 
far from the ideal, they do indicate concrete impacts on lived experience. 
The impacts of legal mobilization for social rights on how citizens live also 
take on a symbolic character. Symbolic changes include an impact on how individual 
claimants, potential claimants, and the broader public understand an issue, specifically 
whether or not it is a legal or a rights issue. As the empirical chapters of this 
                                                 
346 The critique here is also not that the justices involved in these cases did not attend to these life and 
death considerations – no one could read either decision and walk away with that conclusion.  
347 Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement SA and Another v Premier of the Province of Kwazulu-Natal and 
Others (2009). 
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dissertation have demonstrated, recurring legal mobilization for particular social rights 
can result in the development of the understanding that certain issues are legally 
grievable, especially when judges decide these cases positively. In other words, over 
time, legal mobilization can encourage the translation of everyday difficulties into 
legal grievances and state obligations. This translation of issues into explicitly legal 
problems can occur among actors not affiliated with the legal system as well. For 
instance, Rodríguez-Garavito (2011: 1681) conducted an analysis of news coverage in 
Colombia, and found that before a major Constitutional Court decision regarding the 
right to health, about 60% of articles framed the problems in the healthcare sphere as 
related to “institutional crisis,” whereas after the court case, 72% of articles instead 
referred these problems as “in terms of the right to health.” These changing frames 
reflect underlying changes in how actors understand rights, the law, and the state. 
Additionally, legal mobilization for social rights can influence how judges 
view claimants, as well as how the parties in a dispute interact with one another. In an 
interview, a South African lawyer with years of experience litigating housing rights 
cases described a shift in the way that judges engaged with her clients over the course 
of her career: 
When we started, the way in which courts inferably referred to our clients was 
“building hijackers,” “criminals,” “the lowest of the low.” Through putting the 
personal circumstances of occupiers before the courts, time after time after time, 
that narrative has changed. Courts, now when you get up and you talk about 
unlawful occupiers in the city of Johannesburg, don’t see “building hijackers,” 
“criminals,” you know. [Instead] they see poor people who have nowhere else 
to live, and if they do not live [in the occupied buildings] they will not be able 
to work. So that narrative has changed, and I think that’s probably one of our 
biggest victories.348 
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As Chapter 7 shows, these rhetorical changes may also reflect changes in the way that 
judges analyze and decide cases, which may then have concrete material effects on 
litigants as well. Another example from South Africa demonstrates the symbolic 
impact that legal mobilization for social rights can have on the two parties to a dispute. 
As detailed in Chapter 7, the idea behind meaningful engagement was to give  
… voice, direct voice, to the poor. The poor are not just an anonymous mass 
out there to be protected by the judiciary. The poor become participants in 
deciding on their own fate … They become people with names, with the 
history, with biographies, with particular interests … At the same time, it 
compels the authorities to humanize the processes… to take account of the 
impact of the measures on the poor. And it’s the process, I think, [that] has 
been very educative for many bureaucrats, and it humanizes what otherwise 
could be a very cold abstract form of judicial intervention.349 
 
 In other words, by requiring that the two parties interact with each other outside of the 
courtroom before a case proceeds, the goal was to encourage the recognition of the 
mutual humanity underlying these legal disputes. Relatedly, in describing Abahlali 
baseMjondolo’s legal victory against the Slums Act, one member of Abahlali said, 
“For us it was a great victory for us and we were very happy and we [still] are – 
because we were clear that it is the place that we know that we can be respected and 
we can be recognized.” He continued, saying that the legal victory made it clear that, 
at least at the Constitutional Court, no one was above the law.350 Thus, the symbolic 
effects of legal mobilization for social rights complement the material consequences. 
Additionally, it is important to remember that oftentimes those who live 
through a rights violation have different expectations about legal mobilization than 
scholars and litigators. One South African lawyer at a prominent NGO described 
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several particularly illuminating instances in which her expectations and 
understandings of social rights cases diverged from that of her clients:351   
Sometimes we lose cases or sometimes we don’t win the way we wanted to 
and it’s still successful. We’ve recently represented a community in the 
Western Cape who were working 21 hours a day for 400 Rand a week … Then 
what happened is they joined a union, and everybody who joined the union got 
dismissed, of course. So we represented them, and what we wanted was two 
years’ salary, which was the maximum the legislation allowed for … 
Everything went wrong everywhere. Eventually, we get to court, and the 
employer that dismissed people was in the witness box. Third question, he 
asked for a postponement, and we were approached with a settlement offer. 
The settlement offer was a year’s salary. 
 
The clients said … “half of the money now is worth much more than all of it 
later.” So we settled. And I can tell you, the whole legal team, we’d been 
carrying this case in our hearts. You know? What a loss! Like, of course, I 
must do what the client says. There’s no – this only works, this only has value 
if we do what they say but it didn’t sit well in my heart. 
 
Later on, the community called up this lawyer and asked to meet again. 
 
They said, “Can you come and help us? There are these cases we want to do 
also.” … And the community said to me [the original case] was incredibly 
successful because they did this and they did that. They’re mentioning all of 
the things they did with the money. They said the biggest thing is the idea that 
the employer has to go stand on the witness box and explain why he’s 
dismissed people … The fact that we got this order against this employer 
spread like wildfire. Union membership went up exponentially. Litigation 
against employers sky rocketed. People who were before willing to accept 
certain types of treatment, there’s been an increase in the amount of eviction 
cases being opposed [since then], because the tenure rights is often linked to 
the job rights. So aside from the money, there was a new sense that people can 
be held to account in the litigation setting.  
 
What this legal team viewed as a loss, the community viewed as a win, and there were 
rippling effects of the legal process that impacted broader social and economic 
relations within the community. The lawyer described another case to me, this time 
one with a favorable outcome: 
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There’s this other community … They live in an area where, again, [there has 
been] no upgrading [to the informal settlement]. Nothing’s happened. They’ve 
been told since ’94 they will be upgraded. They’ve never been upgraded. And 
we go to court and we argue for the upgrading of the informal settlement. It’s 
never been done. You’ve never been able to go to court – I mean, you’ve been 
here, you know how many people live in informal settlements – to be able to 
tell government through the court, “You must give people water, electricity, 
and roads.” Unheard of! I mean, when the people came to us, they told us – 
you know, everybody had told them, “You can’t argue this case.” And we won 
the case. Look, to say we were happy! We were celebrating!  
 
So the community invited us to come and tell them about [how] the case [had 
gone]. But we were number three of five things they discussed that day in the 
community. We weren’t even number one. They were like, “We have managed 
to get a social, a mobile clinic that comes in once a week. We’ve spoken to the 
mayor about this. We’ve also won this case. We created the following 
educational spaces, and we’ve created a program to keep kids off the street 
through basketball.” 
 
Here, we see that while legal decisions have serious consequences, much of the time, 
court cases are not the only important thing going on in peoples’ lives. Often, people 
mobilize in more than one way at a time, and they use forums and languages 
deliberately (Lovell 2012). Further, as demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6 of this 
dissertation, the turn to law does not necessarily reflect buy-in about the legitimacy or 
utility of law.  
Now, I want to return to the individuals whose stories I shared in the 
introduction to this dissertation. In the case of Doña Beatriz, although the judge found 
that her right to health had been violated, his decision offered her access to creams and 
other products, not the night nurse she had requested. She concluded that she had to 
learn how to improvise to deal with her health problem. Even so, she told me that if 
presented with another problem in the future, she would file another tutela claim.352 
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Sifiso and Patrick similarly indicated ambivalence about the turn to law.353 As Patrick 
put it, “I was still young in 1994, but … our parents and our grandparents, they fought 
for us. They fought for us for freedom, but … still we got no work. You are forced to 
live in the shack. When you start to speak out, you are a threat. You must be killed.” 
While legal claims-making may result in important victories, it does not necessarily 
resolve all the problems that Abahlali members face, and, in fact, it may create new 
problems, such as the risk of violent retribution from actors opposed to the movement. 
Sifiso noted that Abahlali has always considered legal claims-making as a form of 
mobilization that should come only after other avenues have been exhausted, because 
“by just waking up in the morning taking the issue to court, you take away the power 
of the people. You’re taking away the ideas and the thinking of the people. Let them 
get involved first in whatever way.” The case of Irene Grootboom sheds additional 
light on the tensions that are part of legal-claims-making. Although she won her legal 
case, and although that case set an important precedent, and although that case is 
talked about in human rights law courses the world over, she died eight years after the 
ruling, still living in a shack. Thus, there are myriad symbolic and material 
consequences for claimants who make the choice to engage in legal mobilization. 
2. The Consequences of Legal Mobilization for the State 
The impact of legal mobilization on the state takes on multiple forms. For one, 
legal mobilization for social rights has had significant impact on public policy – or 
public policy-making – in both of the countries examined in this project. These 
impacts on policy can be understood in terms of direct or indirect materials 
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consequences in Rodríguez-Garavito’s terms. Additionally, however, legal 
mobilization impacts the state through the workload it creates for judges and its effect 
on the way judges understand their role as state officials. These impacts are both 
material and symbolic in nature. Finally, the act of legal mobilization for social rights 
signals a shift in state-society relations. This shift is yet another consequence of legal 
mobilization for the state. 
Looking first to Colombia, in a study of the impact of the judicial protection of 
the right to health, Rodrigo Uprimny and Juanita Durán (2014: 39) find that tutela 
claims regarding the right to health is “inefficient and inequitable, because it distracts 
public resources that could satisfy other priorities.” Further, they show that those who 
have benefitted most from health rights litigation have been members of middle and 
upper classes. Uprimny and Durán refer to a study by Emmanuel Nieto and Alejandro 
Arango (2011) of healthcare litigation in Medellín, which found that for every $100 in 
services denied by the healthcare provider, “the Medellín judicial system spent around 
$48 on [the] legal process.” More than half the time, the cost of the legal process 
exceeded the that of the healthcare service in question. While these numbers are 
staggering – and while they do undoubtedly reflect an inefficient and inequitable 
system – we should be careful when assessing what would have happened absent the 
tutela procedure. Money currently being spent on tutela claims would not necessarily 
otherwise go toward addressing public health issues or toward those in the most need. 
Still, the filing of legal claims has become a routine part of access to healthcare 
services in Colombia; in effect, some of the time, the recurrent filing of tutela claims 
replaces healthcare policy.  
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At other times, however, the judicialization of health has resulted in direct 
efforts by the Constitutional Court to influence healthcare policy. The clearest 
example of this is the structural decision T-760/08. The Constitutional Court decided 
22 separate tutelas together and in the process mandated significant changes to the 
overarching healthcare policy structure. The decision called for a restructuring of the 
benefits plan that outlined which medicines and services had to be covered by the 
entidades promotoras de salud (which are akin to insurance companies), regulated 
transfers of administrative costs to patients, and solidified the freedom to choose 
among healthcare providers. In addition, the decision called for the adoption of 
deliberate measures to realize universal coverage. The Constitutional Court has 
required concrete changes to the healthcare system in other cases as well.354 Because 
legal mobilization has congregated around the right to health, its impact is most clear 
in the realm of healthcare policy, but judicial decisions have also effected the 
implementation of education, social security, and – to a lesser extent – housing policy. 
In South Africa, legal mobilization has similarly impacted social policy. As 
Carol Steinberg, who specializes in constitutional law, concludes: 
there can be no debate about whether the Courts must engage with 
Government policymaking or not. I think the Constitution obliges the Courts to 
do so. If Government comes up with a policy scheme that’s challenged, the 
Courts are obliged to evaluate that scheme against the Constitution. So I don’t 
think that it’s open to anybody to say that policy falls outside of the domain of 
the courts. That’s for me the starting point. The question really is how the 
Courts engage with policy issues.355 
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The Grootboom case in particular set into motion significant changes to housing 
policy and the standard used in Grootboom – reasonableness – would come to define 
South African social rights jurisprudence. The case specifically “led to [the 
development of a] new program, the 2003 Housing Assistance in Emergency 
Situations, [which was] incorporated into Chapter 12 of the National Housing Code in 
2004” (Williams 2014: 823). This program represented a new emergency housing 
policy and a new policy for the upgrading of informal settlements. Subsequent housing 
rights cases expanded on the standard set in Grootboom, as detailed in Chapters 7 and 
8. These expansions in the meaning of the right to housing included the requirement of 
meaningful engagement and the provision of alternative accommodation in evictions.  
Although relatively few health rights cases have come before the South 
African courts (at least compared to housing rights cases), these cases have still 
impacted healthcare policy. As noted above, the Treatment Action Campaign case 
yielded direct changes to public policy – namely, the nationwide roll out of nevirapine 
rather than a limited one. Lisa Forman (2005: 719) notes that “the decision not only 
directly ensured the implementation of a national MTCT [mother-to-child 
transmission] plan but also added critical mass to public pressure on government to 
initiate a national ARV treatment plan, which it announced over a year later.” Here, 
we see both direct and indirect material effects of legal mobilization for the right to 
health in the realm of public policy. Legal mobilization has also influenced policy 
regarding education (e.g., through the development of norms and standards for school 
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infrastructure)356 and social welfare (e.g., through changes to the administration of 
social grants).357 
Legal mobilization for social rights has also impacted the state through its 
effects on judges and the practice of judging. Although judges are meant to be neutral 
arbiters in disputes, they are formally state officials, and therefore impacts on judges 
are also impacts on the state. As shown in Chapters 7 and 8, the ways in which judges 
understood issued related to access to social welfare goods changed over time, with 
judges in Colombia coming to view the right to health as justiciable in itself (and as 
integral to human dignity) and judges in South Africa coming to view the right to 
housing as particularly important (and connected to both human dignity and the legacy 
of apartheid). In other words, judicial receptivity changed over time and thus so did 
judicial behavior.  
Beyond these changes in how judges understood what they were doing (and 
what they ought to be doing), legal mobilization for social rights has impacted the 
workload of judges. This is most evident in Colombia, where all judges must hear 
tutela claims, and they must prioritize tutela claims over their other workload, though 
certainly in South Africa, too, legal mobilization for social rights has required judges 
to consider new kinds of legal questions that simply did not come before the courts 
prior to the introduction of social constitutionalism into the country. I turn now to my 
interviews with lower courts judges in Medellín and Cali for additional perspective on 
how judges outside the Colombia Constitutional Court – ones who are tasked with the 
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initial tutela decision-making – see the effects of the tutela. Importantly, these views 
do not necessarily reflect the modal understanding of the tutela procedure among 
lower courts judges, but they do offer insight into some of the challenges posed by the 
tutela procedure for judges. 
One judge commented that one of the most difficult parts of the job was “the 
drama of the tutela and incidentes de desacato [contempt orders], which do not stop 
being dramatic – that a person needs a health service and they are denied it.”358 He 
was alluding to the fact that oftentimes, one tutela order is not enough to ensure 
compliance, even though the medicine or procedure sought might be time-sensitive. 
Instead, the claimant must seek a contempt order in the hopes that the second order or 
a more severe penalty will prompt compliance. Not only does this affect the claimant, 
but it also increases the workload of the judges involved. Another lower court judge 
noted that this workload can become quite burdensome, especially considering the 
need to keep up with changing jurisprudence across rights issues and the quick 
turnaround time required for tutela decisions (10 days in the first instance, and 20 in 
the second): “If I am a day late, I am punished. I can be suspended from office for a 
month, two months, a year, depending on how serious was the error” in terms of the 
judgment or in terms the delay.359 This burden in turn can have negative effects for 
claimants. As one judge put it: 
Not all judges are experts in constitutional law … Through the tutela action we 
can get involved in all the processes that involve fundamental rights. A 
criminal law judge like me, who knows and has specialized in criminal law, 
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who works every day in criminal law, may be forced to resolve a matter of 
labor law, civil law, social security, administrative law.360 
 
Similarly, another judge noted that this lack of expertise 
… is something that costs people, and the cost is sometimes very serious. I am 
not necessarily an expert in health, right? So I think that there should be 
specialized judges in tutelage but since there are not, and we cannot deny 
justice, we have to learn [on the job] … There are areas in which you are more 
comfortable, in my case, for example, criminal law. I prefer to go to those 
hearings all day than to decide tutela claims, because there I feel like a fish in 
the water. When deciding tutelas, not so much, but because I have to do it, 
because it is part of my job, I do it.361 
 
Yet another judge concluded that in order to be a good judge of the tutela, you must be 
something of an autodidact “because the tutela actions are so unpredictable, and they 
require your immediate attention. You do not know what will happen to you, and you 
do not know what [kinds of requests] people are going to present to you.”362 
Overall, then, the tutela presented new challenges to judges as they sought to 
carry out their duties. The timing of tutela decisions as well as the subject matter 
pushed judges to do not only more work than they had previously but also to engage in 
different legal topics, topics that some of the time might be outside their expertise. To 
sum up his views on the effects of the tutela procedure, one judge referenced the 
phrase made famous by the poet Guillermo Valencia during Rafael Uribe Uribe’s 
funeral, “blessed be democracy, even though it may kill us,” suggesting “blessed be 
the tutela, even though it may kill us.”363 Typically, interviewees – both those working 
at the Constitutional Court and those working elsewhere in the legal system – 
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evaluated the tutela positively, pointing to the immense advances in access to justice 
brought about by the mechanism, though many also recommended revisions to way 
that tutelas are processed in the hopes of reducing congestion in the legal system.364 
And, as one judge put it, “today I think that no Colombian imagines life without the 
tutela. It’s that simple. It would be hard to imagine what Colombian society would be 
like without this mechanism.”365  
Finally, legal mobilization for social rights influences state-society relations, as 
citizens engage new forums for claims-making. Rather than relying only on electoral 
pressures or local brokers to expand social incorporation, Colombians and South 
Africans can make claims to social welfare goods through the courts. In making those 
claims, they are enacting social citizenship through the law, asserting the right to have 
access to social welfare goods not because of particularistic ties, but because of shared 
belongingness to both a national community and the human community. Contestation 
around social welfare goods in these contexts signal not only an inequitable allocation 
of resources, but, importantly, the failure of the government to live up to its legal 
obligations. The following section engages more deeply with the question of the 
impact of legal mobilization for social rights on social change and social 
incorporation. 
3. Law, Social Change, and Social Incorporation 
As Sandra Liebenberg (2001: 233) holds, “the ultimate test of giving 
constitutional recognition to these [social] rights is whether they result in real 
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improvements in the quality of life of all.” In other words, if we are to judge whether 
or not social constitutionalism has “worked,” we must look to the cumulative effects 
of the turn to law for social change and social incorporation. A challenge inherent to 
this analysis is the ability to isolate the impact of particular cases on broader social 
outcomes. In the discussions of the impacts of legal mobilization for social rights 
above, I have drawn links between both favorable and unfavorable judicial decisions 
and material and symbolic effects on claimants and the state. Importantly, though, 
favorable judicial decisions can have very different effects. As described above, 
favorable decisions can result in material or symbolic improvements to daily life, and, 
over time, these improvements – if they expand through changes to public policy or as 
more and more citizens advance legal claims – can have transformative effects. 
However, favorable decisions may falter if implementation does not follow or if these 
decisions are artificially narrow in scope. 
As has long been noted, courts lack the power to implement or enforce their 
own decisions. Examples from both Colombia and South Africa indicate that 
compliance remains a difficult problem. In Colombia, one judge estimated that 
“almost 80 or 90%” of health tutelas are decided in favor of the claimant, but that does 
not mean that the insurance companies will comply those favorable tutela orders or 
even the contempt orders that follow. Instead, “the judge accumulates 20, 30, 50, 100 
contempt orders.”366 This assessment was borne out in the experience of residents of 
the marginal community of Aguablanca.367 One explained, 
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I have a relative who is very sick. I had to file tutela actions that said the health 
clinic would not do the [necessary] surgery or give the [necessary] medication. 
Sometimes they comply, and they attend to the patient. Many times, no … [In 
these situations,] you have to get an order of contempt or file another tutela or 
go to the media. The tutela is not enough.368 
 
Another woman from Aguablanca noted that a further problem beyond compliance 
with tutela orders related to the right to health is that, depending on where you are, the 
pharmacies near you may not have – and may not be willing or able to obtain – the 
medications you need.369 
 Likewise, compliance with and implementation of judicial decisions does not 
always occur in South Africa. Take, for example, the case Nokotyana & Others v 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality & Others (2009). Residents of an informal 
settlement called Harry Gwala brought a complaint against the municipality, seeking 
access to basic services, including sanitation services, toilet, potable water, and trash 
removal. The Constitutional Court issued a decision that required the municipality to 
implement the existing National Housing Code. In effect, the Court urged the 
municipality to determine whether to relocate residents of Harry Gwala or to provide 
for in situ upgrading of the settlement. By 2015, the municipality still had not issued a 
decision, and the community remained without access to basic services.370  
Yet another possibility is that favorable decisions have circumscribed effects. 
This may occur if there is limited access to the courts or if decisions are narrow in 
scope and do not address the root causes of the problem in question. Where few 
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people can access the courts or when only certain kinds of people can access the 
courts, it becomes more likely that the cases that judges hear reflect not the problems 
that most people face. Instead, these cases will be more likely to feature a certain kind 
of claimant – one that likely to be perceived sympathetically or one that has access to 
more resources, whether knowledge-based or financial. Jackie Dugard (2015) 
demonstrates that the South African Constitutional Court’s hesitance to accept direct 
access petitions has had precisely this effect. Remedies, logically, will be oriented 
toward the needs of the claimants who come before the courts, so if the claimants who 
come before the courts are not those in the most need (or representative of those most 
in need), then even rights-expansive decisions will have a limited overall impact. 
Unlike in South Africa, there are relatively few formal barriers to legal claims-
making in Colombia, thanks to the design of the tutela procedure. In order to file a 
tutela claim, you must know what the tutela is and you must be able to wait in line, but 
you do not need the services of a lawyer. Further the claim will be decided in a matter 
of days, not years. The expansion of claims-making possibilities in Colombia, then, 
may appear to be an important move toward greater democratic participation – and 
considering the state of Colombian politics throughout the 20th century (and before), 
that conclusion seems quite defensible371 – but the fact that claims-making now 
follows a market logic also provides reason for concern. As Alejandro Gaviria (2010) 
has argued, “paradoxically, the Colombian estado social de derecho created the 
conditions for the development of the worst type of opportunistic capitalism” and has 
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led to what he views as “the excessive judicialization of private life.” Thus, the focus 
is not necessarily on those in the most need, but those best situated to take advantage 
of the new configuration of institutions and opportunities, and as Chapter 8 described, 
at least some of the time pharmaceutical and insurance companies have been able to 
manipulate this new configuration for their own gain. By comparing the Colombian 
approach of open access to the court with the more restricted South African approach, 
we see that neither one necessarily is better suited to ensuring that the rights of those 
most in need are protected.   
The impact of favorable decisions may also be limited due to the scope of the 
decision itself. This difficulty is evident in the Nokotyana case described earlier. 
Similarly, Abahlali baseMjondolo’s challenge to the Slums Act resulted in a favorable 
decision in that the Court struck down the Act. Yet, the decision indicated that those 
living in shacks in KwaZulu-Natal could continue to live in those shacks – or, more 
precisely, that the government could not evict shack dwellers without a coherent plan 
for the provision of alternative accommodation. This decision, although technically 
favorable, did not spur material changes to the daily lives of those affected. One 
member of Abahlali reflected on this situation: 
… the Constitutional Court declared the Slums Act invalid and 
unconstitutional … Justice was done. But also … the lesson out of that is that 
you can win in court but still fail in reality. Now, the question is what’s the 
point of winning in court [if] in reality there is no difference?372 
 
As noted above, the same could be asked with respect to Irene Grootboom’s turn to 
the legal claims-making. The decisions in these case did not necessarily have tangible 
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effects on the lives of the claimants involved; there was no advance in social 
incorporation, at least not for these claimants. On the other hand, these decisions 
perhaps stymied the further marginalization of Grootboom and the shack-dwellers of 
the greater Durban area. Thinking back to Doña Beatriz’s experience with her tutela 
claim, there is also the possibility of that the remedy offered by the judge will be 
disconnected from the needs of the claimant. 
 So what does all of this mean for social incorporation? As noted in the 
introduction to this dissertation, access to social welfare goods in developing countries 
has typically been determined by patron-client ties, membership in organized sectors 
of the formal economy, or one’s ability to buy these goods on the market. More 
recently, factors such as electoral competition, shifting preferences of employers, and 
the strength of the political Left have prompted social welfare expansion in different 
contexts. The existence of justiciable social rights provides another avenue for access 
to social welfare goods and the extension of social incorporation, at least in theory.  
This study of legal mobilization for social rights in Colombia and South Africa 
has shown that not only did the idea of socially responsive law come to the fore in the 
early- to mid-1990s, but it was also embedded institutionally in the decade(s) that 
followed. Newly empowered actors took steps to ensure that social constitutionalism – 
and their role in social constitutionalism – would endure. In both countries, legal 
claims-making has prompted changes to social policy and social welfare. Citizens 
have engaged the state through the courts, advancing legal claims that have resulted in 
tangible changes to social policy – in effect enacting what Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 
(2000) call “societal accountability.” Concretely, these policy changes include the 
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creation of emergency housing policy in South Africa, which has protected thousands 
of people facing dire housing situations, and substantial revisions to healthcare policy 
in Colombia, including a revamp of the dual health system – specifically an 
equalization of the contributive and subsidized systems. Yet, these changes have done 
little by way of addressing the underlying causes of poverty and inequality.  
While more systematic study is needed, what the Colombian and South 
African experiences have shown is that legal mobilization for social rights might be 
best described as having a limited and partial, though important, impact on social 
incorporation. The goal of ensuring that each and every Colombian and South African 
is able to live a life of dignity remains unmet, but the legal recognition of social rights 
in both countries has empowered citizens to claim access to the goods and services 
necessary for a good life, including health, housing, education, and social security. As 
a result of these claims – in other words, as a result of these efforts to create a new 
sense of obligation – social incorporation has expanded on a case-by-case and issue-
by-issue manner, allowing some people improved access to certain social goods or 
protections, advances that should not be overlooked. 
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